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Abstract 
Absence, grievance, injury reporting, voluntary turnover and adverse events are 
mechanisms of voice that may be used by dissatisfied employees to voice their 
discontent. Of interest is whether the use of such mechanisms of voice is more prevalent 
during volatile periods of collective bargaining. This research study examined the use of 
these mechanisms of voice during periods of collective bargaining, for three unions who 
represent employees ofthe Eastern Health organization, St. John's region. Once 
approvals were reached, Eastern Health human resources data sets were obtained. 
Collective bargaining information was gathered from the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Health Boards Association, for each ofthe unions under study, and time frames were 
created representing the start and end dates for each collective bargaining event, unique 
to the collective bargaining cycles of each union. Counts of events were gathered 
utilizing these time frames. Descriptive analysis was performed to assess the rates of 
each mechanism of voice. Negative binomial regression analysis was performed to 
identify whether a significant relationship between the outcomes of interest and collective 
bargaining, could be identified. Results of the analysis were mixed, with some clear 
indications of statistical significance identified, indicating that there are times when 
certain voice mechanisms are utilized during particular collective bargaining events. 
Key Words: Employee Voice, Mechanisms of Voice, Absenteei m, Grievance, Injury Reporting, 
Voluntary Turnover, Adverse Events, Collective Bargaining, Labor Relation , Industrial 
Relations, Employee Dissatisfaction. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Workplace and Voice 
The relationship between an employer and the union representing the interests of 
employees is extremely important to organizational culture, and can be highly influential 
upon the employees working within the organization (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon 
& Brown, 2008). This relationship, or the labour relations climate, has been studied 
extensively; the workplace has been a source of interest and an area of study since before 
the 1960's (Becker, 1960; Hebdon & Brown; Zangaro, 2001). 
Of interest in this current study, is whether the labour climate is sufficiently 
influential to encourage the use of employee voice, that is to create reason for employees 
to desire filing official complaints, reporting injuries, missing work, quitting their posts, 
and furthermore reducing the quality of overall work performance. The process of 
examining employee behaviors of grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary 
turnover, and performance quality can be very enlightening and may help shed light upon 
the current internal stability within the organization (Gifford, Zammuto, Goodman, & 
Hill, 2002; Krueger, Brazil, Lohfeld, Edward, Lewis, & Tjam, 2002; Lum, Kervin, Clark, 
Reid & Sirola, 1998). 
Grievance filing, injury reporting, absenteeism and voluntary turnover are costly, 
both financially and interpersonally, to any organization, and being aware of the degree 
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of their use is essential to maintaining a healthy, well-functioning and efficient workplace 
(Becker, 1960; Bennett, 2002; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002; 
Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid, & Sirola, 1998; McHugh, 2001 ; McNeese-Smith and Crook, 
2003; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black, & Heaton, 1995; Upenieks, 2003 ; Zboril-Benson, 
2000). To some degree, these behaviors will always occur; however, it is important to 
understand that their impact goes beyond the workplace, as they may indicate that an 
organization is not functioning at an optimal level, with employees who are showing 
lower levels of performance in their jobs, and are utilizing behaviors as mechanisms of 
voice (Becker; Bennett; Buchan & Seccombe; Dunn & Wilkinson; Lum, Kervin, Clark, 
Reid, & Sirola; McHugh; McNeese-Smith and Crook; National Steering Committee, 
2002; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black, & Heaton; Upenieks; Zboril-Benson). 
Another way employee performance can be measured is to analyze rates of errors that 
are made within an organization, which may be a way to gauge performance quality 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gittell, Von Nordenflycht & Kochan, 2004; Katz, Kochan & 
Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & Mas, 2004; Mas, 2008; 
Mas 2006). Adverse events are errors or "close calls" that occur in the workplace, and in 
the current study refers to those made within the health care sector (The Canadian Patient 
Safety Dictionary, 2003). They may be related to a multitude of causal factors associated 
with the care of patients such as: medication errors, injuries to patients, and procedural 
errors, amongst others; these errors range from minor to major in scope (The Canadian 
Patient Safety Dictionary; The National Steering Committee on Patient Safety, 2002). 
They may be the result of workplace issues, bringing forward the concept that unhappy or 
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unsatisfied employees care less about the level of effort they put into performing specific 
job tasks, thereby consciously or unconsciously reducing the overall quality of 
workmanship (Freeman & Medoff; Gittell, Von Nordenflycht & Kochan; Katz, Kochan 
& Gobeille; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski; Krueger & Mas; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006). 
Moreover, identifying areas that have higher levels of these behaviors could assist the 
orgaruzation in adopting a proactive approach, whereby potential or actual issues could 
be identified rapidly, enabling the organization to provide interventions, long before they 
become problematic. Orgaruzations that encourage a satisfying workplace will motivate 
employees to become active participants who are stakeholders, rather than individuals 
with no concrete affection, who may rely upon negative worker behaviors to show their 
discontent (Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991 ; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Issa, & Koblegard, 2005; 
Havlovic, 1991; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Kuokkanen, 
Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003; Lewin & Peterson, 1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & 
Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; McNeese-Smith & 
Nazarey, 2001 ; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian & Almost, 2001 ; Steltzer, 2001 ; 
Upenieks, 2003; Zangaro, 2001). 
Demands placed on employees may influence how well motivated and satisfied they 
become with their orgaruzation, which in turn, may encourage the expression of 
employee voice (Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991 ; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Issa & Koblegard, 2005; 
Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Havlovic, 1991 ; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Ingersoll, Olsan, 
Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003 ; 
Lewin & Peterson, 1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; 
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McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003 ; McNeese-Smith & Nazarey, 2001 ; Spence-Laschinger, 
Finegan, Shamian & Almost, 2001; Steltzer, 2001; Strahan, Watson & Lennon, 2008; 
Upenieks, 2003; Zangaro, 2001). Compounding this issue are other serious events that 
impact the level of job stress felt by healthcare employees, including: the current climate 
of cost control, downsizing, reorganization, the increasing use of casual employment, 
mandatory overtime, inability to utilize annual leave banks and heavy workload (Cappelli 
& Chaurin; Cohen; Cox, Issa & Koblegard; Havlovic; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, 
DeVinney & Davies; Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto; Lewin & Peterson; Lum, 
Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola; Manion; McNeese-Smith & Crook; McNeese-Smith & 
Nazarey; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian & Almost; Steltzer; Strahan, Watson & 
Lennon; Upenieks; Zangaro). While these issues can effect each employee differently, 
they have the power to add to their personal burdens, as well as impact overall job 
security, which may result in utilization of employee voice (Cappelli & Chaurin; Cohen; 
Cox, Issa & Koblegard; Havlovic; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies; 
Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto; Lewin & Peterson; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & 
Sirola; Manion; McNeese-Smith & Crook; McNeese-Smith & Nazarey; 
Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian & Almost; Steltzer; Strahan, Watson & Lennon; 
Upenieks; Zangaro ). 
1.2 Industrial Relations 
An important aspect of organizational culture is the concept of industrial relations, 
which is well represented in the literature. In essence, industrial relations examines the 
relationship between employers and employees with particular emphasis on unionization, 
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thus this field examines how well the employer and unions coexist together during both 
good times and bad (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon & Brown, 2008). Difficult 
periods in their relationship may influence employees to create a rocky workplace, with 
increased usage of missed days from work, filing complaints, job quits and performance 
issues specifically related to injury reporting and level of quality (Becker, 1960; Bennett, 
2002; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Clark, 1980; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002; Fitzpatrick, 
2001; Katz, Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard, & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & 
Mas, 2004; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; 
McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; Steltzer, 2001 ; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & 
Heaton, 1995; Upenieks, 2003; Zboril-Benson, 2000). 
This study will examine the levels of grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, 
voluntary turnover, and adverse events behaviors within Eastern Health, a health care 
organization located in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Eastern Health is the largest integrated health care organization in Atlantic 
Canada ... formed on April 1, 2005 from the merger of seven health 
organizations ... the new organization extends from the St. 1 ohn ' s region west to Port 
Blanford, including all communities on the Avalon, Burin and Bonavista Peninsulas 
(Eastern Health, 2008, About/Quick Facts section,~ 1-3). 
In particular, this study will examine the rates of these behaviors occurring in the St. 
John' s region of Eastern Health, specifically involving the acute care portion ofhealth 
services within the metro area. 
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Considering the expansive distance of Eastern Health's employment zones, coupled 
with the fact that it is the only health care organization on the east coast of the province, 
it is clear that a unique situation occurs for employees within this organization. The 
concern is that once employees are at the point where they are dissatisfied, they are 
unable to leave the organization to find other work, as there are no other major acute care 
organizations to find employment with (Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991 ; Cohen, 1993; Cox, 
Issa, and Koblegard, 2005; Hanrmer & Avgar, 2005; Havlovic, 1991 ; Ingersoll, Olsan, 
Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003; 
Lewin & Peterson, 1999; Lurn, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; 
McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; McNeese-Smith & Nazarey, 2001; Mitchell, Holtom, 
Lee, Sablynski & Erez, 2001; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Sharnian & Almost, 2001 ; 
Steltzer, 2001; Upenieks, 2003; Zangaro, 2001 ). What happens to these employees? 
They are met with a massive dilemma: do they stay and become even more dissatisfied, 
or risk it all and quit the organization for other opportunities outside of St. John' s or the 
province? If desperate enough, they must move away from a familiar home environment 
and start anew. For many, the idea of moving is a daunting prospect, and in some cases 
impossible to consider. For these individuals, the risk ofleaving outweighs the 
unhappiness of staying (Hanrmer & Avgar). It is possible that they will stay within the 
organization, all the while feeling ever more desperate for change, but with nowhere else 
to tum. This may be a time when voice mechanisms are utilized within the organization. 
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1.3 Union Groups 
Within Eastern Health, St. John's region, there are different unions, each with its own 
unique interests and representing a variety of employee groups who are employed in 
different areas within the organization. These unions represent employees with a diverse 
level of skill sets, education levels, professional responsibility/accountability, seniority, 
pay and experience. The unions include: the Association of Allied Health Professionals 
(AAHP), the Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees 
(NAPE), and the Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses Union (NLNU). While these 
unions represent different employees, their ultimate function is the same: to use their 
collective power as a source of voice, representing the interests oftheir members, 
ultimately concerned with work conditions, as negotiated with the employer (Hebdon & 
Brown, 2008). 
1.4 Collective Bargaining Cycle 
The collective bargaining cycle is a period of time where unions become involved in 
the process of contract negotiation with the employer (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon 
& Brown, 2008). Included in this time period are a variety of events that enable the 
process to evolve to the point where a contract is signed. These events include: meetings, 
negotiation, conciliation (an event whereby an outside expert acts as an intermediary to 
assist with overcoming an impasse in the negotiation process, with the hopes of 
influencing reconciliation between the parties), collective bargaining expiry date and 
signed date, strike vote, and strike activity, among others (Appendix I ; Newfoundland 
and Labrador Health Boards Association, 2007; Hebdon & Brown). Since this period can 
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be a highly charged time for employers and union groups, it is interesting to consider the 
overall effects that this process has upon employees, in particular the mechanisms of 
voice that are used in response (Freeman & Medoff; Hebdon & Brown). Collective 
bargaining events should be viewed over periods of time so as to see the true cycle effects 
taking place. 
Each of the unions under study have different bargaining times for contract 
negotiation, and go through an evolving process to formulate an agreement and reach a 
final contract deal (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). The negotiation phase takes varying 
amounts of time, and may be considered successful or unsuccessful at the end of the 
process, by union members through a voting process, known as a ratification vote 
(Hebdon & Brown). 
Understanding the influence that the collective bargaining process has on employees 
is a critical step in appreciating the weight that unions have with their members, and the 
degree of industrial conflict that occurs as a result of the collective bargaining process 
(Clark, 1980; Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Steltzer, 2001). The 
over-arching theme of this study is to examine whether union culture provides indirect 
influence on members, which is outwardly portrayed by the use of the behaviors under 
study: absence, grievance, injury reporting, voluntary turnover, as well as decreased 
quality of performance. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
Employee behaviors, including grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary 
turnover and adverse events continue to challenge organizations (Becker, 1960; Bennett, 
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2002; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Clark, 1980; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002; Fitzpatrick, 
2001; Katz, Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard, & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & 
Mas, 2004; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; 
McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; Steltzer, 2001; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & 
Heaton, 1995; Upenieks, 2003; Zboril-Benson, 2000). Discovering whether or not these 
behaviors are influenced by collective bargaining is critical to any organization. For a 
unionized environment, high levels of employee behaviors occurring around times of 
union involvement, such as during collective bargaining time, may highlight the level of 
influence that union representation has upon employees, manifested through the use of 
employee mechanisms of voice (Becker; Bennett; Buchan & Seccombe; Cappelli & 
Chaurin, 1991; Clark; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Issa & Koblegard, 2005; Dunn & Wilkinson; 
Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Havlovic, 1991 ; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Ingersoll, Olsan, 
Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Katz, Kochan, & Gobeille; Kleiner, Leonard, & 
Pilarski; Krueger & Mas; Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003; Lewin & Peterson, 
1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola; Manion, 2004; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; 
McNeese-Smith & Crook; McNeese-Smith & Nazarey, 2001; Spence-Laschinger, 
Finegan, Shamian & Almost, 2001 ; Steltzer, 2001 ; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & 
Heaton; Upenieks; Zangara, 2001 ; Zboril-Benson). Finding ways to improve the 
industrial relations climate, and reduce the use of these costly employee behaviors is 
extremely important to the organization as a whole, as well as to employee groups and 
their respective unions alike. 
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1.6 Specific Aim 
This study was designed to quantitatively examine and evaluate the behaviors of 
grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary turnover, and adverse event 
occurrences and their relationship to the collective bargaining process. Utilizing Eastern 
Health, St. John's region, secondary administrative data sets, and detailed collective 
bargaining information from the Newfoundland and Labrador Health Boards Association 
(NLHBA), will facilitate this endeavor. Specifically, the goal of this study is to identify 
whether there is a change (and in particular an increase) in grievance, injury reporting, 
absenteeism, voluntary turnover as well as adverse events throughout the collective 
bargaining cycle. 
1. 7 Target Population 
The target population for this study are employees of Eastern Health, St. John's 
region, who are represented by different unions, including: AAHP, NAPE, and the 
NLNU. Each union group has their own unique collective bargaining contract with the 
employer. 
These employees have various levels of formal and informal training, and have 
differing job tasks, diverse skills sets, responsibility, years of service, and work in a 
variety of areas within acute care facilities ofEastern Health, St. John's region. The 
target population was chosen based on human resources administrative secondary data 
sets obtained from the human resources department of Eastern Health, specifically 
relating to acute care centers within the metro region. 
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1.8 Research Questions 
1. What are the employee rates of grievance, injury reporting, absence, voluntary 
turnover and adverse event occurrences within the Eastern Health organization, 
St. John's region (acute care areas), around and throughout the collective 
bargaining cycle? 
2. Is there a significant difference between rates of these behaviors with the three 
unions under study? Specifically, are any of the unions under study more 
responsive to the collective bargaining process than the others, through the use of 
grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events? 
3. Considering the collective bargaining events, are specific events within the 
collective bargaining process more influential upon employee behavior than 
others? 
While it is understandable that none of the employee behaviors under study are 
completely avoidable, and are not always used as a way to indicate unhappiness and 
discontent, it is still extremely important to examine the various reasons why they occur, 
recognize their importance to industrial relations, and mitigate their impact upon an 
organization, other employees and the public. Examining these elements is critical to 
human resources management, as these behaviors are known to be quite destructive to the 
workplace when overused (Gifford, Zarnmuto, Goodman & Hill, 2002; Krueger, Brazil, 
Lohfeld, Edward, Lewis & Tjam, 2002; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998). 
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Furthermore, high uses of these mechanisms of voice may be a further sign of poor 
communication between parties; placing emphasis away from jobs and required job tasks, 
and towards aspects of recrimination (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). These findings may 
generate useful results for a variety of stakeholders, including: Eastern Health, employee 
groups and their respective unions. 
1.9 Outline 
This thesis will include six chapters beyond the introduction, and will be used to 
support and detail study findings. Chapter two provides a thorough review of the 
empirical evidence related to the outcomes, variables and concepts under study. Chapter 
three outlines the description of the data being utilized, a detailed discussion of the 
statistical methods that will be used to achieve the desired data analysis, as well as the 
identification and discussion of main assumptions related to this study. Chapter four will 
fully describe the descriptive analysis results, while chapter five will describe the results 
ofthe negative binomial regression analysis. Chapter six will provide a discussion of the 
findings, identifying any relationship between the empirical evidence, and the descriptive 
and negative binomial regression analyses. Lastly, chapter seven will provide a 
conclusion of this work, identifying any limitations, and outlining future research needs. 
12 
Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
This literature review focuses on the evidence related to the concepts, variables and 
outcomes under study: employee voice, industrial relations and the collective bargaining 
cycle. Specifically, the literature chosen addresses grievance, injury reporting, 
absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events. In addition, the relationship 
between mechanisms of voice and employee discontent is examined, in particular during 
times of union involvement. Empirical evidence utilized in this review draws upon valid 
findings from the fields of Industrial Relations and Health Services Research. 
2.1 Exit-Voice Theory 
The exit-voice theory is well studied in the industrial relations field (Freeman & 
Medoff, 1984). In essence, employees have two options when they become dissatisfied: 
they can exit (voluntarily quit employment) or use voice (either individual or collective 
representation) to announce discontent (Freeman & Medoff). Clearly, this theory 
provides a way to understand the inner workings of unionized environments. Of 
particular interest is how influential union culture is upon employees and union groups, 
as well as how this influence is expressed within the organization via mechanisms of 
voice (Freeman & Medoff). 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that unionized employees had lower levels of 
satisfaction with their work yet did not resort to quit behavior as a method of avoidance 
as often as non-unionized workers. In their view, unionized employees were more likely 
to find ways to convey discontent through criticism about their jobs, and their work life 
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(Freeman & Medoff). It is interesting that this level of criticism did not transpose into 
encouraging more quit behavior. That being said, one must consider the overall "costs" 
of voluntarily quitting unionized employment, including pay, benefits, seniority, as well 
as having to start over often at a lower level of respect and favor (Freeman & Medoff). 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) explained this finding as being related to union presence, 
participation in union activity, and collective voice. In other words, the fact that 
unionized workers have the ability to use forms of employee voice to indicate their 
discontent acts as a positive and protective factor on encouraging individuals to stay 
employed (Freeman & Medoff). Collective bargaining, in fact, was seen to be a 
favorable occurrence in the unionized environment, providing group influence on change 
where individual voice would be weak and not make a difference, groups, through 
collective bargaining, could band together and be facilitators of change (Freeman & 
Medoff). This process provides unionized employees with the ability to seek change in 
work issues, rather than giving up, walking away and quitting (Freeman & Medoff). 
Furthermore, this group mentality provides employees with anonymity and security, 
along the line of the old adage that there is safety in numbers (Freeman & Medoff). 
In addition, unionized workers have methods of righting perceived wrongs, through 
the use of grievance activity (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). This reality restricts employers 
from using favoritism, and nepotism, instead demanding fairness and equality for all their 
workers (Freeman & Medoff). Each and every union worker is considered important to 
the union culture, and worker's long years of service are rewarded with higher levels of 
seniority, influencing levels of pay and other benefits (Freeman & Medoff). 
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Interestingly, it is these aspects of unionization that influence individuals to stay; union 
protection, freedom to utilize forms of grievance and years of service invested in the 
organization all encourage workers to remain employed (Freeman & Medoff). 
Furthermore, individuals become less desiring of quitting and losing years of built 
seniority and skills, along with pay levels, and do not want to start over again somewhere 
new (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). This is very beneficial for the employer, through 
maintaining employment levels, and avoiding high associated costs ofturnover (Freeman 
& Medoff). In addition, there is a connection between decreased turnover and 
improvement in levels of performance, part of which must be related to keeping higher 
skilled workers within the workforce, rather than losing them through attrition (Freeman 
& Medoff). 
It should be noted, however, that Freeman and Medoff(1984) did discover that 
unionized workers were extremely dissatisfied with their work life, in particular with the 
work environment and management structure and influence. Part of this can be explained 
by the idea that unions "fire-up" individuals to recognize problems within their 
environment, adding to feelings of perceived unhappiness (Freeman & Medoff). During 
times when it is to the union's advantage to show a unified front, as is the case during 
collective bargaining, this may play into the unions hand, encouraging workers to identify 
and express feelings of frustration which may positively influence the formulation of 
better contract deals (Freeman & Medoff). 
The question remains whether unionized individuals can brush off these feelings once 
the agreement is signed. Do employees continue to feel frustrated with their work lives 
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after collective bargaining is finished, and do these types of serious events act to 
influence an even higher use of the behaviors under study, in response? Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) found that during difficult periods between unions and employers, lower 
performance levels were noted. This certainly describes the industrial climate during 
collective bargaining, so it is of major interest to understand the influence that these 
collective bargaining events ultimately have upon employees within the workplace. 
2.2 Employee Voice 
The issue of how employees voice their discontent is extremely important to an 
organization, and to researchers interested in labor relations. When problems occur 
within the workplace, employees may be dissatisfied enough to utilize a variety of 
behaviors as a way to announce their displeasure (Becker, 1960; Cappelli & Chaurin, 
1991; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Issa & Koblegard, 2005; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gittell, Von 
Nordenflycht & Kochan, 2004; Havlovic, 1991 ; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, DeVinney 
& Davies, 2002; Katz, Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002; 
Krueger & Mas, 2004; Kuokkanen, Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003 ; Lewin & Peterson, 
1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; 
McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; McNeese-Smith & Nazarey, 2001; Mittleman et al. , 
1945; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian & Almost, 2001; Steltzer, 2001; Upenieks, 
2003; Zangaro, 2001). The perpetual use ofthese voice mechanisms can be a sign that an 
organization has an unstable internal environment; even more informative is recurring 
trends of employee behaviors of voice, which may provide more evidence of a 
problematic industrial relations climate (Gifford, Zarnmuto, Goodman & Hill, 2002; 
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Krueger, Brazil, Lohfeld, Edward, Lewis & Tjam, 2002; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & 
Sirola, 1998; National Steering Committee, 2002). 
Employees who feel unheard in the workplace may ultimately find ways to express 
their concerns, through the use of a variety of employee voice mechanisms, including 
missing days from work, filing complaints, reporting injuries, quitting, and making more 
mistakes (Becker, 1960; Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991 ; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Issa & Koblegard, 
2005; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gittell, Von Nordenflycht & Kochan, 2004; Havlovic, 
1991 ; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Katz, Kochan & 
Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & Mas, 2004; Kuokkanen, 
Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003; Lewin & Peterson, 1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & 
Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; 
McNeese-Smith & Nazarey, 2001; Mittleman et al. , 1945; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, 
Sham ian & Almost, 2001 ; Steltzer, 2001 ; Upenieks, 2003; Zangaro, 2001 ). These 
behaviors are all extremely costly to an organization, both financially and interpersonally; 
being aware of how often they are used, and truly understanding their impact on 
organizational structure is key to maintaining a healthy, well-functioning and efficient 
workplace (Becker; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002; Lum, Kervin, 
Clark, Reid & Sirola; McHugh, 2001; McNeese-Srnith & Crook; Taunton, Perkins, 
Oetker-Black & Heaton, 1995; Upenieks; Zboril-Benson, 2000). 
Identifying areas which have higher levels of employee voice behaviors could assist 
the organization in adopting a proactive approach, whereby they could rapidly identify 
potential or actual issues, enabling intervention long before they become problematic 
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(Becker, 1960; Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991; Cohen, 1993; Cox, Is sa & Koblegard, 2005; 
Havlovic, 1991; Ingersoll, Olsan, Drew-Cates, DeVinney & Davies, 2002; Kuokkanen, 
Leino-Kilpi & Katajisto, 2003; Lewin & Peterson, 1999; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid & 
Sirola, 1998; Manion, 2004; McNeese-Smith & Crook, 2003; McNeese-Smith & 
Nazarey, 2001; Mittleman et al., 1945; Spence-Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian & Almost, 
2001; Steltzer, 2001 ; Upenieks, 2003; Zangara, 2001). Organizations concerned with 
industrial relations have the opportunity to make a significant difference to their 
workforce, by facing these challenges head on, adopting a mind set of being "facilitators 
of change", rather than issuing authoritative reactions to employee behaviors, after the 
fact (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter & Dixon, 2003; Baker et al., 2004; Coyle, 2005; Fleming 
& Wentzell, 2008; Hoffman, Beard, Greenall, U & White, 2006; Matlow, Stevens, 
Urmson & Wray, 2008; National Steering Committee, 2002). 
2.3 Unions and Unionized Employees 
Employees who are unionized have both support and protection by their union group 
and are represented by the union during a variety of situations, including contract 
negotiation (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Guest & Conway, 2004; Hebdon & Brown, 
2008). Guest and Conway suggest that unionized employees are not as content with their 
employment as those without union affiliation. Part of this reason, they feel , is the wide 
gap between the employer and the union, a distance which is difficult to bridge (Guest & 
Conway). This fosters distrust on both sides, further influencing worker discontent 
(Guest & Conway). Hammer and Avgar (2005) claim that while employees affiliated 
with organized unions are less content with their work lives, and are less likely to 
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voluntarily quit their jobs, they are more likely to utilize other forms of employee voice 
in response to their discontent. Freeman and Medoff (1984) broaden this argument, 
asserting that unionized workers are less content with their work and are more likely to 
be dissatisfied with aspects of employment and with managerial influence than non-union 
workers. However, this position is in direct contrast to other positive findings of 
unionized employment that Freeman and Medoff identified, including " ... higher wages, 
better fringes, better seniority protection, better grievance systems and greater voice in 
determining conditions of employment ... " than their non-union counterparts (p. 136). 
Kelly (1998) suggests that union affiliation encourages response of unionized 
employees and helps stimulate their level of involvement. This helps to raise workers 
hope in the union system, but does not necessarily mean that change will occur (Guest & 
Conway, 2004). Likewise, Freeman & Medoff (1984) identify that unions encourage and 
incite worker unhappiness to benefit the collective bargaining process. Metcalf (1995) 
suggests a different view of unionization whereby the actual membership in the union 
begets contribution, allowing union representation itself to become a way for employees 
to be heard, thus taking part in maintaining the balance of equity between the employer 
and unionized employees, without galvanized action. 
Employees who are experiencing workplace stressors, due to less than favorable 
working conditions may be sufficiently dissatisfied to become more active with their 
union or their particular bargaining group (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). These employees 
could be more willing to take part in using the worker behaviors under study, including 
grievance filing, injury reporting and missed days from work and are more likely to take 
19 
part in demonstration activity, including both legal and illegal strike activity (Hebdon & 
Brown). However, Chaulk and Brown (2008) found that adversarial union activities 
(strikes) greatly influenced a decline in satisfaction with both the union and employer. 
This suggests that while dissatisfied employees may be encouraged to take part in strike 
activity, strike action can add to the problem, by fostering further dissatisfaction in these 
employees, potentially increasing the use voice (Chaulk & Brown; Hebdon & Brown). 
2.4 Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining is defined as "the process by which management and labour 
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment in a unionized workplace" (Hebdon & 
Brown, 2008, p. 4 ). The collective agreement reached after the formal collective 
bargaining process" . .. includes issues related to work schedules, overtime, pay, health 
and welfare benefits (i.e., vacation, retirement, health plans, etc.), and layoff/termination 
of employment (including progressive discipline, probationary periods, and violations of 
company rules that can lead to termination)." (Hebdon & Brown, p. 248). 
Collective bargaining is considered an essential component of unionized 
environments, and can greatly influence the conditions in which unionized employees 
must work (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Klikauer, 2005). The 
process can be a lengthy one, involving the negotiation of issues towards developing a 
new contract. In most cases, this contract would be put forward to union members to 
vote upon and, when officially in place, given an expiry date from which the entire 
bargaining process will begin anew (Hebdon & Brown). There are two sides to every 
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collective bargaining process, each coming to the bargaining table with its own goals 
(Freeman & Medoff; Hebdon & Brown). 
Considering the terms that are under discussion during contract negotiation, collective 
bargaining time can be a highly charged period for employees. Steltzer (200 1) found that 
there is more discontent amongst staff prior to collective bargaining. However, Clark 
(1980) found no association between completed contract bargaining and improved 
employee behaviors. This suggests that a new contract does not impact the workplace 
environment enough to actually decrease the use of voice. 
Union representation during the collective bargaining process, while definitely a 
protective force for unionized employees, may unknowingly provide negative influence 
upon members, and in turn, impact the level of satisfaction employees have for their jobs 
and how they react to issues that arise within its domain (Klikauer, 2005; Metcalf, 1995; 
Wagar & Rondeau, 2002). During problematic, sometimes volatile, periods between 
union and employer, there is regular communication and feedback between union 
representatives and employees to keep all those involved up to date with any progress or 
lack thereof (Iverson & Currivan, 2003). This may perpetuate the intensity of reaction by 
employees. Furthermore, workers frequently discuss issues amongst themselves, passing 
on both fact and rumor, providing additional pressure and persuasion (Iverson & 
Currivan). Additionally, the collective bargaining process, is frequently discussed and 
dissected within the media, enabling the general public to make both positive and 
negative judgments and take sides throughout the negotiation process (Hebdon & Brown, 
2008). 
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Each of these factors provides additional, sometimes negative, influence upon 
employees during the bargaining process (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). It is fair to say that 
perceived difficulties with the negotiation process and/or with the final contract might 
negatively sway employees within the work environment and provide them with reason 
to make their individual feelings known. In addition, worker groups may also be 
disgruntled with the process, if not viewed favorably, leading to further problems within 
the workplace (Hebdon & Brown). The degree of impact is certainly an important 
question and one wonders whether it is possible for employees to be frustrated enough 
with the bargaining process to announce their discontent through the use of mechanisms 
of voice. 
2.5 Employee Behaviors 
2.5.1 Grievance 
When unionized employees have problems within the workplace, they may utilize a 
formal complaint process from which to find resolution from conflict (Cox, Issa & 
Koblegard, 2005; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Nelson & 
Reimann, 1983; Steltzer, 2001 ). Grievances, in their purest form, represent allegations 
that the collective agreement has not been properly followed (Hebdon & Brown). They 
represent an official avenue for an employee to utilize in order to right a perceived 
wrong, which has occurred within their work environment, and are a form of protection 
for the worker from heavy-handed managers and unfair decision making, affecting 
employment status (Cox, Issa & Koblegard; Freeman & Medoff; Hebdon & Brown; 
Nelson & Reimann; Steltzer). 
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The grievance process is one of the multitude of issues defined within the collective 
bargaining process, and is considered one ofthe benefits of unionized employment (Cox, 
Issa & Koblegard, 2005; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; Nelson & 
Reimann, 1983; Steltzer, 2001). For instance, if a unionized employee 'A' discovered 
another unionized employee 'B' was given a new post, contrary to the collective 
agreement seniority provision, and employee 'B' had less seniority than employee 'A', 
who had applied for the same position, a grievance could be filed in respect of this action. 
Once the grievance process was completed, and if a wrong was identified, the fair correct 
action would be applied (Hebdon & Brown). This helps avoid nepotism and encourages 
fairness and accountability within the workplace (Freeman & Medoff; Hebdon & 
Brown). 
The literature shows that if employees are not committed, and feel dissatisfied with 
their employment situation, they may utilize the grievance process as a response to their 
environment (Cox, Issa & Koblegard, 2005; Nelson & Reimann, 1983; Steltzer, 2001). 
Thus, while grievances can be a legitimate process, they may also be a negative behavior 
that increases union involvement within the organization (Cox, Issa & Koblegard; Nelson 
& Reimann; Steltzer). It is when employees are feeling negatively about their workplace 
that they become more open to and reliant upon their union, and related union activities 
(Fitzpatrick, 2001 ; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). 
Nelson and Reimann (1983) found that large organizations with varied units and 
employee levels, utilizing different skills, show the highest levels of grievance activity. 
This may be very significant in a large organization such as Eastern Health, as there are a 
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large number of employees, working in a variety of areas, using diverse skill sets with 
various levels of education, and who fall under the umbrella of different union affiliation. 
Lewin and Peterson (1999) found that individuals who filed grievances were more 
likely to miss days of work than those who did not utilize the grievance process. The 
literature identifies that there were a higher number of complaints and missed days in 
response to conflict and increased demands, with an associated decrease in co-worker 
interaction (Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991 ; Cohen, 2003; Mittleman et al. , 1945; Shader, 
Broome, Broome, West & Nash, 2001). Further, in workplaces where there were fewer 
complaints filed, there were less mistakes and more improved output amongst workers 
(Katz, Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002). Thus, strained and 
angry workers file more grievances, and are less satisfied with their jobs, organization 
and co-workers (Cappelli & Chaurin; Cohen; Hebdon & Brown, 2008). This supports the 
idea that grievance filing is utilized more often in areas with higher industrial conflict 
(Cappelli & Chaurin; Cohen; Hebdon & Brown; Mittleman et al.; Shader, Broome, 
Broome, West & Nash). 
2.5.2 Injury Reporting 
Historically unionized employees have every right to report an injury sustained at 
work, a process that is considered to be one of the benefits of unionized environments 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984). More recently, through occupational health and safety 
legislation, all employees now have this right (Government ofNewfoundland and 
Labrador, 2009). Without this provision, individuals could be forced to continue working 
despite having an injury, possibly worsening their condition, or potentially placing others 
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in jeopardy, as the worker may not be able to perform job tasks safely (MacEachen, 
Chambers, Kosny & Keown, 2009). 
Injury reporting may be influenced by workplace difficulties and employee discontent 
(Mittleman et al. , 1945). Mittleman et al. indicated that in areas with increased conflict 
and demands, there was a subsequent increase in injury reporting. It has been shown that 
this behavior may be used as a way for workers to speak out about workplace problems 
and issues (Mittleman et al. ; Shamian, O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis & Kerr, 2003). 
In fact, Havlovic (1991) identified that satisfied employees were less likely to have, and 
report workplace injuries. Many workplace issues increased the likelihood of accidents, 
including workload, staffing levels, cutbacks and the mentality of "needing to do more 
with less"; however it has been shown that other issues including education level and 
quality of machinery upkeep also play an important part (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter & 
Dixon, 2003; Cohen, 2003; Federal Aviation Administration, 2005 ; Peterson, Bergstrom, 
Samuelsson, Asberg & Nygren, 2008; Shamian, O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis, & 
Kerr). 
Injuries have a significant impact on the workplace, through the loss of an employee 
for varying periods of time, creating higher demands on those left behind (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2005). Furthermore, they are a significant expense to an 
organization, paying replacement workers while the injured worker is off, and when 
providing a reduced workload for the injured worker once the employee is deemed able 
to safely return to work (Shamian, O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis & Kerr, 2003). 
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2.5.3 Absence 
Absenteeism is defined as "frequent absence from work without good reason" 
(Soanes [Oxford Dictionary], 2001 , p.3). It is considered to be one of the most common 
and problematic employee behaviors in an organization (Bennett, 2002; Buchan & 
Seccombe, 1995; Cohen, 2003; McHugh, 2001 ; Rosenblatt & Shirom, 2005; Sanders, 
2004; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & Heaton, 1995; Zboril-Benson, 2000). While 
absenteeism can be the result of true illness, it has been shown that high job expectations, 
overwork, and decreased support lead to feelings of worker dissatisfaction, resulting in 
increased absenteeism (Bennett; Buchan & Seccombe; Dionne & Dostie, 2007; McHugh; 
Savery, Travaglione & Firns, 1998; Shamian, O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis & Kerr, 
2003 ; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & Heaton; Zboril-Benson). For these individuals, 
absenteeism becomes a way to respond to dire work circumstances (Sapsford & Turnbull, 
1994). 
Sapsford and Turnbull (1994) found that in areas with less employment opportunity 
and lower earnings, employees were more likely to be absent. They found absenteeism to 
be a way for employees to voice discontent and create strife in the workplace (Sapsford 
& Turnbull). Furthermore, this form of strife was seen to be as serious as other more 
formal forms of employee voice, such as strike (Sapsford & Turnbull). 
In workplaces with higher employee satisfaction, there is notably less absenteeism 
(Bennett, 2002; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; McHugh, 2001 ; Rosenblatt & Shirom, 2005 ; 
Savery, Travaglione & Firns, 1998; Zboril-Benson, 2000). This suggests that an 
organization that takes the issues of commitment seriously, and helps encourage and 
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motivate employees, will have less absenteeism. This type of organization would help 
motivate its workers, and in turn receive commitment and support from its employees 
(Bennett; Buchan & Seccombe; McHugh; Rosenblatt & Shirom; Savery, Travaglione & 
Fims; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & Heaton, 1995; Zboril-Benson). 
There are a variety of costs associated with absenteeism. The most frequently cited is 
the financial burden that absences place upon the employer including paying the salary 
for both the absent employee and the substitute worker brought in to cover required time 
and tasks (Bennett, 2002; Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Cohen, 2003; Dunn & Wilkinson, 
2002; McHugh, 2001; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & Heaton, 1995; Zboril-Benson; 
2000). The replacement worker may be current staff forced to work overtime (which is 
generally at a higher than normal wage), a transfer employee from another work area 
(who may or may not be used to the area he/she is being sent to work in) or a casual 
employee brought in from the replacement "pool" (Bennett; Buchan & Seccombe; Dunn 
& Wilkinson; Kosnik, Brown & Maund, 2007). Worse case scenario would be having no 
available replacement, therefore relying upon regular st~ff members to work above and 
beyond their regular duties to accommodate the staffing problem, potentially for the 
entire extra shift (Buchan & Seccombe). Furthermore, this could include the "call back" 
of additional regular staff members who are on their scheduled days off. Unfortunately, 
for these individuals, absenteeism becomes an easy way to respond to such dire work 
circumstances. 
Other related costs and burdens, which may also be related to absenteeism, include: 
increased job anxiety and stress, increased fatigue, increased injury reporting, decreased 
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productivity and potential increase in the number of mistakes made by employees, 
possibly due to being required to act in roles in which they are unfamiliar (Bennett, 2002; 
Buchan & Seccombe, 1995; Cohen, 2003; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2005; Kosnik, Brown & Maund, 2007; McHugh, 2001; Rosenblatt & 
Shirom, 2005; Shamian, O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis & Kerr, 2003; Strahan, 
Watson & Lennon, 2008; Taunton, Perkins, Oetker-Black & Heaton, 1995; 
Zboril-Benson, 2000). Many ofthese costs can greatly impact satisfaction and 
commitment, influencing the use of behaviors as a form of employee voice (Bennett; 
Buchan & Seccombe; Savery, Travaglione & Firns, 1998; Taunton, Perkins, 
Oetker-Black & Heaton; Zboril-Benson). 
2.5.4 Voluntary Turnover 
Another interesting facet of industrial relations is voluntary turnover, occurring when 
employees voluntarily quit the organization (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). Current thought 
is that unionized employees do not readily quit their jobs, due to a variety of reasons 
including: seniority based benefits (e.g. pay and promotion, which are often based on 
years of service with the organization); job security; and attachments to the workplace 
and community (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Guest & Conway, 2004; Hammer & Avgar, 
2005; Hebdon & Brown; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski & Erez, 2001). The review of 
the literature shows that while unionized employees are less likely to leave their jobs, 
they do report lower satisfaction with many aspects of their work (Freeman & Medoff; 
Guest & Conway; Hammer & Avgar; Hebdon & Brown; Iverson & Currivan, 2003; 
Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski & Erez). The fact that employees stay within their 
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employment, despite low satisfaction, is an ironic contradiction, as one would expect that 
a dissatisfied worker would do everything in his/her power to find more satisfying work. 
Where does this dissatisfaction come from? One idea is that unionized workers feel 
tied to their current workplace, which causes an increase in feeling trapped, and ever 
more frustration, leading to poor levels of satisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; 
Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski & Erez, 2001). Another is 
that the unionized style of work creates division and strict work rules (defined and 
protected in collective agreements) from which workers cannot veer, without risk of 
complaint and grievance by other unions, which results in a divided workplace (Hammer 
& Avgar; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; McHugh, 2007). Both of these situations create 
feelings of frustration and may in fact influence how contented employees are with their 
work situation. 
Why do unionized workers choose to continue working? There are a multitude of 
risks involved with quitting employment. Starting over is a frightening prospect to many 
individuals, in particular to unionized employees. Once the unionized worker leaves the 
workplace, there is a likelihood that there will be fmancialloss involved as they are 
leaving behind years spent building up levels of seniority, and pay raises over time 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Further, an individual who has years invested in an 
organization will be walking away from time spent building experience, skill sets, and 
respect given to experienced workers, which may not be recognized in new positions 
(Freeman & Medoff; Hammer & Avgar, 2005). Frequently, these risks are too high for 
more experienced workers; however, an individual with less time invested in the 
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workplace does not have this attachment, and may in fact choose to depart the 
organization for good (Freeman & Medoff). Considering the risks involved with quitting 
unionized employment, it is no wonder that more unionized employees continue working 
(Freeman & Medoff; Hammer & A vgar; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski & Erez, 
2001). 
Iverson and Currivan (2003), in their study on unionized schoolteachers, found the 
degree of union involvement greatly influenced the desire to quit, rather than the actual 
level of dissatisfaction. To them, union involvement was a form of employee voice, and 
included such activities as: presence at union information sessions, exercising personal 
choice regarding whether to accept new contract deals; filing a grievance; discussing 
workplace issues and union ideas amongst colleagues; reading union updates online or in 
print; and even as far as working in some capacity for the union (Iverson & Currivan). 
An interesting finding in the Iverson and Currivan study was that while involvement 
influenced desire to quit, strangely it occurred in employees who were both happy and 
unhappy with their work life, which goes against conventional thinking on the subject 
that would suggest that only dissatisfied workers would want to quit (Freeman & Medoff, 
1984; Iverson & Currivan). 
Consideration must be given to the idea that participation in union activity influences 
employees to consider how bad their work situation is, or has become, and to this end 
acts as a form of persuasion to recognize things that are unacceptable (Bryson, Cappellari 
& Lucifora, 2004; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Iverson & Currivan, 2003). This could lead 
to the expectation that these methods of participation, or voice, could lend itself to further 
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enticing workers to use additional expressions of voice through the use of absenteeism, 
injury reporting, grievance as well as affecting the quality of work performance (Bryson, 
Cappellari & Lucifora; Iverson & Currivan). 
Turnover is quite costly to an organization given costs related to interviewing for a 
new employee; training; and the loss of overall experience and skill sets in a more 
experienced worker (Thatcher, Stepina & Boyle, 2003). It is certainly a problematic 
situation for any organization. That being said, turnover could be seen as more of a 
problem in areas where there is a lot of diversity in employment opportunities available 
within a community (Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Thatcher, Stepina & Boyle). When there 
is abundant employment available, workers become more appreciated, and employers do 
whatever they can to keep individuals working within the organization (Hammer & 
Avgar; Thatcher, Stepina & Boyle). Conversely, in times where there is high 
unemployment, or there is no other employer, this is not the case (Hammer & Avgar; 
Thatcher, Stepina & Boyle). In that environment, workers have little recourse and their 
lack of mobility may lend itself to a perceived lower value by their employing 
organization, resulting in less satisfaction, lower commitment and higher rates of quit 
behaviors (Hammer & Avgar; Thatcher, Stepina & Boyle). 
These employees have to decide whether their best course of action is to stay with the 
organization or quit and find employment elsewhere. The concern is that with limited 
opportunity to leave, these individuals become backed into a corner with their only out 
being to rely upon the use of other ways to voice their discontent: missing days from 
work, reporting injuries, filing grievances, and being more likely to make workplace 
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errors, indicating a clear decrease in adverse events (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hammer 
& Avgar, 2005; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski & Erez, 2001). For many the idea of 
moving is a daunting prospect, and in some cases impossible to consider (Freeman & 
Medoff; Hammer & Avgar). For these individuals, the risk ofleaving outweighs the 
unhappiness of staying (Hammer & Avgar). 
Since job satisfaction is closely linked with turnover, the question arises whether the 
act of collective bargaining also negatively influences employees' satisfaction, leading to 
the increased use ofthe mechanisms of voice as well as higher quit outcomes (Hammer 
& Avgar, 2005). Iverson and Currivan (2003) found that it was not the actual presence of 
the union that affected quit behavior, but the degree of expression of voice identified 
through participation in union activities and that since workers have mechanisms for 
voice they do not need to resign. This certainly supports the idea that becoming involved 
in the collective bargaining process, through the activities of participation documented in 
the literature, such as: attending meetings; reading and discussing collective bargaining 
updates with colleagues, and watching things unfold in the media; and voting on whether 
to strike or accept a new collective agreement, all could synergistically work together to 
influence an individual, resulting in lower satisfaction and increased desire to quit 
(Fullagar, Gallagher, Gordon & Clark, 1995; Iverson & Currivan). If participation itself 
is a factor in determining whether an individual is happy with work, then the idea of 
increased participation during volatile collective bargaining periods certainly could have 
a significant influence on unionized workers behaviors. 
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2.5.5 Adverse Events 
Industrial relations literature frequently examines employee and organizational 
performance (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gittell, Von Norden:flycht & Kochan, 2004; 
Katz, Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & Mas, 
2004; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006). The idea of quantifying performance can be a challenge as 
there are aspects of job performance that are extremely difficult to evaluate and analyze 
(Katz, Kochan & Gobeille; Krueger & Mas; Mas, 2008). Most times, changes in 
performance go unnoticed, with workers appearing to be working at acceptable levels, 
but in reality they are not (Katz, Kochan & Gobeille; Krueger & Mas; Mas, 2008). 
Putting less effort into performing required skills, and caring less about the quality of 
performance is more of an internal action, one tha~ may never be outwardly identifiable 
by others (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gittell, Von Nordenflycht & Kochan, 2004; Katz, 
Kochan & Gobeille, 1983; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski, 2002; Krueger & Mas, 2004; 
Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006). Often these changes in behavior go unnoticed; however this 
lower effort and lack of personal contribution may become apparent due to a decrease in 
levels of production, with an increase in adverse events (Freeman & Medoff; Gittell, Von 
Nordenflycht & Kochan; Katz, Kochan & Gobeille; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski; Krueger 
& Mas; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006). 
The study by Mas (2008), examined the resale value of machinery from the 
Caterpillar Company during a seven-year union/employer battle. This study found that 
during this highly volatile time of bargaining, machinery made during this time had more 
problems, and more importantly had lower resale value compared to machinery made 
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during more stable periods (Mas, 2008). This was linked to lower exertion and interest 
on the part of the employees while performing required tasks (Mas, 2008). 
Likewise, Krueger and Mas (2004) analyzed the two-year labour relations conflict 
with Bridgestone/Firestone and the occurrence of faulty tires. These substandard tires 
were found to have more blowouts while in use, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries 
with individuals using their product (Krueger & Mas). These faulty tires were made 
during periods of intense labour conflict between the union and the Bridgestone/Firestone 
tire company (Krueger & Mas). The volatile collective bargaining process and negative 
labour relations climate greatly influenced unionized workers to work at a lower level of 
ability, leading to the production of an inferior quality product (Krueger & Mas). 
Similarly, in a study by Katz, Kochan and Gobeille (1983), poor labour relations were 
shown to negatively impact the General Motors Company employees, whereby cars made 
during that difficult time had more problems with gaining a pass rate during their 
required examination process. This greatly influenced a lower sale and resale value of 
these cars (Katz, Kochan, & Gobeille). Union/employer clash was shown to have a high 
negative impact upon employees' desire to work hard, greatly affecting their 
workmanship during times of strife (Katz, Kochan & Gobeille). 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) found similar findings, identifying that in periods of 
union/employer stability, workers were more efficient and effective with performance. 
Conversely, they found that during problematic periods of union/employer interaction, 
workmanship suffered (Freeman & Medoff). Likewise, in plants where airplanes were 
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made, poor union/employer relations, particularly those involved with collective 
bargaining, were found to lower employee output (Kleiner, Leonard, & Pilarski, 2002). 
Mas (2006) also identified that police officers' productivity was impacted by negative 
collective bargaining outcomes such as a failed arbitration process, and noted an increase 
in reported crime rates, fewer arrests and less time spent in prison, in result. Further, 
there was a suggestion that police officers were less willing to help the court process of 
gaining serious jail time for criminals, following poor labor outcomes (Mas, 2006). This 
suggests that the collective bargaining process upset these employees to the degree that 
they were unwilling to participate in activities which would help guilty offenders receive 
jail time. 
What do Caterpillar tractors, Bridgestone/Firestone tires, General Motor' s vehicles, 
police officers, and airline production plants have to do with adverse events in a hospital 
setting? These examples provide concrete evidence that employees react strongly to 
periods of union/employer strife, and that these strong reactions greatly impact the work 
level willingly given by each employee. These findings are extremely helpful when 
considering the serious problem of adverse events in a healthcare environment, which 
may be considered a proxy for quality, or job performance (Cohen, 2003; Landrigan et 
al. , 2004; National Steering Committee, 2002; Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg 
& Nygren, 2008; Strahan, Watson & Lennon, 2008; Wilkins & Shields, 2008) 
Problems within the workplace environment can eventually become stressors that 
greatly impact the individual worker as well as the system, potentially influencing the 
quality of service provided (Cohen, 2003; Landrigan et al., 2004; National Steering 
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Committee, 2002; Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg & Nygren, 2008; Strahan, 
Watson & Lennon, 2008; Wilkins & Shields, 2008). Further along on this vein is the 
issue of adverse events and whether it is possible for employees to be so affected by the 
collective bargaining process that more errors occur (Cohen; Hebdon & Brown, 2008; 
National Steering Committee; Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg, Nygren; 
Wilkins & Shields). 
Adverse events occurring within the health care environment are of major concern as 
human lives are ultimately at stake. Adverse events are defined as: 
an unexpected and undesired incident directly associated with the care or services 
provided to the patient; an incident that occurs during the process of providing health 
care and results in patient injury or death; an adverse outcome for a patient, including 
an injury or complication (The Canadian Patient Safety Dictionary, 2003, p. 54). 
This definition is quite broad in its scope, as it can represent any episode related to 
patient care, regardless of whether any negative result occurs following the occurrence 
(Baker et al. , 2004; The Canadian Patient Safety Dictionary). 
The concept of adverse events has been extensively studied throughout the world for 
many years; however, Canada has been sluggish in recognizing and investigating this 
problem (Hoffman, Beard, Greenall, U & White, 2006; National Steering Committee, 
2002). In more proactive countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Australia), studies have shown that these errors are serious, and have far-reaching and 
occasionally grave consequences (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter & Dixon, 2003; National 
Steering Committee). 
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The National Steering Committee on Patient Safety (2002) reports that, as in other 
countries, errors occur at alarming rates within the Canadian health care system. This 
was confirmed in a study by Baker et al. (2004) in which errors were approximated at 
over 180 000 with over 70 000 of these being of the type that could have been avoided. 
Note that Baker et al. only identified more serious errors, or errors that result "in 
disability at the time of discharge, death or prolonged hospital stay ... [they] defined 
disability as temporary impairment of function lasting up to a year, permanent 
impairment of function or death" (p. 1679). One wonders how vast the rates of error 
would be had the statistics reflected less serious errors and "near-missed events", beyond 
those counted in the Baker et al. study. There is potential that the approximated rates 
would be well beyond those realized. Even minor errors are still very important to the 
health care system, as any error can affect patient safety, and can encourage mistrust in 
the health care system (Coyle, 2005; Matlow, Stevens, Urmson & Wray, 2008). 
When investigating adverse events in the health care system, the literature identifies 
that these events can be related to a variety of workplace stressors, such as: the number of 
employees working per shift, mandatory overtime, organizational structure and cutbacks 
(Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas & Smith, 2003; Cohen, 2003; Matlow, Stevens, Urmson & 
Wray, 2008; National Steering Committee, 2002; Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, 
Asberg, & Nygren, 2008; Wilkins & Shields, 2008). It is interesting to note that these 
stressors are all related to items examined by the union during the collective bargaining 
process (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). Furthermore, these stressors may influence 
employees to the degree that more errors are made and quality of performance is 
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decreased (Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas & Smith; National Steering Committee; Peterson, 
Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg, & Nygren; Wilkins & Shields). This may be even more 
prevalent during periods of high stress and discordance within an organization, a time 
when workplace issues are brought to the forefront, as is the case during collective 
bargaining (Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas & Smith; National Steering Committee; Peterson, 
Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg, & Nygren; Wilkins & Shields). 
There are two issues to consider with these breaks in adverse events: one is the event 
itself, which, as mentioned above, can be influenced by a number of outside forces, while 
the other is the actual filing of the report (Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas & Smith, 2003; 
Cohen, 2003 ; Hobbs, 2008; Matlow, Stevens, Urmson & Wray, 2008 ; National Steering 
Committee, 2002; Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg, & Nygren, 2008; Wilkins 
& Shields, 2008). The question remains whether an individual would always report such 
errors (despite the ethical duty to do so), especially those considered minor in nature that 
workers feel might not be discovered. The act of deciding to report an error, or not, may 
be another method for the employee to announce discontent, indicating increased 
frustration and conflict within the work environment. These employees may go forward 
with reporting errors as a way to ensure that the organization is held ultimately 
accountable for problems in the workplace, in particular during highly charged times 
such as the collective bargaining process. 
In a study by Wilkins and Shields, errors were found to be higher among employees 
who were working beyond regular scheduled hours (2008). This finding suggests that 
working extra hours increases fatigue, thereby influencing the ability to safely provide an 
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adequate quality of performance (Wilkins & Shields). Staffing problems, routine 
mandatory overtime, workload, difficulty in getting time off from employment, and 
cutbacks influence dissatisfaction and affect quality of performance (Cho, Ketefian, 
Barkauskas & Smith, 2003 ; Cohen, 2003; Elfering, Semmer & Grebner, 2006; Matlow, 
Stevens, Urmson & Wray, 2008; National Steering Committee, 2002; Peterson, 
Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg, & Nygren, 2008; Wilkins & Shields). 
It is interesting to note that The National Steering Committee on Patient Safety 
(2002) reviewed airline policies and found that this industry had a maximum amount of 
time that employees were permitted to work each shift. Hobbs (2008) indicated that 
mishaps within the health care environment are closely related to those occurring in the 
aviation industry, as errors similarly impact public safety. According to Hobbs, many 
factors contribute to the occurrences of mistakes, including physically demanding work, 
high demands, and more importantly the way the person was thinking when the error 
occurred. That is to say, was the individual fatigued, emotional, under undue stress and 
were these factors influencing the employee' s focus on the job at hand (Hobbs). This is a 
clear example of an industry concerned with maintaining quality workmanship, and 
protecting the consumers who access its services. 
Overtime. The issue of overtime is a recurring theme in the adverse events literature. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States, has done much research 
into the issue of errors within the aviation industry, and identified that overtime increases 
the risk of an error occurring, and went as far as to say that "fatigue affects emotional, 
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physical and mental capabilities ... [and] ... causes performance decrements similar to 
those caused by alcohol" (2005, p.17, section 5.1). 
The issue of overtime effecting error has also been found to be a problem within the 
Canadian Railway industry. Transport Canada (2006) reported changes within this 
employment sector, through union and organizational efforts to reduce the burden of 
error, through setting the amount of continuous hours that an employee was allowed to 
work each day (twelve hours); however, in specific situations employees could work up 
to eighteen hours with the provision that a break period had taken place. Furthermore, 
Transport Canada also determined that the maximum number of hours that each 
employee could safely work each week was sixty-four hours. These hours could be 
bypassed in times of crisis or emergency; however, they were direct with maintaining 
their stance that before an employee could be brought back to work, a break period of six 
to eight hours was required (Transport Canada). 
The FAA (2006) broadened this argument by reporting that overtime was related to 
absenteeism and injuring oneself on the job, which, in turn, created more stress upon the 
employees continuing to work. This identifies that the well being of employees should 
be as important as the level of performance to an organization; placing extra burden on 
employees through overtime may influence the use of mechanisms of voice (FAA). 
Building organizational commitment and satisfaction of employees is well worth the 
effort. The more an organization pushes its employees to work beyond their capabilities, 
the more they are at risk of error (FAA; Transport Canada, 2006). These findings are 
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very applicable to the health care environment as mandatory overtime and high demands 
are a daily reality and stressor for those employed in this industry (Shamian, 
O'Brien-Pallas, Thomson, Alksnis & Kerr, 2003). 
2.6 Conclusion 
The evidence in this literature review provides a sound basis to link together the ideas 
concerning industrial relations, collective bargaining and employee dissatisfaction and 
their effects upon expression of voice. These behaviors include: missing time from work, 
filing complaints, reporting injuries, performing required job tasks at a lower level of 
quality (making more errors), and quitting jobs. Utilizing these behaviors as methods of 
voice is problematic to any organization and may impact the ability of the workplace to 
function at an optimal level, potentially leading to an even further decrease in quality and 
effectiveness (Bryson, Cappellari & Lucifora, 2004; Cappelli & Chaurin, 1991; Cohen, 
2003; Fitzpatrick, 2001; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Fullagar, Gallagher, Gordon & Clark, 
1995; Gifford, Zarnmuto, Goodman & Hill, 2002; Iverson & Currivan, 2003 ; Krueger, 
Brazil, Lohfeld, Edward, Lewis & Tjam, 2002; Lurn, Kervin, Clark, Reid & Sirola, 1998; 
Mittleman et. al., 1945; National Steering Committee, 2002; Sapsford & Turnbull, 1994; 
Shader, Broome, Broome, West & Nash, 2001). 
Consistent support was given to the idea that there is an influential relationship 
between the union, the employer and the collective bargaining process, and that the 
effects of this relationship can greatly influence union members ' satisfaction and, in turn, 
the use of mechanisms of voice. It is ever more prevalent when relations between the 
union and the employer are stalled and the bargaining process turns more negative in 
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focus. Extensive negative labor relation periods can have serious consequences upon the 
workplace, as employees were shown to be more likely to utilize methods of voice and 
have higher adverse events throughout this volatile time (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter & 
Dixon, 2003; Cohen 2003; Freeman & Medoff; Gittell, Von Nordenflycht & Kochan; 
Katz, Kochan & Gobeille; Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski; Klikauer; Krueger & Mas, 2004; 
Landrigan et al. , 2004; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006; National Steering Committee, 2006; 
Peterson, Bergstrom, Samuelsson, Asberg & Nygren, 2008; Strahan, Watson & Lennon, 
2008; Wilkins & Shields, 2008). The issues of adverse events can have far reaching, and 
sometimes grave outcomes; therefore organizations should be cognizant of the effects 
that negative labor relations can have on employee groups (Baker et. al, 2004; Freeman & 
Medoff; Katz, Kochan and Gobeille; Krueger & Mas; Mas, 2008; Mas, 2006). 
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Chapter 3 
3. Data Description and Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
The goal of this study is to examine the use of employee voice behaviors, specifically 
grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, adverse events, and voluntary turnover during 
collective bargaining for three unions employed within the Eastern Health organization, 
St. John' s region, acute care sectors. Specifically, the intent of this study is to 
demonstrate the extent to which these potential voice mechanisms are associated with the 
collective bargaining cycle. To accomplish this, secondary, quantitative data sets were 
utilized. These secondary data sets have been compiled by Eastern Health human 
resources staff and represent actual counts or observances of behaviors occurring over 
time. 
These data will be analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistical techniques, 
and through this process, relationships will be identified and conclusions formed 
regarding the rates of employee behaviors before and after specific events of collective 
bargaining, over time (Coxe, West & Aiken, 2009; Hilbe, 2007). This study will provide 
tangible evidence of how the industrial relations climate interacts to influence employee 
use of voice in a large health care organization. 
3.2 Ethical Considerations 
Once the specific variables of this study were identified and research hypotheses 
formed, the rigorous process of obtaining approvals was initiated. Specific ethical 
approval was sought and granted by both the Human Investigation Committee (HIC) 
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from Memorial University ofNewfoundland, and the Research Proposal Approval 
Committee (RP AC) from Eastern Health. Access to data utilized in this study did not 
occur until required approvals were obtained. Once this process was complete, the data 
was released for use in this study. 
Specific requirements of the approvals process included the protection of data used in 
this study, and these stringent rules of security were maintained. Data was not seen by 
anyone other than the principal investigator and the thesis supervisor. In addition, data 
did not contain any identifying information, or numerical identifiers that could link 
observations to individual employees, including names, employee numbers, or employee 
record identification codes. Along this vein, there was no way to cross-link data to 
identify use of multiple behaviors by any employee. Following Statistics Canada (2003) 
practice, no units or cells with fewer than five observations were identified, to ensure 
confidentiality of information. Further, data was kept on a personal computer, with 
password protection, which was always locked in a secure area when not in use. 
Confidentiality and security of data was maintained at all times. 
3.3 Target Population and Sample 
The target population for this study was unionized employees of Eastern Health, St. 
John' s region acute care sectors. There was no sample size calculation performed, as the 
population was completely dependent upon the pre-existing secondary administrative 
data sets being utilized. Further, due to the use of secondary sources of data, no inclusion 
or exclusion criteria were formulated. Data represented daily counts of occurrences of 
the behaviors under study. In addition, the use of collective bargaining information 
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gathered from the Newfoundland and Labrador Health Boards Association (NLHBA) 
was also a pre-existing secondary data set containing specific collective bargaining 
events for each of the unions being studied. 
3.4 General Features of the Data 
The Eastern Health, St. John' s region, human resources data sets utilized for this 
study were obtained for the particular behaviors under study, including grievance, 
reported injuries, absenteeism, adverse events and voluntary turnover. Each of these data 
sets was provided to the principal investigator in EXCEL spreadsheets. These data were 
compiled according to the date of occurrence and union affiliation. However, there were 
slightly different ways of data organization in each of these files, possibly due to the fact 
that different individuals were responsible for these data sets, and potentially more so due 
to a lack of an apparent unified way of entering and compiling data within the Eastern 
Health human resources environment. 
This information was limited by the time that human resources began collecting and 
compiling each data set, and as such, data used in this study have different times when 
they became available. Furthermore, the end dates for each data set were constrained by 
the timeframe that the principal investigator requested its use. In particular, the 
absenteeism data sets were only available beginning in 1998 until 2004 since it was 
collected for another purpose and could not be easily updated for this current study. A 
timeline of availability of human resources data sets is identified in table 1. 
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Table 1: Timeline of Availability of Human Resources Data-All Unions 
Union Collective Grievance Injury Absence Voluntary Adver e 
Group Bargaining Turnover Events 
Timeline 
AAHP February 98 April 01 April 01 January 98 January 97 January 97 
To To To To To To 
Apri l 07 April 07 March 07 December 04 January 09 November 08 
NAPE January 97 January 0 I April 01 January 98 January 97 January 97 
HS To To To To To To 
April 08 MayO? March 07 December 04 December 08 November 08 
NAPE January 97 January 0 I Apri l 01 January 98 January 97 January 97 
LX To To To To To To 
April 08 May 07 March 07 December 04 November 08 November 08 
NLNU January 95 January 01 April 01 January 98 January 97 January 97 
To To To To To To 
July 08 MayO? March 07 December 04 February 09 November 08 
3.5 Union Groups 
This study utilizes administrative data sets, compiled for each of the unions under 
study, including AAHP, NAPE, and the NLNU. While each union will be described in 
more detail in the next section, it is important to note that employees within these union 
groups have varying levels of education, training, experience, job requirements, pay 
grades, employment status, seniority, work hours (with some required to work twelve 
hour shifts, and some working both days and nights), as well as differing levels of 
professional responsibility. However, while they have these differences, they are similar 
in the fact that they are all represented by the union culture, and function under the 
unionized umbrella of solidarity, fairness and support. 
These employees work for the largest health care organization in the province, with 
little to no recourse open to them for organizational change. There is only one health 
care organization on the A val on Peninsula; therefore, if individuals felt the need to 
change organizations, they would face having to relocate with subsequent loss of 
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employment status, seniority, pay level and respect gained through years of service 
devoted to the same organization. This may be the prime opportunity for employees to 
utilize mechanisms of voice, including those under study: formal grievances, injury 
reporting, missing days from work, increased errors, and while quitting may be a difficult 
decision, it is still possible and warrants examination in its own right. The individual 
unions are described in the following sections. 
3.5.1AAHP 
The Association of Allied Health Professionals (AAHP) is a union that represents a 
wide and varied group of health professionals including: physiotherapists; dieticians; 
occupational therapists; social workers; pharmacists; psychologists; respiratory 
therapists; audiologists; speech language pathologists; mental health counselors, among 
others (2004). AAHP union members have varied educational (with most being 
university educated) and clinical backgrounds, responsibilities, job tasks, and levels of 
expertise within their particular fields of practice (AAHP). 
3.5.2 NAPE HS and NAPE LX 
The Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees 
(NAPE), is unique due to the fact that it has subgroups of employees who are categorized 
separately and utilize separate collective bargaining cycles. For this reason alone, NAPE 
data was separated into two distinct subgroups for this study, in order to more accurately 
link the process of collective bargaining to potential voice mechanisms. The two 
subgroups are NAPE HS and NAPE LX. 
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NAPE HS represents housekeeping (domestic and clinical areas) and support staff 
(Mr. E. Wade, personal communication, July 27, 2009; NAPE, 2009). Support staff 
includes: orderlies; clerical and medical records staff; food services staff; technicians 
from computer/dental and payroll areas; mail room employees and 
storekeeping/purchasing staff; assistants from occupational therapy, social work and 
physiotherapy areas; licensed practical nurses and personal care attendants (Mr. 
E. Wade; NAPE). NAPE LX includes laboratory and x-ray employees (NAPE; Mr. E. 
Wade). These separate groups, while being represented by the NAPE union, have the 
distinction of differing educational requirements, responsibilities, job tasks, as well as 
associated professional standing. 
3.5.3NLNU 
The Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses Union (NLNU) represents registered nurses 
and nurse practitioners (2007). These nurses may be working within the nursing units 
located in city hospitals, or in a wide variety of areas under the Eastern Health umbrella, 
including: education, staff health, and in a number of outpatient clinics. NLNU members 
can have a variety of educational levels, may be diploma or degree prepared, and may 
have advanced levels of education and training (NLNU). In result, nurses will have 
differing levels of responsibilities, job tasks and expertise within their areas of 
professional practice. 
3.6 Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining information was obtained from the NLHBA (2007). This 
information contained a detailed list of specific collective bargaining events related to 
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each union' s collective bargaining process, recorded by date and event (NLHBA). Each 
union was noted to have its own collective bargaining agenda and negotiation process, 
following a very unpredictable and evolving pattern (NLHBA). 
Once the collective bargaining information was gathered from the NLHBA, time 
intervals were produced, by the principal investigator. These time intervals were based 
on the particular collective bargaining events, for each of the unions being studied. The 
start date was initiated on the actual day each collective bargaining event occurred, and 
each time interval ended the day prior to the next collective bargaining event. Since the 
start and end dates were completely dependent upon collective bargaining events, which 
occur at different times, each of these time intervals were variable in length. The time 
intervals were created to represent specific and important steps in the negotiation process, 
and include events, such as: opening proposals, meetings, negotiations, mediation, 
collective agreement signed/expired, strike vote, strike action, conciliation, tentative 
agreements, legislated agreements and ratified agreements (NLHBA, 2007). 
Additional descriptive periods were created for this study as a way to delineate 
particular times of ebb and flow within a collective bargaining cycle, including periods of 
"calm", which were used to categorize the periods of time when there were no collective 
bargaining events occurring; periods of"heating up", which represent the "build-up" to 
potentially volatile collective bargaining events; as well as "cooling off' periods, which 
were periods of time after significant collective bargaining events took place. In 
addition, periods of "resolution" were created to signify events that indicated that an 
agreement was reached. These periods of "calm", "heating up", and "cooling off' as well 
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as "resolution" occurred frequently throughout the collective bargaining cycles for each 
of the unions under study. The time lines showing a visual account of collective 
bargaining events and their related descriptive periods, for each union under study, are 
located at the end of this chapter. 
3. 7 Outcomes of Interest 
3.7.1 Grievance 
Grievance is the process that unionized employees utilize to voice unfairness 
regarding the administration of the collective agreement by the management of an 
organization; in essence grievances are the way for employees to formally voice a 
violation ofthe collective agreement (Hebdon & Brown, 2008). The grievance data set 
used within this study contains all grievances from 2001 to 2007, for the AAHP, NAPE 
HS, NAPE LX, and NLNU union groups of Eastern Health, St. John's region, acute care 
sector (Eastern Health, 2007). 
Daily counts of grievances were provided throughout this time frame, with each entry 
containing the date, type of grievance, and union affiliation. The grievance data set 
includes general complaints gathered from 2003-2007, harassment complaints from 
2001-2006 and human rights complaints from 2001-2007 (Eastern Health, 2007). Each 
of these measures was combined to represent the overall "grievance rate" per union. 
Using the specific collective bargaining time intervals created for this study, counts and 
rates of grievances were calculated and results were used to populate tables created for 
each union. These results were used to identify whether there were any trends in using 
grievance behavior, surrounding the collective bargaining cycle. 
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3.7.2 Injury Reporting 
The injury data set provides daily counts of reported injuries, occurring between 2001 
and 2007 for each of the unions being studied (Eastern Health, 2007). Each entry 
indicates the date of the claim, and the union affiliation of the unnamed employee who 
submitted the claim (Eastern Health, 2007). These data were organized into one EXCEL 
file per union, including all dates, and years for each of the union groups. Once this was 
done, counts and rates of reported injuries were calculated based upon the collective 
bargaining time intervals formulated by the principal investigator and further were used 
to populate tables created for each union group. This enabled the investigator to identify 
the use of injury reporting, as well as any potential spikes in this behavior during the 
collective bargaining cycle. 
3.7.3 Absence 
The absenteeism data set includes daily counts of absences, or missed days from 
work, compiled from 1998 to 2004, for each union under study (Eastern Health, 2007). 
These data were organized into one EXCEL file per union, containing all observed counts 
and all years of data, for each union group. Results were then used to populate tables 
representing counts and rates of absences, based on the collective bargaining time frames 
created for this study, facilitating an examination of how absenteeism varies across the 
bargaining cycle for each union group. 
3.7.4 Voluntary Turnover 
The turnover data set provides daily counts of employee voluntary quit behavior, 
occurring between 1997-2008 (Eastern Health, 2009). Each entry indicates the date of 
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quit, and the particular union affiliation for each resignation (Eastern Health, 2009). 
These data were organized into one EXCEL file representing all dates and years of 
voluntary turnover behavior, for each union being studied. Once the data was organized 
appropriately, counts and rates of voluntary turnover were calculated based on the 
collective bargaining time intervals created for this current study, and these results were 
used to populate the tables created for each union group. This assisted the investigator in 
the assessment of the use of voluntary turnover behavior in relation to collective 
bargaining cycles. 
3.7.5Adverse Events 
For this particular study, the investigation of workplace errors was completed through 
the use of adverse events data sets from the Eastern Health organization, St. John' s region 
(Eastern Health, 2009). This large data set, contained a wide variety of events, including 
(among others): medication issues; personal property losses; equipment issues; specimen 
issues; treatment issues; cancellations; dietary problems; staffing availability; and patient 
and visitor accidents and injuries (Eastern Health, 2009). 
The human resources data set provided daily counts of adverse events occurring 
within the Eastern Health organization, St. John's region, throughout the time period of 
1997-2008, and was provided in two large EXCEL files (Eastern Health, 2009). Each 
occurrence included the date of event, the type of event, and outcome, if known (Eastern 
Health, 2009). This data set is the only one being utilized within this study that was not 
organized by union affiliation. In fact, this data set does not include any identification of 
union affiliation for any of the adverse events indicated. This is a significant issue with 
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this data set, as it is difficult to surmise a true relationship between collective bargaining 
events and the occurrence of these adverse events, without knowing union affiliation. 
However, it is quite likely that the omission of union affiliation was intentional, so as to 
encourage reporting of such events, rather than assigning blame, and increasing fear 
amongst staff. 
Within the adverse events data set, each event could be related to a multitude of staff, 
employed by any of the unions under study. While a limitation to this current study, 
there is still great interest in how the rates of employee behaviors are influenced by 
collective bargaining events, regardless of union affiliation. As such, the same data is 
applied to each union's collective bargaining cycle. Clearly, data that could more 
accurately link adverse events to specific unions would be of more value; however 
evaluating the associati.on between collective bargaining and adverse events, could help 
identify whether there is a relationship between these concepts. That being said, if a 
significant association can be found between this data and the collective bargaining 
process, it is likely that it will be an under-estimate of the true relationship between these 
concepts since accurate counts of events for each union are unknown, while the data set 
for this outcome is extremely large. 
3.8 Methodology 
This study utilized a descriptive, observational case-series design, whereby the effects 
of collective bargaining upon the employee behaviors of grievance, injury reporting, 
absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events, were investigated in relation to 
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specific collective bargaining events, to examine whether particular union groups were 
more responsive to the collective bargaining process than others. 
3.8.1 Data Analysis 
The descriptive analysis was performed and graphs produced using EXCEL software. 
Broad trends and patterns of grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary turnover 
and adverse events were identified and further compared and contrasted to the unique 
union collective bargaining time intervals created for this study. 
The negative binomial regression analysis, discussed in detail in the next chapter, was 
performed using STATA software (2003). Negative binomial regression was chosen as 
the primary method of analysis, as it is a technique that is utilized to count events over 
varied periods of time, which is of prime importance to this current study, as well as 
being the favored technique when data is over-dispersed, which is the case of data used in 
this study (Coxe, West & Aiken, 2009; Hilbe, 2007; STAT A). In particular, negative 
binomial regression will assess the trends and variances of the data, before and after an 
event over time (Coxe, West & Aiken; Hilbe; Jablin & Putnam, 2004; Kenyon and 
Dawkins, 1981 ; Mesch & Dalton, 1992). In this case, the desired event is collective 
bargaining and the measurements analyzed include the employee voice mechanisms of 
grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events. The 
purpose of this analysis was to assess the rate at which employee behaviors occurred 
before and after each collective bargaining event. 
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3.8.2 Variables 
The independent variable for this study is the various phases of the collective 
bargaining process. For this inquiry, the collective bargaining time frames that were 
created and utilized were specific to the particular collective bargaining events identified 
from the Newfoundland and Labrador Health Boards Association data. These collective 
bargaining events were then further broken down and categorized according to "broad 
themes" of collective bargaining, identified by the principal investigator. These broad 
themes were used to group similar collective bargaining events into categories that could 
better facilitate the regression analysis process. 
Collective bargaining events occurring at the beginning ofthe bargaining cycle, 
including: opening proposals, meetings, conciliation, negotiations, requesting 
negotiations, deferring notice to bargain, being served notice to negotiate, not returning to 
the bargaining table, final offer, as well as final agreement, were grouped into the 
category of"heating up". Heating up represents the time frame that the union 
membership may become ready for further union action, and can also indicate increased 
union involvement and activity prior to particularly volatile events, such as strike votes. 
"Resolution" represents the category of events which signifies an agreement being 
reached, including: memo of understanding signed, tentative agreement reached, ratified 
agreement, ratification vote, negotiated settlement, and legislated agreement; times when 
the end of the bargaining cycle is near, and the union group has begun to prepare for the 
collective agreement to be signed. 
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"Cooling off' was denoted as the time when significant collective bargaining events 
had just ended with agreements reached. These periods occur throughout the collective 
bargaining cycle, representing times that the union membership may have come out of a 
particularly volatile period, such as a long collective bargaining cycle, job action, as well 
as periods following the collective agreement being signed. In addition, periods of 
"calm" occur throughout the collective bargaining cycle, always following periods of 
cooling off, signifying the length of time between the end of one collective bargaining 
cycle and the beginning of another, in which no collective bargaining events take place. 
It is during periods of "calm" where union membership settles down following the end of 
the collective bargaining cycle. These "calm" periods can be of varying lengths of time, 
and are completely dependent upon the particular collective bargaining cycles of each 
un1on group. 
The only events that were not assigned to any of the above mentioned descriptive 
periods were "strike", "collective agreement expired" and "collective agreement signed". 
The reason for this is that these events were considered to be "stand-alone" events within 
the collective bargaining cycle, for data analysis purposes. Tables for each union, 
provided at the end of this chapter (Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5), identifies both the description 
of the collective bargaining event, as well as the broad category of collective bargaining. 
The voice mechanisms being studied, including: grievance, injury reporting, absenteeism, 
voluntary turnover and adverse events, were the dependent variables in this analysis. 
These mechanisms of voice were studied retrospectively in order to assess and identify 
how often employees of the Eastern Health organization, St. John' s region, were utilizing 
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such behaviors, on a daily basis, in association with the collective bargaining cycles of 
their respective union groups. 
3.8.3 Assumptions 
There were numerous assumptions formed throughout this study. While union groups 
were analyzed separately, there may have been an indication of a relationship between 
these union groups where none may actually exist. These unions may have no 
similarities except for the fact that they are all union groups; their union culture may 
actually be extremely different. 
There is also an assumption that these union members were aware of the different 
collective bargaining events occurring throughout each collective bargaining cycle, when 
they may realistically not be aware of when they take place, or whether the union 
executive is involved with the negotiation process. How informed union members are 
regarding particular collective bargaining activities, and how influenced they might be by 
them, may be quite different across union groups. Furthermore, different bargaining 
cycles may be more volatile than others, and it must also be said that other events 
occurring around previous collective bargaining events/cycles may have influenced the 
use of voice mechanisms, not the event itself. Obviously, the workplace climate may be 
an influencing factor upon the use of voice mechanisms, and should be considered as an 
important confounding factor when considering the reasons behind using employee 
behaviors as mechanisms of voice. 
Aspects of the occupations of each group may also play a role in whether an 
individual utilizes voice mechanisms. The educational level and professional standing 
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amongst each group does differ, and as such may influence union members in different 
ways. Further to this is the idea that higher educated individuals may have less 
opportunity for change with fewer employers to choose from, such as those who are 
employed in the laboratory and x-ray setting, nursing, as well as other health professions. 
3.9. Statistical Measurement 
3.9.1 Organization of Data 
Data were organized into one EXCEL file per outcome, for each union. "Counts" 
were considered to be the number ofbehaviors occurring each consecutive day. The 
collective bargaining time frames that were created were used as a framework to 
calculate the total number of count behaviors occurring within each of these periods. All 
counts occurring between the start and end dates of each collective bargaining time frame 
were added together, providing the "true count" of events for that particular time period. 
To ensure accuracy of the data, missing days, or days with no actual occurrences, were 
issued a date and given a count of "zero". 
Once the true counts were determined, rates of the occurrences were then calculated, 
using the number of days in each particular collective bargaining time frame as the 
"exposure period" (or y), and the actual number of outcomes occurring within each of 
these time frames (or x). Rates were calculated using the equation x/y. Tables created 
indicating the true counts as well as the calculated rates for the outcomes of interest, for 
each union group, are provided in Appendix 1. 
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3.9.2 Descriptive Analysis 
A descriptive analysis was performed to facilitate the organization and general 
summary of the data being studied. A variety of descriptive tests were performed on the 
data, including those related to dispersion, central tendency, and distribution, including: 
mean, median, mode, standard deviation, variance, range, sum as well as the minimum 
and maximum values of the data. Each ofthese tests helped to describe the data, and 
assisted with comprehending discrete events. In addition, calculation of rates of 
grievance, reported injuries, absenteeism, adverse events and voluntary turnover, allowed 
for comparison of findings across union groups through identification of obvious spikes 
in these calculations, related to the collective bargaining cycle. 
3.9.3 Negative Binomial Regression 
The negative binomial regression technique was the method utilized to measure the 
mechanisms of voice under study and the probability of such outcomes occurring over 
time, particularly when data is over-dispersed (Coxe, West & Aiken, 2009; Hilbe, 2007; 
ST ATA, 2003). This form of regression analysis allowed the principal investigator to 
establish if there were any significant relationships between the mechanisms of voice and 
collective bargaining events. 
3.9.4 Results 
Once the methodology was formulated, and the measures completed, results were 
generated. In chapter four the descriptive analysis will be presented and following this, 
in chapter five, the negative binomial regression analysis will be discussed. These 
analyses will assist the principal investigator to draw comparisons between the outcomes 
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of interest and the collective bargaining process, for the unions under study. Further, 
they will help the investigator identify conclusions regarding the significance of such 
events upon union groups from a large health care organization. 
Table 2: Visual Account of Collective Bargaining Events and Associated Broad 
Categories of Collective Bargaining-AAHP 
Union Start Dat.e End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of 
Bargaining Event Collective Bargaining 
Event 
AAHP 9-Feb-98 29-Mar-98 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
AAHP 30-Mar-98 18-0ct-98 Meetings Heating Up 
AAHP 19-0ct-98 17-Dec-98 Conciliation Heating Up 
AAHP 18-Dec-98 29-Apr-99 Meetings Heating Up 
AAHP 30-Apr-99 27-Jun-99 MOU Signed Resolution 
AAHP 28-Jun-99 28-Jul-99 Collective Agreement Signed Col lective Agree. Signed 
AAHP 29-Jul-99 29-Aug-99 Cooling Off Cool ing Off 
AAHP 30-Aug-99 4-Dec-00 Calm Calm 
AAHP 5-Dec-00 14-May-01 Union Requests Negotiations Heating_ UJ> 
AAHP 15-May-0 1 13-Jun-01 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
AAHP 14-Jun-01 30-Jun-0 I Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
AAHP 1-Jul-01 5-Sep-01 Heating Up Heating Up 
AAHP 6-Sep-0 I 25-Sep-01 Meetings Heating Up 
AAHP 26-Sep-01 10-0ct-01 Union A_j)J>Iied for Conciliation Heating Up 
AAHP 11 -0ct-0 1 28-0ct-0 1 Conciliation Heating Up 
AAHP 29-0ct-0 I 7-Feb-02 Tentative Agreement Resolution 
AAHP 8-Feb-02 8-Mar-02 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agree. Signed 
AAHP 9-Mar-02 9-Apr-02 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
AAHP I 0-AJ>r-02 29-Jun-04 Calm Calm 
AAHP 30-Jun-04 7-Jul-04 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
AAHP 8-Jul-04 25-May-05 Union Deferred Notice to Bargain Heating Up 
AAHP 26-May-05 21-Mar-06 Gov't. Served Notice to Negotiate Heating Up 
AAHP 22-Mar-06 6-Jul-06 Negotiations Heating Up 
AAHP 7-Jul-06 20-Aug-06 Ratified A~reement Resolution 
AAHP 2 1-Aug-06 21-Sep-06 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agree. Signed 
AAHP 22-Sep-06 22-0ct-06 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
AAHP 23-0ct-06 26-Apr-07 Calm Calm 
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Table 3: Visual Account of Collective Bargaining Events and Associated Broad 
Categories of Collective Bargaining-NAPE HS 
Union Start Date End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of 
Bargaining Event Collective Bargaining Event 
NAPEHS 1-Jan-97 30-Nov-97 Cairn Calm 
NAPEHS 1-Dec-97 31-Dec-97 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPEHS 1-Jan-98 23-Feb-98 Negotiations Heating Up 
NAPEHS 24-Feb-98 1-Jun-98 Strike Notice Heating Up 
NAPEHS 2-Jun-98 2-Jul-98 Negotiated Settlement Resolution 
NAPEHS 3-Jul-98 3-Aug-98 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPE HS 4-Aug-98 4-Sep-00 Calm Calm 
NAPEHS 5-Sep-00 5-0ct-00 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPEHS 6-0ct-00 28-Jan-0 I Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NAPEHS 29-Jan-0 I 5-Mar-0 I Conciliation Heating Up 
NAPEHS 6-Mar-0 I 22-Mar-01 Strike Vote Heating Up 
NAPEHS 23-Mar-0 I 31-Mar-01 Collective Agree. Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
NAPE HS 1-Apr-01 5-Apr-01 Strike Strike 
NAPEHS 6-Agr-01 6-May-01 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPEHS 7-May-01 14-May-01 Negotiated Settlement Resolution 
NAPEHS 15-May-01 5-Jun-0 I MOU Signed Resolution 
NAPE HS 6-Jun-0 I 9-Jul-01 Ratification Vote Resolution 
NAPE HS 10-Jul-01 10-Aug-01 Collective Agree. Signed Col lective Agree. Signed 
NAPE AS 11-Aug-0 I 11-Sep-0 I Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPEHS 12-Sep-01 15-Jun-03 Calm Calm 
NAPE HS 16-Jun-03 31-0ct-03 Union Requests Heating Up 
Negotiations in Oct. 2003 
NAPE HS 1-Nov-03 9-Nov-03 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPEHS 10-Nov-03 2-Dec-03 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NAPEHS 3-Dec-03 14-Jan-04 Union Wrote NLHBA to Heating Up 
Negotiate 
NAPEHS 15-Jan-04 16-Feb-04 Union Requests Heating Up 
Conciliation 
NAPE HS 17-Feb-04 3-Mar-04 Strike Vote Commenced Heating Up 
NAPE HS 4-Mar-04 20-Mar-04 Strike Vote Conclude Heating Up 
NAPE HS 21-Mar-04 31-Mar-04 Collective Agree. Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
NAPE HS 1-Apr-04 3-May-04 Strike Strike 
NAPE HS 4-May-04 4-Jun-04 Collective Agree. Signed Collective Agree. Signed 
NAPEHS 5-Jun-04 5-Jul-04 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPEHS 6-Jul-04 30-Mar-08 Calm Calm 
NAPEHS 31-Mar-08 30-Apr-08 Collective Agree. Expired Col lective Agree. Expired 
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Table 4: Visual Account of Collective Bargaining Events and Associated Broad 
Categories of Collective Bargaining-NAPE LX 
Union Start Date End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of 
Bargaining Event Collective Bargaining Event 
NAPE LX 1-Jan-97 16-Jun-97 Calm Calm 
NAPE LX 17-Jun-97 17-Jul-97 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NAPE LX 18-Jul-97 8-Mar-98 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPE LX 9-Mar-98 24-Nov-98 MOU Signed Resolution 
NAPE LX 25-Nov-98 25-Dec-98 Collective Agree. Signed Collective A!rreement Signed 
NAPE LX 26-Dec-98 26-Jan-99 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPE LX 27-Jan-99 12-0ct-00 Calm Calm 
NAPE LX 13-0ct-00 17-0ct-00 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NAPE LX 18-0ct-00 24-0ct-00 Strike Strike 
NAPE LX 25-0ct-00 25-Dec-00 Mediated Return to Work Cooling Off 
NAPE LX 26-Dec-00 29-Mar-0 1 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPE LX 30-Mar-0 I 3 1-Mar-01 Collective A!rree. Expired Collective Agreement Expired 
NAPE LX 1-Apr-01 5-Apr-01 Strike Strike 
NAPE LX 6-Apr-0 I 18-Jul-0 I Negotiated Settlement Resol ution 
NAPE LX 19-Jul-0 I 19-Aug-01 Collective Agree. Si!!lled Collective Agreement Signed 
NAPE LX 20-Aug-0 1 20-Sep-0 I Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPE LX 2 1-Sep-0 I 6-Nov-03 Calm Calm 
NAPE LX 7-Nov-03 14-Jan-04 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NAPE LX 15-Jan-04 25-Jan-04 Union Requests Heating Up 
Conciliation 
NAPE LX 26-Jan-04 29-Mar-04 Heating Up Heating Up 
NAPE LX 30-Mar-04 31-Mar-04 Collective Agree. Expired Collective Agreement Expired 
NAPE LX 1-Apr-04 3-May-04 Strike Strike 
NAPE LX 4-May-04 4-Jun-04 Collective Agree. Signed Collective Agreement Signed 
NAPE LX 5-Jun-04 5-Jul-04 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NAPE LX 6-Jul-04 30-Mar-08 Calm Calm 
NAPE LX 31-Mar-08 30-Apr-08 Collective Agree. Expired Collective Agreement Expired 
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Table 5: Visual Account of Collective Bargaining Events and Associated Broad 
Categories of Collective Bargaining-NLNU 
Union Start Date End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of 
Bargaining Event Collective Bargaining 
Event 
NLNU 1-Jan-95 12-Jan-95 Calm Calm 
NLNU 13-Jan-95 13-Feb-95 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agree. Signed 
NLNU 14-Feb-95 14-Mar-95 CoolingOff Cooling Off 
NLNU 15-Mar-95 30-Dec-95 Calm Calm 
NLNU 31-Dec-95 3 1-Jan-96 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
NLNU 1-Feb-96 26-Nov-97 Heating Up Heating Up 
NLNU 27-Nov-97 27-Dec-97 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NLNU 28-Dec-97 25-Jan-99 Heating Up Heating Up 
NLNU 26-Jan-99 15-Mar-99 Strike Vote Heating Up 
NLNU 16-Mar-99 23-Mar-99 Conciliation Heating Up 
NLNU 24-Mar-99 3 1-Mar-99 Strike Strike 
NLNU 1-Apr-99 1-May-99 Legislated Agreement Resolution 
NLNU 2-May-99 2-Jun-99 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NLNU 3-Jun-99 4-0ct-0 1 Calm Calm 
NLNU 5-0ct-0 I 14-Nov-01 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NLNU 15-Nov-01 26-Feb-02 Meetings Heating Up 
NLNU 27-Feb-02 5-Mar-02 Conci liation Requested by Union Heating Up 
NLNU 6-Mar-02 23-May-02 Conci liation Heating Up 
NLNU 24-May-02 2 1-Jul-02 Ratified Agreement Resolution 
NLNU 22-Ju l-02 22-Aug-02 Collective Agreement Signed Collective A!ITee. Si!!lled 
NLNU 23-Aug-02 23-Sep-02 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NLNU 24-Sept-02 I 0-Jun-04 Calm Calm 
NLNU 11-Jun-04 29-Jun-04 Union Announces not Returning to Heating Up 
Bargaining Table in 2004 
NLNU 30-Jun-04 30-Jul-04 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agree. Expired 
NLNU 31-Jul-04 25-May-05 Heating up Heating Up 
NLNU 26-May-05 23-Feb-06 Gov' t Serves Notice to Negotiate Heating Up 
NLNU 24-Feb-06 13-Apr-06 Opening Proposals Heating Up 
NLNU 14-Apr-06 14-May-06 Meetings Heating Up 
NLNU 15-May-06 23-May-06 Employer Requests Conciliation Heating Up 
NLNU 24-May-06 3-Jul-06 Meetings Heating UQ 
NLNU 4-Jul-06 5-Jul-06 Conci liation Heating Up 
NLNU 6-Jul-06 22-0ct-06 Final Offer Heating Up 
NLNU 23-0ct-06 3-Dec-06 Final Agreement Heating Up 
NLNU 4-Dec-06 25-Jan-07 Ratified Agreement Resolution 
NLNU 26-Jan-07 26-Feb-07 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agree. Signed 
NLNU 27-Feb-07 27-Mar-07 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
NLNU 28-Mar-07 29-Jun-08 Calm Cooling Off 
NLNU 30-Jun-08 30-Jul-08 Col lective Agreement Expired Col lective Agree. Expired 
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Chapter 4 
4. Descriptive Results 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between collective bargaining 
events and employee use of voice mechanisms: grievance, injury reporting, absence, 
voluntary turnover and adverse events. This chapter will present the descriptive results 
separately for each voice mechanism and union group. It is important to note that rates of 
the behaviors under study are, in part, determined by the size of the union, therefore 
making absolute comparison ofthe rates across all union groups, impossible. 
Rates of each voice mechanism will be visually represented in line graphs, which will 
correspond to the particular collective bargaining events occurring with each union 
group. In particular, each of these line graphs will clearly indicate collective bargaining 
events, and the date on which these events occurred. Twenty ofthese graphs have been 
produced for this study, and will be displayed within this chapter. It is important to note 
that any strike activity was taken out of these graphs, as the data was not clearly 
representative of these periods. The corresponding tables representing the underlying 
data are located in Appendix 1. The results of the negative binomial regression analysis 
will be presented separately in chapter five. 
4.1 Calculation of Rates 
The calculation of the rates utilized in both the tables and graphs correspond to each 
voice mechanism, per union group. These rates were performed using the x/y 
formula: with 'x ' representing the counts of behaviors for each collective bargaining 
event time frame, and 'y' representing the number of days duration of each of these time 
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frames, or the "exposure period". In each calculation, the results were rounded to the 
second place, after the decimal. These rates can be found within the tables located in 
Appendix 1. 
4.2 Grievance 
4.2.1AAHP 
AAHP Grievances 
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collective Bargaining Events 
Figure 1: AAHP Grievance Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
AAHP grievance rates indicate a number of key increases of grievance behaviors 
within the data, in association with particular collective bargaining events. The first, 
albeit mild increase, was noted following the collective bargaining event where the union 
requested negotiations, between December 5, 2000 and May 14, 2001 , when grievance 
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rates went from 0.01 to 0.03 between May 15, 2001 and June 13,2001 , when opening 
proposals were given. Following this slight increase, grievance rates fell to zero by the 
next collective bargaining event, between June 14, 2001 and June 30, 2001 , when the 
collective agreement expired. 
The most pronounced spike in grievances, for AAHP, occurred following the union 
requesting conciliation on September 26, 2001 (ending on October 10, 2001 ), when rates 
of grievance dramatically increased from zero to 0.11 within a 15-day period, when 
conciliation took place between October 11 , 2001 and October 28, 2001. At this point in 
time, the collective agreement had been expired for almost 4 months, with ongoing 
negotiation through meetings, leading up to the application for conciliation by the AAHP 
union executive. It is interesting to note that leading up to the conciliation event, rates of 
grievance remained at zero. 
Once conciliation took place, rates of grievances profoundly dropped to 0.03 by 
October 29, 2001 (between October 29, 2001 and February 7, 2002), when a tentative 
agreement was reached. Grievances remained at this level through the next event, 
between February 8, 2002 and March 8, 2002, when the collective agreement was signed. 
Once this agreement was finalized, grievance rates fell to zero, between March 9, 2002 
and April 9, 2002, (during a cooling off period). Grievance rates increased to 0.02 
between April 10, 2002 and June 29, 2004, when union members entered an extended 
period of calm, which lasted 812 days, during which no collective bargaining events took 
place. 
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The next collective bargaining cycle for the AAHP union began on June 30, 2004 
(between June 30,2004 and July 7, 2004), with a grievance rate of zero, when the 
collective agreement expired. Rates of grievance slightly increased from zero to 0.01 
between July 8, 2004 and May 25, 2005, when the union deferred notice to bargain. It is 
interesting to note that when the union deferred notice to bargain on July 8, 2004, it was 
shortly after the long volatile strike with the NAPE union, which occurred between April 
1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. It is possible that AAHP, fearing similar outcomes with 
bargaining, decided against approaching the bargaining table at that time. Grievance 
rates increasing within this time frame, suggest that union members may have been 
frustrated with this decision, and with the inflexibility of the government to reach a 
settlement with NAPE in a timely manner, as well as with their prospects for a fair 
collective bargaining process. 
Grievance rates continued to be steady at 0.01 (between May 26, 2005 and March 21 , 
2006, when the government served notice to negotiate) until between March 22, 2006 and 
July 6, 2006, when grievances rose to 0.02, when negotiations took place between the 
union and the employer. Grievances remained steady at the rate of0.02 through July 7, 
2006 to August 20, 2006, when the agreement was ratified. Once this event occurred, 
grievances dropped to zero between August 21 , 2006 and September 21 , 2006, when the 
collective agreement was signed. Rates remained at zero through the cooling off period, 
between September 22, 2006 and October 22, 2006, until October 23, 2006, when 
grievances rose to 0.03, during the period of calm that lasted 186 days, between October 
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23, 2006 and April 26, 2007. This rise in grievances occurred when no collective 
bargaining activity had taken place. 
Results indicate that for the most part, AAHP union members are not wholly 
responsive to the collective bargaining cycle, in so far as grievance patterns are 
concerned. However, the dramatic increase in grievance rates from zero, when the union 
requested conciliation between September 26, 2001 and October 10, 2001 , to 0.11 during 
the event of conciliation, between October 11 , 200 1 and October 28, 2001 , does suggest 
that employees may have been influenced by the labor relations environment at that time. 
In addition, increases in grievance activity throughout periods of calm, also lend 
credence to the idea that union members might be swayed by the collective bargaining 
process, and that they may become more responsive once negotiations end and their 
working environments return to normal, following collective bargaining events. 
Grievances increased during two separate periods of calm: the first being April 10, 2002 
(this calm period lasted until June 29, 2004), when grievance rates rose to 0.02, and the 
second period being on October 23, 2006 (this calm period lasted until April 26, 2007), 
when grievance rates rose to 0.03. These increases during periods of calm suggest that 
workers may be utilizing the grievance mechanism of voice more often during times 
when collective bargaining activity has ended. 
68 
4.2.2 NAPE HS 
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Figure 2: NAPE HS Grievance Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
NAPE HS grievance rates indicate a number of dramatic increases in grievance 
behaviors within the data, in association with particular collective bargaining events. 
October 6, 2000 was the first collective bargaining event indicated within the data, with a 
grievance rate of0.08 (between October 6, 2000 and January 28, 2001), when the NAPE 
HS union initiated the negotiation process on behalf of their members, with opening 
proposals. Grievances rose dramatically in the following 36 days, to 0.50 between 
January 29, 2001 and March 5, 2001, when conciliation took place. Rates continued to 
increase to 0.53 between March 6, 2001 and March 22, 2001, when union members took 
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a strike vote. This rapid progression through collective bargaining events to a strike vote 
indicates high volatility within this union group, and with the negotiation process. This 
may have influenced members prior to the start of the collective bargaining cycle, as is 
suggested by the continual increases in grievance behaviors, throughout this short period. 
Another profound increase occurred between March 23, 2001 and March 31 , 2001 , 
with an increase in grievances to 0.78 in a 9-day period, during which the collective 
agreement expired. Strike action took place on April 1, 2001 (between April 1, 2001 and 
April 5, 2001). This strike lasted 5 days, and once employees were back to work, 
grievances quickly rose again. Between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 grievances rose 
rapidly to 0.26, during the period of cooling off that occurred after the volatile collective 
bargaining cycle ended. Rates continued to increase between May 7, 2001 and May 14, 
2001 with grievances rising to the highest rate within the data set to 0.88, during which a 
negotiated settlement was reached. Considering that this collective bargaining cycle only 
began on October 6, 2000, and quickly involved strike action by April 1, 2001, it is 
questionable whether union members were dissatisfied with the negotiation process, or 
with the final settlement, encouraging individuals to express their feelings through 
grievance behavior, or perhaps increasing the members' decision to follow through with a 
formal report of grievance. 
Following the negotiated settlement, between May 15, 2001 and June 5, 2001 , 
grievances fell to 0.45, when the memo of understanding was signed between the union 
and employer. On June 6, 2001 , rates of grievance continued to decrease to 0.32, during 
the period oftime when the ratification vote took place, between June 6, 2001 and July 9, 
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2001 . Following this event, rates rose to 0.63 when the collective agreement was signed 
(between July 10, 2001 and August 10, 2001); however, this increase was short-lived as 
rates dropped to 0.3 8 on August 11 , 2001 , during a cooling off period ending September 
11 , 2001 , following the end of the collective bargaining cycle. Rates rose to 0.83 from 
September 12, 2001 to June 15, 2003, during 642 days of calm that followed, a time 
when no collective bargaining activities took place. It is interesting to note that 
throughout this bargaining period, rates of grievance remained at a comparatively high 
level, which supports the concept that individuals who are affected or influenced by 
collective bargaining events, may utilize grievance as a voice mechanism. 
The next collective bargaining event for NAPE HS began on June 16, 2003, when the 
union requested that negotiations start, with an associated grievance rate of 0.38 between 
June 16, 2003 and October 31 , 2003. This rate rose slightly to 0.56 between November 
1, 2003 and November 9, 2003, during a period ofheating up when the union was about 
to enter the collective bargaining cycle. This slight rise was short lived as rates of 
grievance fell to 0.48 between November 10, 2003 and December 2, 2003 (with opening 
proposals), and even further to 0.37 between December 3, 2003 and January 14, 2004, 
when the union wrote the NLHBA requesting negotiations. 
Grievances rose to 0.64 between January 15, 2004 and February 16, 2004, when the 
union, on behalf of its members, requested conciliation. Rates of grievance continued to 
rise to 0.69 between February 17, 2004 and March 3, 2004, when a strike vote began, 
however, between the start and end of the strike vote between March 4, 2004 and March 
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20,2004, rates of grievance fell to 0.47, and again to 0.45, between March 21 , 2004 and 
March 31, 2004, when the collective agreement expired. 
A 33-day strike occurred between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. In the 32 days 
following the collective agreement being signed (between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 
2004), there was an increase in grievance activity to 0.63. Following this large increase 
in grievance rates, there was a decrease in grievances to 0.52, between June 5, 2004 and 
July 5, 2004, during the cooling off period. Rates again decreased to 0.49 during the 
almost 3 years of calm that occurred, between July 6, 2004 and May 29, 2007. 
It is important to remember that this strike action was a particularly long, drawn-out 
and negative campaign on both sides. Union members stayed on the picket line, 
receiving small monetary compensation throughout this period, impacting both their 
personal and professional lives; with little gain from the strike, given there was a 
legislated collective agreement. It is no wonder that following this lengthy event, 
grievance rates drastically increased throughout the time frame when the collective 
agreement was signed. It could have been the strike, the legislated agreement or details 
of this agreement, or even general dissatisfaction, that influenced individuals to utilize 
grievance behaviors. 
Results show that the NAPE HS union members seem to be quite responsive to a 
variety of events occurring throughout collective bargaining activity, as rates of grievance 
were found to be quite unstable throughout the bargaining cycles. Dramatic spikes in 
grievance rates were identified at key periods in the negotiation process. In particular, 
this was noted prior to and following the strike action taken by NAPE HS, twice within 
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the data. When the collective agreement expired on March 23, 2001 (between March 23, 
2001 and March 31 , 2001), grievance rates were 0.78. Following the first strike, 
occurring between April 1 and April 5, 2001 , grievances rose to 0.26 during the period of 
cooling off occurring between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 . Rates further increased to 
0.88 between May 7, 2001 and May 14, 2001 , when the negotiated settlement was 
reached. 
Likewise, when the collective agreement expired on March 21 , 2004, grievance rates 
were identified as 0.45 (between March 21 , 2004 and March 31 , 2004), and following the 
second strike, occurring on April 1, 2004 (ending May 3, 2004 ), grievances increased to 
0.63, between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004, when the collective agreement was signed. 
These spikes in grievance rates occurring before and after a strike event highlight how 
union members are responsive to particularly volatile collective bargaining events. 
In two of the three cooling off periods identified within the data, grievance rates 
increased. The first instance was between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 , corresponding 
to a cooling off period (and following strike action between April 1 and April 5, 2001 ), 
with rates of grievance at 0.26. Rates increased to 0.88 during the time frame when the 
negotiated settlement was reached, between May 7, 2001 and May 14, 2001. 
The second period of cooling off occurred between August 11, 2001 and September 
11 , 2001 , following the collective agreement being signed, on July 10, 2001. Rates of 
grievances, during this cooling off period, were at 0.38, however they increased to 0.83 
during the 642 days of calm, occurring between September 12, 2001 and June 15,2003 . 
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Interestingly, the last cooling off period on June 5, 2004 (between June 5, 2004 and 
July 5, 2004), showed a decrease in grievances following the collective agreement being 
signed, on May 4, 2004. This cooling off period had a grievance rate of 0.52 (down from 
0.63 in the previous period, when the collective agreement was signed, between May 4, 
2004 and June 4, 2004). Rates once again fell to 0.49 during the almost 3-year period of 
calm, which followed this cooling off period, between July 6, 2004 and May 29, 2007. 
This finding is quite interesting as these events followed a particularly acrimonious strike 
event lasting 33 days (between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004). While there was a slight 
decrease, these grievance rates continued to be at a fairly high level, suggesting that 
union members may have utilized grievance as a method to voice their discontent. 
74 
4.2.3 NAPE LX 
NAPE LX Grievances 
I --Grievance Rates I 
0.14 ..------------------------~---------. 
negobated 
selllement 
12/26/00 3130/01 4/6/01 7/19/01 8/20/01 9/21/01 11/7/03 1115/04 1/26/04 3130/04 5/4/04 6/5/04 7/6/04 3/31/08 
Collective Bargaining Events 
Figure 3: NAPE LX Grievance Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
NAPE LX grievance rates indicate a number of key increases and decreases in 
grievance activity within the data, in association with particular collective bargaining 
events. The first main decrease in activity occurred between December 26, 2000 and 
March 29, 2001 , during a period ofheating up, with grievance rates falling from 0.07 to 
zero when the collective agreement expired between March 30, 2001 and March 31 , 
2001 . An increase in grievance occurred following a 5-day strike (between April 1 and 
AprilS, 2001), with rates increasing to 0.12, when the negotiated settlement was reached, 
between April 6, 2001 and July 18, 2001. 
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Rates of grievance fell to 0.03 when the collective agreement was signed, on July 19, 
2001 (between July 19,2001 and August 19, 2001). However, these rates increased to 
0.06, between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001 , while members were in a period 
of cooling off. In addition, during the 777 days of calm, between September 21, 2001 
and November 6, 2003, rates decreased to 0.05. It is interesting to note that these 
grievance rates decrease following a collective bargaining cycle that contained two strike 
actions, the first on October 18, 2000 (ending October 24, 2000) and the second on April 
1, 2001 (ending April 5, 2001). These findings suggest that while the NAPE LX union 
group does utilize grievance activity, they are not wholly relying on this behavior as a 
way to voice their frustrations with the bargaining process. 
Grievance rates continued to drop to 0.04 as NAPE LX union entered their next round 
of collective bargaining, starting with opening proposals on November 7, 2003 (between 
November 7, 2003 and January 14, 2004). Following this period of time, rates dropped 
to zero on January 15, 2004 (between January 15, 2004 and January 25, 2004) when the 
union, on behalf of their members, applied for conciliation. This decrease was short 
lived, as grievance rates rose to 0.03 by January 26, 2004, during a period of heating up 
(between January 26, 2004 and March 29, 2004), leading into a more volatile period of 
bargaining. That said, by the time the collective agreement expired on March 30, 2004, 
grievance rates were again at zero. 
The next spike in grievances occurred following strike action on April 1, 2004, 
between Apri11 , 2004 and May 3, 2004. When the collective agreement was signed on 
May 4, 2004, rates of grievances rose to 0.06, in the 1-month period following the strike. 
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This increase was short lived, as rates of grievance fell to zero by June 5, 2004, during a 
period of cooling off occurring between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004. That said, by 
July 6, 2004, rates of grievance once again rose to 0.03 (between July 6, 2004 and March 
30, 2008) when the NAPE LX group was in their almost 4-year period of calm. 
However, following this extended period oftime (during which no bargaining activity 
was taking place), rates of grievances once again fell to zero, between March 31 , 2008 
and April 30, 2008, when the collective agreement expired. 
Examination of the data shows that the NAPE LX union group is not particularly 
responsive to the collective bargaining process, in so far as grievance patterns are 
concerned. That said, there are a number of spikes in grievance rates surrounding 
particularly important collective bargaining events. The most obvious spike in data 
occurs when the negotiated settlement was signed on April 6, 2001 (following a strike, 
between April 1, 2001 and April 5, 2001 ). During this period of time, rates of grievance 
increased to 0.12. This spike in rates suggests that this collective bargaining cycle was 
potentially a highly charged period of time; the spike in grievances may help to shed light 
upon the temperament of NAPE LX workers, throughout that time. 
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Figure 4: NLNU Grievance Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
NLNU grievance rates indicate a number of large increases and decreases in 
grievance behaviors, in association with particular collective bargaining events. The first 
increase in grievances occurred following the 855 days of calm, which occurred on June 
3, 1999 (between June 3, 1999 and October 4, 2001), when grievance rates were at 0.15. 
Following this period, the union submitted opening proposals for the next round of 
bargaining on October 5, 2001 (between October 5, 2001 and November 14, 2001) and at 
this time rates of grievance rose to 0.56, with a slight decrease in rates to 0.51 , between 
November 15, 2001 and February 26, 2002, during which the union was taking part in 
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meetings. Rates of grievance dropped to zero by February 27, 2002 (between February 
27, 2002 and March 5, 2002), when the union requested conciliation. This decrease was 
very short lived, as rates of grievance made the most profound increase in the data set 
between March 6, 2002 and May 23, 2002, when rates rose to 0.63, when conciliation 
took place. 
Fallowing conciliation, grievance rates gradually decreased throughout the remainder 
ofthe collective bargaining cycle, initially maintaining a level of0.53 when the 
agreement was ratified on May 24,2002 (between May 24, 2002 and July 21, 2002), and 
on July 22, 2002 when the collective agreement was signed (between July 22, 2002 and 
August 22, 2002). Rates of grievance dropped significantly to 0.22 during the cooling off 
period that occurred between August 23, 2002 and September 23, 2002. This drop in 
grievance rates did not last throughout the 626 days of calm that followed this collective 
bargaining cycle, as rates of grievance rose to 0.48 between September 24, 2002 and June 
10, 2004. 
The next collective bargaining cycle began with the NLNU announcing on June 11, 
2004 that they would not return to the bargaining table during the remainder of that year. 
This announcement preceded the collective agreement expiration on June 30, 2004. 
Rates of grievance during this time fell from 0.32 on June 11, 2004 (between June 11 , 
2004 and June 29, 2004), to 0.06 on June 30, 2004 (between June 30, 2004 and July 30, 
2004). Following this period oftime, union members entered into a 299-day period of 
heating up, whereby they were building up to the approaching negotiation process, 
between July 31,2004 and May 25,2005. During this period ofheating up, rates of 
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grievance rose to 0.28. When the government served notice to the union to begin 
negotiations, on May 26, 2005, rates of grievance fell to 0.17 (between May 26, 2005 and 
February 23, 2006). No further collective bargaining event took place until February 24, 
2006, when opening proposals were initiated, with rates of grievance decreasing to 0.04 
between February 24, 2006 and April 13, 2006. 
Rates of grievance continued to be extremely low during the next few events of this 
collective bargaining cycle: during meetings on April 14, 2006, grievances were 0.03 
(between April 14, 2006 and May 14, 2006); when the employer requested conciliation 
on May 15, 2006, rates of grievance dropped to zero (between May 15, 2006 and May 23, 
2006); during meetings, rates of grievance slightly rose to 0.02 (between May 24, 2006 
and July 3, 2006); and when conciliation took place on July 4, 2006, grievances fell to 
zero (between July 4, 2006 and July 5, 2006). That said, rates rose to 0.19 between July 
6, 2006 and October 22, 2006, when the final offer was given. When the final agreement 
was reached on October 23, 2006 (between October 23, 2006 and December 3, 2006), 
grievances again rose to 0.33 ; however following this event, rates consistently lowered to 
0.25, when the agreement was ratified on December 4, 2006 (between December 4, 2006 
and January 25, 2007) and the collective agreement being signed on January 26, 2007 
(grievances decreased to 0.03, between January 26, 2007 and February 26, 2007). Once 
this collective bargaining period was finished and employees entered into the period of 
cooling off (between February 27, 2007 and March 27, 2007), rates again increased to 
0.07, however they rose to 0.10 throughout the 41 days of calm, occurring between 
March 28, 2007 and May 7, 2007. 
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This data indicates that the NLNU grievance patterns are not especially responsive to 
collective bargaining events. That said, the period of profound increase in grievance 
rates to 0.63 between March 6, 2002 and May 23, 2002, during conciliation (which rose 
from zero grievances occurring between February 27, 2002 and March 5, 2002, when 
conciliation was requested by the union), indicates that certain events may play a part in 
the use of grievance activity for this union group. In addition, other significant increases 
in grievances occurred throughout the collective bargaining cycles, further lending 
support to the idea that some collective bargaining events seem to influence employees to 
utilize grievance as a voice mechanism, more than others. 
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Figure 5: AAHP Injury Reporting Rates during Collective Bargaining 
Events 
AAHP reported injury rates indicate that there was an obvious spike in injuries being 
reported after the tentative agreement was reached on October 29, 2001 (ending February 
7, 2002), with a rate of0.11. Between February 8, 2002 and March 8, 2002, reported 
injury rates rapidly increased to 0.45, when the collective agreement was signed. Once 
this occurred, rates decreased to 0.13 during the cooling off period, occurring between 
March 9, 2002 and April 9, 2002. This decline continued to 0.08, throughout the period 
of calm occurring between April 10, 2002 and June 29, 2004, which lasted for 812 days. 
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Interestingly, the collective agreement expired on June 30, 2004, and the rates of injuries 
being reported between this date and July 7, 2004 increased to 0.13, within this 8-day 
period. 
Throughout the observation period, there were a number of minor spikes in rates of 
reported injuries that corresponded to times when the AAHP union became more 
involved in labor relations activities. The first spike occurred following opening 
proposals in the negotiation process, between May 15, 2001 and June 13, 2001 , with a 
corresponding reported injury rate of0.03. Between June 14, 2001 and June 30, 2001 , 
the reported injury rate increased to 0.06, when the collective agreement expired. This 
slow, steady rise in reported injuries continued with union members entering a heating up 
period between July 1, 2001 and September 5, 2001 , corresponding to a reported injury 
rate of0.07, and further when meetings were taking place, between September 6, 2001 
and September 25, 2001 , with a rate of0.15. 
The other minor spike in rates of reported injuries occurred following negotiations 
occurring between March 22, 2006 and July 6, 2006, with a rate of 0.06. Rates of 
reported injuries increased following this event when the agreement was ratified on July 
7, 2006 until August 20,2006, with a rate of0.09, and further rose to 0.13 when the 
collective agreement was signed, between August 21 , 2006 and September 21 , 2006. 
Once again, there was a continual and steady increase in rates of reported injuries, which 
suggests that temperaments remained elevated throughout this period. 
Likewise, there were a number of minor drops of injuries being reported within the 
observation period. The first decline in rates occurred following the union applying for 
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conciliation, between September 26, 2001 and October 10, 2001 , with a rate of0.13. 
After this event occurred, rates of injury reporting dropped to zero when conciliation took 
place between October 11 , 2001 and October 28, 200,1. In addition, there was a second 
minor drop in rates of reported injuries following the union deferring notice to bargain, 
between July 8, 2004 and May 25, 2005, with a rate of0.13, with a decrease in rates 
occurring between May 26, 2005 and March 21 , 2006, with a rate of0.07, when the 
government was served notice to negotiate. These rates dropped further between March 
22, 2006 and July 6, 2006, when negotiations were taking place, with a corresponding 
rate of reported injuries at 0.06. 
Finally, the last minor decline in reported injury rates occurred after the collective 
agreement was signed on August 21 , 2006, with a rate of 0.13 occurring between August 
21 , 2006 and September 21,2006. Rates ofreported injuries dropped to 0.10, between 
September 22, 2006 and October 22, 2006, during which union members entered a 
cooling off period. This decreasing trend continued through the period of calm, lasting 
186 days, between October 23, 2006 and April26, 2007, when reported injury rates 
dropped to 0.04. 
These results indicate that the AAHP union may not be overtly influenced by 
collective bargaining events, at least when considering reported injuries. That said, there 
were spikes and declines in reported injuries surrounding particularly disruptive 
collective bargaining events, which could be an indication that collective bargaining did 
provide some sort of influence upon members to utilize the reporting of injuries as a 
mechanism of voice. 
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Figure 6: NAPE HS Injury Reporting Rates during Collective Bargaining 
Events 
NAPE HS data indicates spikes in rates of injury reporting that correspond to 
collective bargaining events. The first major spike in rates of reported injuries occurred 
following a 5-day strike (between April 1, 2001 and April 5, 2001), with a reported injury 
rate of 1.29, between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 , during a period of cooling off, 
which followed the volatile strike activity. This increase continued to 1.63 , between May 
7, 2001 and May 14, 2001 , with a negotiated settlement. 
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Following this negotiated settlement, rates of reported injury beg.an its decline, 
between May 15, 2001 and June 5, 2001 , when a memo of understanding was signed. At 
this point, reported injury rates were 1.45. Rates dropped to 1.41 when the ratification 
vote was taken, between June 6, 2001 and July 9, 2001 , and once the collective 
agreement was signed between July 10, 2001 and August 10, 2001 , rates had decreased to 
1.28. Rates of reported injuries continued downward to 0.97, while members were in a 
cooling off period, from August 11, 2001 to September 11 , 2001. 
The next major increase in rates of reported injury for NAPE HS occurred during a 
period of calm, between September 12, 2001 and June 15, 2003, with a rate of2.10. It is 
interesting to note that this calm period, which lasted for 642 days, had an extremely high 
rate of injury reporting, during a period oftime when no active collective bargaining took 
place. This pattern of increased injury reporting continued to 2.34, between June 16, 
2003 and October 31 , 2003, when the union requested negotiations. 
Following this collective bargaining event, rates of injury reporting declined to 1. 78 
when the membership was in a period of heating up, prior to the start of the negotiations 
between November 1, 2003 and November 9, 2003. Rates continued to fall to 1.70 when 
the union was providing opening proposals, between November 10, 2003 and December 
2, 2003. 
The third spike in rates occurred between December 3, 2003 to January 14, 2004, 
with rates increasing to 2.12, when the union wrote the NLHBA, requesting negotiations. 
These rates continued to gradually increase, rising to 2.21 , between January 15, 2004 and 
February 16, 2004, when the union requested conciliation. Rates increased again to 2.38 
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between February 17, 2004 and March 3, 2004, when a strike vote took place. Once the 
strike vote occurred, rates of injury reporting began to decline and between March 4, 
2004 and March 20, 2004, rates were at 2.00. This decrease continued to 1.82, between 
March 21 , 2004 and March 31 , 2004, when the collective agreement expired. 
After the strike occurred, between April1 , 2004 and May 3, 2004, and workers were 
legislated back to work, rates of reported injuries rose to 1. 78 between May 4, 2004 and 
June 4, 2004, during which the collective agreement was signed. This increase continued 
through a period of cooling off, between June 5, 2004 and July 4, 2004, with rates of 
injury reporting increasing to 2.13. These increased rates of injuries being reported 
suggest that this period of time may have been volatile enough for workers to want to 
report injuries due to increased frustration from the collective bargaining cycle, and with 
the legislated agreement. While rates of injury reporting did slightly decline to 2.05, 
during the 1055 days of calm (between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2007), rates were still 
quite high in comparison to the rest of the study period. It is interesting to note that 
during the two periods of calm, between September 12, 2001 and June 15, 2003 and 
between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2007, rates of reported injury appear to be quite 
high, at 2.10 and 2.05, respectively. 
The data shows that the NAPE HS union group appears to be somewhat responsive to 
collective bargaining events, when considering injury reporting as a mechanism of voice. 
Spikes in rates of injury reporting occurred following key collective bargaining events, 
most notably their two strikes: on April I , 2001 (ending April5, 2001) and April 1, 2004 
(ending May 3, 2004). Both of these volatile events resulted in a rapid increase in rates 
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of injuries being reported throughout the period of time, following the strikes. These 
findings provide credibility to the suggestion that union members could be influenced by 
collective bargaining events, or quite possibly the outcomes of such events, and utilize 
the reporting of injury, as a form of response. 
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Figure 7: NAPE LX Injury Reporting Rates during Collective Bargaining 
Events 
NAPE LX data identifies multiple spikes in rates of reported injury corresponding to 
numerous collective bargaining events. The first spike in rates of reported injuries began 
following a 5-day strike action that occurred between April 1, 2001 and April 5, 2001. 
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When the negotiated settlement was reached, between April6, 2001 and July 18, 2001 , 
injury-reporting rates increased to 0.07. 
Following the collective agreement being signed on July 19, 2001 , reported injury 
rates lowered to 0.09, between July 19, 2001 and August 19,2001. Rates lowered further 
to 0.03, during the cooling off period, between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001. 
However, this period of decrease was short lived, as rates of reported injuries once again 
rose to 0.15 during the period of calm, occurring between September 21 , 2001 and 
November 6, 2003. 
Following this lengthy period of calm, the next collective bargaining cycle began 
between November 7, 2003 and January 14, 2004, with opening proposals. The 
corresponding reported injury rates for this time period were 0.09; however, there was a 
large spike in injury reporting during the next event, when the union requested 
conciliation, with a reported rate of injury at 0.27, between January 15, 2004 and January 
25, 2004. This rate was maintained throughout the next event, when a period of heating 
up occurred, between January 26, 2004 and March 29, 2004. 
Once the collective agreement expired, rates of injury reporting dropped to zero, 
between March 30, 2004 and March 31 , 2004. Following the strike that occurred 
between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004, rates of injury reporting rose to 0.09, between 
May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004, during which the collective agreement was signed. Rates 
of injury reporting continued to increase to 0.1 0, during the cooling off period, occurring 
between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004. Rates of reported injury further increased to 
0.14, during the 1362 days of calm, occurring between July 6, 2004 and March 28, 2007. 
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These results indicate that the NAPE LX union group appears to be responsive to 
particular collective bargaining events, most notably when the union requested 
conciliation on January 15, 2004 (between January 15, 2004 and January 25, 2004) and 
the period of heating up on January 26, 2004 (between January 26, 2004 to March 29, 
2004 ), with rates of reported injuries within both of these time frames, at 0.27. Both of 
these rates preceded the collective agreement expiring on March 30, 2004. In addition, 
following periods of heated strike action on April 1, 2001 (ending April 5, 2001) and 
again on April 1, 2004 (ending May 3, 2004), rates of injury reporting increased to 0.07 
(between April6, 2001 and July 18, 2001 , with a negotiated settlement) and 0.09 
(between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004, with the collective agreement being signed), 
respectively. In addition, it was noted that during two periods of calm, injury reporting 
rates increased: the first occurring between September 21, 2001 and November 6, 2003, 
with an injury reporting rate of 0.15 (an increase from 0.03 in the preceding cooling off 
period), and the second occurring between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2008, with an 
injury reporting rate of0.14 (an increase from 0.10 from the preceding cooling off 
period). 
Likewise, drops in injury reporting occurred following key events, with the most 
profound decrease following the period of heating up, between January 26, 2004 and 
March 29, 2004, which found rates of reported injuries falling from 0.27, to zero, when 
the collective agreement expired on March 30, 2004 (between March 30, 2004 and March 
31 , 2004). These events lead into the 33-day strike action by the NAPE union, including 
the NAPE LX group, beginning on April 1, 2004 (and ending May 3, 2004). These 
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results indicate that the NAPE LX union group may be responsive to collective 
bargaining events, in so far as injury reporting is concerned. 
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Figure 8: NLNU Injury Reporting Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
The NLNU data indicates spikes in injury reporting rates, which correspond to key 
collective bargaining events. The first spike was noted following a calm period occurring 
between June 3, 1999 and October 4, 2001, with rates of injury reporting during this quiet 
period, at 0.24. These rates quickly increased to 1.22, between October 5, 2001 and 
November 14, 2001 , during the time that opening proposals were being given to the start 
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the collective bargaining cycle. Injury reporting continued to rise to 1.54, following this 
event, when meetings occurred, between November 15, 2001 and February 26, 2002. 
The next prominent spike in reported rates of injury occurred following the time 
frame when the collective agreement was signed between July 22, 2002 and August 22, 
2002, with a corresponding rate of 1.00. The cooling off period occurring between 
August 23, 2002 and September 23, 2002, indicated a corresponding rise in injuries 
reported to 1. 78. This could be a sign of dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining 
process, or with the agreement that was reached. 
Another increase in rates of reported injuries was observed following the 
announcement by the union on June 11 , 2004, that they would not return to the 
bargaining table in that year. During this time, between June 11 , 2004 and June 29, 2004, 
rates of reported injury were 1.21. Following this, rates of reported injury increased to 
1.71 between June 30, 2004 and July 30, 2004, when the collective agreement expired. It 
is interesting to note that the decision by the union to not follow through with 
negotiations occurred just shortly after the heated NAPE strike, which occurred between 
April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. The spike in these rates could have been influenced by 
frustrations with this decision, or could have been an indication to the employer that 
while negotiations would not take place, their voice could still be heard. 
When the employer requested conciliation during the May 15, 2006 to May 23, 2006, 
time frame, rates of reported injury were at 1.00, however, these rates rose to 1.24 
between May 24, 2006 and July 3, 2006, when meetings between the parties took place, 
and further to 1.50, between July 4, 2006 and July 5, 2006, when conciliation took place. 
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This increase in injuries reported, from 1.24 to 1.50, took place within a very short period 
oftime (43 days) from May 24, 2006 to July 5, 2006, suggesting that these particular 
collective bargaining events may have been significant enough, on union members, to 
influence them to use injury reporting as a voice mechanism. 
The last spike in data occurred once the final agreement was reached on October 23, 
2006 through December 3, 2006, with a rate of 1.05 (down from 1.34 in the period prior 
to this, when the final offer was given, between July 6, 2006 and October 22, 2006). 
Rates of reported injuries once again rapidly increased to 1.36 between December 4, 
2006 and January 25, 2007, when the agreement was ratified. Following a minor drop in 
rates to 1.25, between January 26, 2007 and February 26, 2007 (when the collective 
agreement was signed), rates once again rose during the cooling off period, between 
February 27, 2007 and March 27, 2007, to 1.69. Reported injuries further increased to 
2.00 (between March 28, 2007 and March 30, 2007). These continual increases in rates 
of reported injury around this time, suggests that the concurrent NAPE strike beginning 
on April 1, 2004, and subsequent legislated return to work, on May 4, 2004, may have 
served to encourage members to utilize injury reporting as a form of voice. 
There were also frequent declines in rates of injury reported associated with collective 
bargaining events. The first minor decrease followed the ratified agreement, which 
occurred May 24, 2002 to July 21, 2002, with a corresponding rate of injuries reported at 
1.61. Rates quickly dropped to 1.00, when the collective agreement was signed on July 
22, 2002, (between July 22, 2002 to August 22, 2002). In addition, following the period 
of cooling off from August 23, 2002 to September 23, 2002, rates of reported injuries fell 
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from 1. 78 to 1.42, during a period of calm, between September 24, 2002, and June 1 0, 
2004. Rates fell further to 1.21, between June 11, 2004 and June 29, 2004, when the 
union announced it would not be returning to the bargaining table within that year. 
An additional minor and gradual decline in reported injuries occurred between June 
30, 2004 and February 23, 2006. A number of collective bargaining events occurred 
through this time, and rates fell consistently from 1.71 (between June 30, 2004 and July 
30, 2004 when the collective agreement expired), to 1.64 (between July 31 , 2004 and 
May 25, 2005, when heating up occurred), and further to 1.39 (between May 26, 2005 
and February 23, 2006), during which the government served notice that negotiation 
should begin. Following meetings involving the union and government (between April 
14, 2006 and May 14, 2006), rates of reported injuries fell from 1.48 to 1.00, when the 
employer requested conciliation, between May 15, 2006 and May 23, 2006. 
The last minor drop in rates of reported injury occurred following conciliation 
(between July 4, 2006 and July 5, 2006) with a rate of 1.50, lowering to 1.34 when the 
final offer was given (between July 6, 2006 and October 22, 2006), and to 1.05 when the 
final agreement was reached (between October 23, 2006 and December 3, 2006). It is 
interesting to note that this gradual decline (between July 4, 2006 and December 3, 
2006), occurred during events that could be identified as being potentially emotional or 
volatile, in particular conciliation, and reaching of a final agreement. Further, once the 
agreement was ratified on December 4, 2006 (within the time frame ending January 25, 
2007), with a rate of reported injury at 1.36, rates fell to 1.25 when the collective 
agreement was signed (between January 26, 2007 and February 26, 2007). 
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This analysis suggests that the NLNU union is somewhat responsive to collective 
bargaining, in relation to the use of reporting injury as a voice mechanism. There were a 
number of spikes identified throughout the data, at times when the union was actively 
involved in more volatile collective bargaining events. 
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Figure 9: AAHP Absence Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
Evaluation of AAHP absence data identified that counts and rates of absence 
remained very high, throughout the entire data set. A number of spikes in absence rates 
were noted, corresponding to collective bargaining events. The first minor increase in 
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absence rates occurred following meetings that took place between March 30, 1998 and 
October 18, 1998, with a corresponding absence rate of9.37. Following this event, a 
slight increase in absence rates was noted during conciliation, between October 19, 1998 
and December 17, 1998, with a rate of 13 .08. It is interesting to note that this increase 
took place during a very short period of time, and during a particularly volatile event 
(conciliation). 
The most profound spike in the data occurred gradually, following a period of cooling 
off, between July 29, 1999 and August 29, 1999, when the rates of absence were found to 
be 11.38. These rates increased to 14.87, during the 462 days of calm that occurred 
between August 30, 1999 and December 4, 2000, during which no collective bargaining 
activity had taken place. Absence rates again increased to 19.90 on December 5, 2000 
throughout May 14, 2001 , during which the union requested negotiations begin for the 
next round of collective bargaining. It is interesting to note that the increase in absence 
occurs mainly during very quiet periods of time, beginning shortly after the collective 
agreement had been signed on June 28, 1999 (ending July 28, 1999), which may indicate 
possible disenchantment with how the previous collective bargaining cycle had ended, 
and with the particular results of the agreement, which was reached. 
The next spike in data was once again a minor one, where rates of absence went from 
17.10, between May 15, 2001 and June 13, 2001 (during opening proposals), to 19.59 
between June 14, 2001 and June 30, 2001, (when the collective agreement expired). 
This, albeit small increase in absence rates, occurred when the union was actively 
involved in the negotiation process, and when union members were aware of their 
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agreement coming to its end; a time when individuals might be more susceptible to 
problems within their work environment, and may be more likely to utilize mechanisms 
of voice. 
An additional minor spike in absence rates occurred following conciliation, between 
October 11 , 2001 and October 28, 2001, with a corresponding absence rate of 16.17. 
Following this event, a tentative agreement was reached, with absence rates increasing to 
18.40 (between October 29, 2001 and February 7, 2002). This could possibly be in 
response to how union members felt with the outcome of conciliation, or with the new 
agreement. 
The gradual increase in absences following the end of a collective bargaining cycle 
occurs again within the AAHP data set. During the cooling off period, occurring between 
March 9, 2002 and April9, 2002, rates of absences were at 15.34. The 812 days of calm 
that occurred between April 10, 2002 and June 29, 2004, found a small spike in absences 
to 18.76, and when the collective agreement expired June 30, 2004 (ending July 7, 2004), 
rates of absences increased to 19. 75. These absences gradually increased, and mainly 
occurred throughout the period when no collective bargaining events were taking place, 
once again indicating that there may have been negative feelings towards the outcome of 
the collective bargaining cycle. Further, the short spike in absences building up to the 
expiration of the collective agreement, could be in response to the new collective 
bargaining cycle that was soon to begin. 
There were a number of decreases in absence rates within the AAHP data. The first 
decrease occurred following opening proposals that were given between February 9, 
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1998, and March 29, 1998, with an associated absence rate of 13.1 0. Absences quickly 
fell to 9.37 from March 30, 1998 to October 18, 1998, when meetings were taking place 
between the negotiating parties. 
Following a short lived minor spike, rates once again fell gradually between October 
19, 1998 to August 29, 1999, through five collective bargaining events: conciliation, 
occurring on October 19, 1998 (ending December 17, 1998), with a rate of 13.08; 
meetings, occurring on December 18, 1998 (ending April29, 1999), with a rate of 12.69; 
a memo of understanding being signed on April 30, 1999 (ending June 27, 1999), with a 
rate of 12.66; the collective agreement being signed on June 28, 1999 (ending July 28, 
1999), with a rate of 12.16; and through the cooling off period occurring on July 29, 1999 
(ending August 29, 1999), with a rate of 11.38. 
An additional decline was noted following the AAHP union requesting negotiations 
between December 5, 2000 and May 14, 2001 , when rates were at 19.90. Rates dropped 
slightly to 1 7.1 0 during the period between May 15, 2001 and June 13, 2001, when 
opening proposals were exchanged. This particular drop in absence rates occurred, as 
this collective bargaining cycle was about to begin. 
Following the union applying for conciliation on September 26, 2001 (between 
September 26, 2001 and October 10, 2001 ), and the conciliation event occurring on 
October 11 , 2001 (ending October 28, 2001), absence rates fell from 19.33 to 16.17. 
Shortly following this drop, another decline was identified following the tentative 
agreement being signed on October 29, 2001 (ending February 7, 2002), with rates falling 
from 18.40 to 16.03, when the collective agreement was signed on February 8, 2002 
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(with this time frame ending on March 8, 2002). The decline in absence rates continued 
through the cooling off period that occurred on March 9, 2002 (ending April 9, 2002), 
with rates at 15.34. 
The last decrease noted within the data occurred following the expiration of the 
collective agreement on June 30, 2004 (ending July 7, 2004), with a corresponding 
absence rate of 19.75. Following this event, rates dropped slightly to 16.32, on July 8, 
2004 (ending December 10, 2004 and corresponding to the end of the AAHP absence 
data set), during which the union announced they were deferring the notice to bargain. It 
is interesting to note that this event took place just following the NAPE strike between 
April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. 
Results of this data show the AAHP membership appears not to be overly responsive 
to the collective bargaining process, at least with respect to absenteeism. Of particular 
interest is that following two cooling off events, rates of absence increased: during 
cooling off, between July 29, 1999 and August 29, 1999, absence rates were 11.38 
(absence rates increased to 14.87 between August 30, 1999 and December 4, 2000, 
during the period of calm); during cooling off, between March 9, 2002 and April 9, 2002, 
absence rates were 15.34 (with rates of absence increasing to 18.76 between April 10, 
2002 and June 29, 2004, during the period of calm). This effect is particularly interesting 
as the increases in absence occurred during the time when no collective bargaining events 
were taking place. 
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Figure 10: NAPE HS Absence Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
Due to the sheer size of the NAPE HS absence data set, rates of absences were 
calculated to represent the average number of absences each day during each of the 
defined collective bargaining time frames. Of interest is that absence rates were 
consistently high across the entire NAPE HS data set. 
Between July 3, 1998, and August 3, 1998, during the period of cooling off, 
following the end of a collective bargaining cycle, absence rates were 114.66. These 
rates increased to 154.32, during the 763 days of calm occurring between August 4, 1998 
and September 4, 2000. Rates continued to increase to 156.29 between September 5, 
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2000 and October 5, 2000, when union members were in a heating-up period, prior to the 
start of the new collective bargaining cycle. 
Following opening proposals that took place between October 6, 2000 and January 
28, 2001 , rates of absences were 138.94. These rates spiked to 193.47 during the event of 
conciliation, which took place between January 29, 2001 and March 5, 2001. Talks 
during this period of time were not going well, as directly after conciliation took place, a 
strike vote was taken on March 6, 2001 (ending on March 22, 2001), and a strike 
occurred on April 1, 2001 (ending April 5, 2001). This short bargaining period, leading 
to heated strike action, indicates a volatile bargaining cycle, which may have influenced 
the use of absence as a voice mechanism. 
An interesting spike in absences occurred before and after the strike (occurring 
between April1 , 2001 and AprilS, 2001). The collective agreement expired on March 
23, 2001 , and during this time frame (ending March 31 , 2001 ), there was an associated 
absence rate of 13 7 .11 . Fallowing the strike, during the period of cooling off occurring 
between April6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 , absences rose to 161.90. This spike in absences 
occurred during a short period of time, further suggesting this was a volatile period upon 
union membership. 
The next increase in absence rates occurs following the ratification vote between June 
6, 2001 and July 9, 2001 , with rates of absence during this period at 135.50. Absence 
rate increased to 137.88 when the collective agreement was signed between July 10, 2001 
and August 10, 200 I . Gradually, the absence rate continued to increase to 146.53, during 
the next collective bargaining event, which was a cooling off period from August 11 , 
101 
2001 and September 11, 2001, signifying the end ofthe collective bargaining cycle. 
Absence rates continued to increase to 151.67, between September 12, 2001 and June 15, 
2003, during 642 days of calm, when no collective bargaining activities took place. It is 
interesting to note that this gradual increase in absence rates occurred following a 
yearlong collective bargaining cycle, between September 5, 2000 and September 11, 
2001 , including strike action on Apri11, 2001 (ending April 5, 2001). This increase 
might further highlight the frustration in the workplace, following this particular 
collective bargaining cycle. 
The next increase in absences occurs following a period of heating up, between 
November 1, 2003 and November 9, 2003, with an absence rate of 123.11. This event is 
followed by opening proposals during November 10, 2003 and December 2, 2003, with 
absence rates increasing to 13 7 .91. The event of the union writing the NLHBA 
requesting negotiations, between December 3, 2003 and January 14, 2004, corresponded 
to an absence rate of 144.05. This increase continued with the union requesting 
conciliation, between January 15, 2004 and February 16, 2004, as absence rates increased 
to 157.55. The start of strike votes between February 17, 2004 and March 3, 2004, had a 
further increase in absence rates to 161.63. Of particular interest is that these collective 
bargaining events were the precursor to a particularly grueling strike action, occurring 
between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. Therefore, the gradual increases in absence 
noted during this time, may further highlight workers frustrations with the collective 
bargaining cycle. 
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Following the collective agreement being signed, and workers being legislated back 
to work on May 4, 2004 (with the time period ending June 4, 2004), rates of absence rose 
from 129.38 to 156.97, during the cooling off period occurring between June 5, 2004 and 
July 5, 2004. This sudden increase in absence, following the long and heated strike, 
between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004, could certainly be a sign of member 
dissatisfaction with both the strike activity and the legislated outcome. 
The first decline in absence rates occurred following the strike notice given by NAPE 
HS between February 24, 1998 and June 1, 1998, where rates went from 132.21 down to 
118.13, with the negotiated settlement being made between June 2, 1998 and July 2, 
1998. Following this negotiated agreement, rates again fell to 114.66 during the cooling 
offperiod from July 3, 1998 and August 3, 1998. 
During the next collective bargaining cycle, heating up, beginning September 5, 2000 
(between September 5, 2000 and October 5, 2000), and leading into the approaching 
negotiations, rates of absence fell from 156.29 to 138.94, when opening proposals were 
given on October 6, 2000 (with the period ending January 28, 2001). Following 
conciliation taking place between January 29, 2001 and March 5, 2001 , rates once again 
fell from 193.47 to 164.29, when the strike vote was being taken on March 6, 2001 
(ending on March 22, 2001 ). Rates fell to 13 7.11 prior to the strike (beginning on April 
1, 2001), when the collective agreement expired, on March 23, 2001 (ending on March 
31 , 2001 ). There is no surprise that rates of absence fell during this time, as a strike was 
approaching and workers may have been preparing for a period of time at decreased 
wages, encouraging them to arrive at work for scheduled shifts. 
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Additional periods with decreases in absence rates occurred throughout the remaining 
data. Following the negotiated settlement taking place on May 7, 2001 and ending May 
14,2001, rates of absence fell from 161.50 to 135.00 between May 15, 2001 and June 5, 
2001 , when a memo of understanding was signed. Following the period of calm 
(occurring between September 12, 2001 and June 15, 2003), absence rates decreased 
from 151.67 to 134.71 (between June 16, 2003 and October 31 , 2003), when the union 
requested negotiations. The decrease in rates continued through the period of heating up, 
between November 1, 2003 and November 9, 2003 with rates at 123.11, which was the 
precursor into the negotiation cycle. 
When the strike votes occurred on February 17, 2004, (with the associated time frame 
from February 17, 2004 to March 3, 2004), absence rates decreased from 161.63 to 
155.00, when the strike votes ended (between March 4, 2004 and March 20, 2004) and 
further to 147.73, between March 21 , 2004 and March 31 , 2004, when the collective 
agreement expired. Following strike action between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004, 
when the collective agreement was signed and workers were legislated back to work, 
between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004, rates of absence lowered to 129.38. The last 
decrease in absences occurred following a cooling off period, between June 5, 2004 and 
July 5, 2004, with rates decreasing from 156.97 to 144.58 during the 138 days of calm 
occurring between July 6, 2004 and December 10, 2004. 
Examination of the absence data indicates that the NAPE HS union group appears to 
be responsive to particular collective bargaining events in relation to absence; however, 
while this seems to be the case, it is important to note that rates of absence remained at a 
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high level throughout the entire data set. This was partly due to the size of the data set, as 
well as the size of the union group itself. 
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Figure 11: NAPE LX Absence Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
NAPE LX absence data identifies a number of increases in absence rates in 
association with collective bargaining events throughout the data. Following a heating up 
period between July 18, 1997 and March 8, 1998, absence rates increased from 6. 79 to 
20.07, between March 9, 1998 and November 24, 1998, when the memo of understanding 
was signed. This increase continued as rates rose to 21 .16 when the collective agreement 
was signed, between November 25, 1998 and December 25, 1998. Rates further 
105 
increased to 24.50 between December 26, 1998 and January 26, 1999, during a cooling 
off period. 
The next spike occurred following the collective agreement being signed between 
July 19, 2001 and August 19,2001 , when absence rates increased from 14.19 to 19.75 
during the cooling off period, between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001 . It is 
interesting to see an increase in absences following the end of that particular collective 
bargaining cycle, during a period of time when employees were decreasing tensions 
revolving around particularly volatile collective bargaining events. 
During the next collective bargaining cycle, rates of absences increased from 17.45, 
(when the union requested conciliation between January 15, 2004 and January 25, 2004) 
to 22.39, during the heating up period occurring between January 26, 2004 and March 29, 
2004. In addition, a slight increase in rates occurred following the collective agreement 
being signed, between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004, with rates increasing from 20.19 to 
20.55 during the cooling off period, between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004. 
There were many instances of decreases in absence rates throughout the data. The 
first decline occurred during a period of cooling off, between December 26, 1998 and 
January 26, 1999, when rates decreased from 24.50 to 20.60 between January 27, 1999 
and October 12, 2000, during a period of calm. Rates continued to decrease to 17.80 
between October 13, 2000 and October 17, 2000, when opening proposals were issued. 
Following the strike activity between October 18, 2000 and October 24, 2000, absence 
rates decreased from 27.31 (during the mediated return to work, between October 25, 
2000 and December 25, 2000), to 21.80 between December 26,2000 and March 29, 
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2001 , during heating up, and further down to 15.50 when the collective agreement 
expired, between March 30, 2001 and March 31, 2001. 
Following the strike activity occurring between April1 , 2001 and April 5, 2001 , 
absence rates decreased from 19.05 between April6, 2001 and July 18, 2001 (when the 
negotiated settlement was reached), to 14.19 between July 19, 2001 and August 19, 2001 , 
when the collective agreement was signed. The cooling off period occurring between 
August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001 , had absence rates decreasing from 19.75 to 
18.84, between September 21 , 2001 and November 6, 2003, during 777 days of calm. 
Rates continued to decrease to 18.43 between November 7, 2003 and January 14, 2004, 
when opening proposals were given. Continuing on in this vein, absence rates continued 
to decrease to 17.45, when the union requested conciliation, between January 15, 2004 
and January 25, 2004. From January 26, 2004 to March 29, 2004, absence rates 
decreased from 22.39 (when the heating up period occurred) to 19.00, when the collective 
agreement expired, between March 3 0, 2004 and March 31 , 2004. The final decrease in 
absences occurred following the period of cooling off, between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 
2004, where rates decreased from 20.55 to 18.40 between July 6, 2004 and December 10, 
2004, during 138 days of calm. 
An interesting finding surrounds the periods of cooling off and calm, at the end of the 
three different collective bargaining cycles within the data. In each of these situations, 
there is a decrease in absences during the calm periods. This was first identified 
following the cooling off period, occurring December 26, 1998 to January 26, 1999, 
when rates fell from 24.50 down to 20.60, during the period of calm between January 27, 
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1999 and October 12, 2000. The second time this occurred was following the cooling off 
period, occurring between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001 , when absence rates 
fell from 19.75 to 18.84, during the period of calm between September 21 , 2001 and 
November 6, 2003. Finally, this was once again identified following the cooling off 
period, occurring between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004, with rates falling from 20.55 to 
18.40 during the period of calm, between July 6, 2004 and December 10, 2004. These 
decreases, following periods of calm, suggest that union members normalize absence 
behavior following the signing of an agreement. 
This NAPE LX data indicates that members, for the most part, do not seem to be 
particularly influenced by the collective bargaining process, as far as absence rates are 
concerned. That being said, there are a number of increases and decreases of absence 
rates, which may indicate the influence of collective bargaining events on voice 
mechanisms. 
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Figure 12: NLNU Absence Rates during Collective Bargaining Events 
The NLNU absence data indicates a number of spikes in absence rates, coinciding 
with collective bargaining events. Of particular note is a profound spike in absence rates 
occurring following the union announcing they would not be returning to the bargaining 
table in 2004, between June 11 , 2004 and June 29, 2004, with rates increasing from 63.79 
to 324.52, between June 30, 2004 and July 30, 2004, when the collective agreement 
expired. Leading up to the union announcing they would not bargain in 2004, no 
collective bargaining activity had taken place (with periods of cooling off and calm 
preceding the NLNU announcement), which suggests that union members might have 
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been responding to this situation. It is interesting to note that the NLNU announcement 
followed the long and negative strike ofthe NAPE union (occurring between April1 , 
2004 and May 3, 2004). During this time, there was a common perception that the 
agreement legislated for the NAPE union, established what other unions could expect 
through their own collective bargaining efforts. This volatile situation could potentially 
have influenced the union group to be leery of entering into a bargaining position with 
the employer at that time, and further may have encouraged union members to utilize 
absence as a mechanism of voice. 
Throughout the data there are also a number of minor spikes in absence identified. 
The first occurred following a heating up period, whereby union members were building 
up into a particularly volatile collective bargaining event, which in this case was a strike 
vote on December 28, 1997. During the event of heating up, occurring between 
December 28, 1997 and January 25, 1999, the absence rate was 75.22. These rates 
increased to 85.76 between January 26, 1999 and March 15, 1999, when the strike vote 
was taken. 
During the next collective bargaining cycle, rates of absence increased from 71.76, 
during opening proposals at the start of the negotiation process (occurring between 
October 5, 2001 and November 14, 2001), to 78.28 during meetings taking place between 
November 15, 2001 and February 26, 2002. Absences further increased to 81.86 between 
February 27, 2002 and March 5, 2002, when the union requested that conciliation take 
place. During the conciliation event (between March 6, 2002 and May 23, 2002), rates of 
absence increased further to 81 .97. These increases occurred during a period of time of 
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just over four-months in duration, when there was intensive involvement of the union in 
collective bargaining activity. 
In the quiet period of cooling off and calm, following the collective agreement being 
signed on July 22, 2002, rates of absence again increased. Absence rates increased from 
76.28 between August 23, 2002 and September 23, 2002, during the cooling off period, 
to 80.61 during the period of calm, which occurred between September 24, 2002 and 
June 10, 2004. Once again, there was an increase in absences following the end of a 
collective bargaining cycle, which suggests that union members may have been 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiation process, giving them encouragement to 
use absence as a mechanism of voice. 
There were also increases in absence occurring throughout the data, in relation to 
strike activity, occurring between March 24, 1999 and March 31 , 1999. Preceding the 
strike, the collective bargaining event was conciliation, which occurred between March 
16, 1999 and March 23, 1999, with an absence rate of72.13; following the strike activity, 
absence rates were noted to be 114.58, when the legislated agreement was made (between 
April 1, 1999 and May 1, 1999). The spike in absences following strike action, suggests 
that it might have influenced workers to utilize absence as a method of voice, either 
through dissatisfaction from the strike, or with frustrations from the final agreement 
reached. 
There were also decreases in absence rates noted throughout the data. Following the 
strike vote between January 26, 1999 and March 15, 1999, absence rates decreased from 
85.76 to 72.13 during conciliation between March 16, 1999 and March 23, 1999. 
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Fallowing the formation of the legislated agreement, between April 1, 1999 and May 1, 
1999, absence rates fell from 114.58 to 77.31 during a cooling off period, between May 
2, 1999 and June 2, 1999. This decrease continued following the period of calm that took 
place between June 3, 1999 and October 4 2001, with rates of absence falling from 79.36 
to 71.76 during opening proposals that occurred between October 5, 2001 and November 
14, 2001. Following conciliation, between March 6, 2002 and May 23, 2002, rates 
decreased from 81.97 to 74.71 , when the agreement was ratified, between May 24, 2002 
and July 21 , 2002. Absence rates fell to 73.50 between July 22,2002 and August 22, 
2002, when the collective agreement was signed. 
At the end of this particular collective bargaining cycle, and following the quiet 
periods of cooling off and calm, absence rates once again decreased. Absences fell from 
80.61, during the calm period that took place between September 24, 2002 and June 10, 
2004, to 63 .79 when the union announced it was not returning to bargain within 2004, 
between June 11, 2004 and June 29, 2004. As previously mentioned, this period of time 
was highly charged, as it was the event which followed the heated NAPE strike that 
occurred on April 1, 2004 (ending May 3, 2004). Other unions must have been very 
sensitive to the bad timing of bargaining around this time, particularly when the 
government had indicated that no better deals were on the horizon, for any union entering 
the bargaining process at that time. 
This data suggests that the NLNU membership may be responsive to particular 
collective bargaining events throughout the bargaining cycle. Absence rates increased in 
response to the buildup into the collective bargaining process during the strike vote taken 
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on January 26, 1999 (ending March 15, 1999). Furthermore, during periods of intensive 
union activity within a short period of time, such as was identified between October 5, 
2001 and May 23, 2002, absences were found to consistently increase throughout these 
time frames, involving a variety of collective bargaining events, including: opening 
proposals, negotiation meetings, the union requesting conciliation and conciliation. 
In addition, following the announcement (on June 11 , 2004) that the union would not 
return to the bargaining table in 2004, absence rates increased from 63.79 (between June 
11, 2004 and June 29, 2004), to 324.52 between June 30, 2004 and July 30, 2004, when 
the collective agreement expired (the largest spike in rates noted throughout the absence 
data set, for this union group). This indicates that while the union was not going to 
participate in bargaining, union members may have believed that their fortunes were tied 
to a previous negotiation, thus heightening their frustration. However, it must be 
considered whether this increase could also indicate that members were upset with the 
results of the difficult NAPE strike, occurring between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. 
In this respect, if members felt that their union was not going to take a stand at that time, 
their response could have been to utilize this mechanism of voice to announce their 
discontent. 
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4.5 Voluntary Turnover 
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Figure 13: AAHP Voluntary Turnover Rates during Collective Bargaining 
Events 
Investigation of rates of voluntary turnover of AAHP employees associated with 
collective bargaining, indicate a number of spikes within the data that correspond to 
particular bargaining events. This being said, these rates are quite small throughout the 
entire data set. 
The first spike in voluntary turnover rates occur following opening proposals between 
February 9, 1998 and March 29, 1998, where turnover rates increased from 0.06 to 0.1 2 
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during meetings, that took place between March 30, 1998 and October 18, 1998. 
Following a decline in rates to 0.03, when conciliation took place between October 
19, 1998 and December 17, 1998, rates once again went into a gradual increase from 
0.09, when negotiation meetings took place between December 18, 1998 and April29, 
1999, to 0.19, with the memo ofunderstanding being signed between April30, 1999 and 
June 27, 1999. An interesting finding is that turnover rates rapidly fell to zero during the 
time frame when the collective agreement was signed, occurring between June 28, 1999 
and July 28, 1999. However, this decline was short lived. During the cooling off period 
between July 29, 1999 and August 29, 1999, rates of turnover increased to 0.09. 
Following this, turnover decreased to 0.07 during the 462 days of calm occurring 
between August 30, 1999, and December 4, 2000. 
The spikes and drops in turnover rates throughout this particular collective bargaining 
cycle are very telling of the labor relations climate during this period, in that during 
multiple union activities, occurring over short periods of time, rates of turnover 
increased. In addition, during the cooling off period, a time when members got back to 
their daily routine following the end of a collective bargaining cycle, rates also increased, 
indicating that union members may have been very responsive to both the process and the 
outcome. Likewise, a very small decline in turnover rates during the calm period further 
identified a number of individuals that were still utilizing this behavior, which was 
particularly interesting as this was the time when no collective bargaining events 
occurred. 
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Turnover rates once again increased, following the calm period between August 30, 
1999 and December 4, 2000, from 0.07 to 0.09 between December 5, 2000 and May 14, 
2001, when the union requested that negotiations begin. Rates continued to increase to 
0.13, between May 15,2001 and June 13,2001, when opening proposals occurred. 
These rates continued to rise to 0.18, when the collective agreement expired, between 
June 14, 2001 and June 30, 2001, however following this increase, rates decreased to 
0.07 when the union group was in a heating up period, leading into a number of collective 
bargaining events (between July 1, 2001 and September 5, 2001). Following this period 
of heating up, rates of turnover again increased to 0.1 0, when meetings between the union 
and employer were taking place (between September 6, 2001 and September 25, 2001). 
Turnover rates decreased to 0.07 when the union applied for conciliation, between 
September 26,2001 and October 10, 2001 , and further dropped to zero when the 
conciliation event occurred, between October 11, 2001 and October 28,2001. This 
decrease did not last, as turnover rates again increased to 0.05 with the tentative 
agreement being reached, between October 29, 2001 and February 7, 2002, and increased 
further to 0.07, when the collective agreement was signed between February 8, 2002 and 
March 8, 2002. Turnover rates fell to 0.06 during cooling off, between March 9, 2002 
and April 9, 2002, and further to 0.05 during the 812 days of calm occurring between 
April 10, 2002 and June 29, 2004. Rates continued to drop to zero between June 30, 
2004 and July 7, 2004, when the collective agreement expired. The AAHP union 
deferred notice to bargain on July 8, 2004 (with the corresponding time frame being from 
July 8, 2004 and May 25, 2004), with a turnover rate of0.04 during this period. 
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Interestingly enough, rates of turnover increased to 0.07, between May 26, 2005 and 
March 21 , 2006, when the government served notice to start negotiations. That said, 
during the negotiation period, rates of turnover fell to 0.05, between March 22, 2006 and 
July 6, 2006. When considering why rates of turnover decreased with negotiations, it 
may have been in response to the union and employer finally coming together to start the 
negotiation process, causing union members to step back and wait out the process before 
making drastic moves to voluntarily leave the organization. It is important to remember 
that at the time negotiations took place, the collective agreement had been expired since 
June 30, 2004, and the AAHP group had been working without a contract since that time. 
In addition, the July 8, 2004 announcement by the AAHP union that they would defer 
bargaining, may have played a role in creating higher anxiety in members, encouraging 
them to voluntarily seek employment elsewhere. 
This decline in turnover rates did not last, as when the agreement was ratified, 
between July 7, 2006 and August 20, 2006, rates increased to 0.11 . This might have been 
in response to the agreement that was formed, or with the collective bargaining process, 
as a whole. However, rates of turnover once again decreased following ratification, to 
0.03, when the collective agreement was signed between August 21 , 2006 and September 
21 , 2006. Continuing with this trend, turnover rates lowered to zero during the cooling 
off period, occurring between September 22, 2006 and October 22, 2006. In contrast, 
during the 186 days of calm, between October 23, 2006 and April 26, 2007, rates of 
voluntary turnover increased to 0.02. 
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When considering AAHP turnover data, while the rates of turnover are quite low, as 
expected, there were particular spikes in turnover rates that suggest that there could be 
some relationship between turnover behavior and collective bargaining events. Spikes in 
turnover for AAHP most often occurred in a gradual fashion, that is, rates increased 
gradually over time, through many collective bargaining events. Continual and gradual 
increases in turnover rates suggests that employees may have maintained their level of 
frustration and dissatisfaction over extended periods oftime, which may have served to 
impact the amount of turnover utilized. 
Noteworthy is the gradual increase in turnover, following conciliation on October 19, 
1998, with rates going from 0.03 (between October 19, 1998 and December 17, 1998), to 
0.09 (between December 18, 1998 and April29, 1999), when meetings took place. 
Turnover decreased further to 0.19, when the memo of understanding was signed on 
April 30, 1999 (between April 30, 1999 and June 27, 1999). In addition, a gradual 
increase occurred in turnover rates from 0.07 on August 30, 1999 (between August 30, 
1999 and December 4, 2000), during a period of calm, to 0.09 when the union requested 
negotiations on December 5, 2000 (between December 5, 2000 and May 14, 2001), to 
0.13 with opening proposals on May 15, 2001 (between May 15, 2001 and June 13, 
2001 ). Rates continued to rise to 0.18 when the collective agreement expired on June 14, 
2001 (between June 14, 2001 and June 30, 2001). These increases in turnover occurred 
over a longer period oftime and may have influenced members to feel more uncertain 
with their work environment, encouraging voluntary turnover as a mechanism of voice. 
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The final , gradual increase in turnover rates occurred following conciliation on 
October 11 , 2001 (between October 11 , 2001 and October 28, 2001), with a rate of zero, 
which increased to 0.05 with the tentative agreement being reached on October 29, 2001 
(between October 29, 2001 and February 7, 2002). These rates continued to rise to 0.07 
with the collective agreement being signed on February 8, 2002 (between February 8, 
2002 and March 8, 2002). Likewise, rates again increased from zero with the collective 
agreement expired on June 30, 2004 (between June 30, 2004 and July 7, 2004), to 0.04 
when the union deferred notice to bargain on July 8, 2004 (between July 8, 2004 and May 
25, 2005), and to 0.07 on May 26, 2005 (between May 26, 2005 and March 21 , 2006) 
when the government served notice to start negotiations. 
Evaluating turnover data for the AAHP union group, in relation to collective 
bargaining events, finds that there may be some influence on members to utilize turnover 
as a mechanism of voice, as there were many instances of increases in voluntary turnover 
during and following collective bargaining cycles where there was a lot of union 
involvement. Furthermore, the trend to have recurring instances of gradual increases in 
turnover, also suggests that there is some correlation between collective bargaining 
events and voluntarily turnover. 
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Figure 14: NAPE HS Voluntary Turnover Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
NAPE HS voluntary turnover data identifies a number of spikes in turnover rates in 
relation to collective bargaining events. The first increase occurred following 
negotiations between January 1, 1998 and February 23, 1998, with a rate of0.15 rising to 
0.48 during the period oftime when strike notice occurs, between February 24, 1998 and 
June 1, 1998. This sudden and rapid increase in turnover rates does not last, as rates 
decline to 0.35 (between June 2, 1998 and July 2, 1998), when a negotiated settlement is 
reached, and further down to 0.34 during the cooling off period (between July 3, 1998 
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and August 3, 1998). This decreasing trend continues through the period of calm that 
occurs between August 4, 1998 and September 4, 2000, with a turnover rate of0.28. 
These decreasing rates suggest that the agreement may have been viewed favorably, by 
union membership. 
Turnover rates once again increased to 0.65 during a heating up period, which 
occurred between September 5, 2000 and October 5, 2000. Following this, rates of 
turnover dropped to 0.21 , with opening proposals (between October 6, 2000 and January 
28, 2001), and further to 0.19 during conciliation (between January 29, 2001 and March 
5, 2001). This decreasing trend continued with a strike vote that took place on March 6, 
2001 (between March 6, 2001 and March 22, 2001), with turnover rates decreasing to 
0.12. This is an interesting outcome as these events were more heated in nature, and 
involved a strike vote. Following this, rates increased to 0.44, (between March 23, 2001 
and March 31 , 2001 ), when the collective agreement expired, prior to strike action 
(between April 1, 2001 and AprilS, 2001). This increase suggests that union members 
were more responsive to these events and utilized more turnover behavior around these 
periods. Interestingly, rates ofturnover decreased to 0.10 during the cooling off period 
(which occurred following the strike between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001 ), further 
suggesting that NAPE HS union members were influenced by such "quiet periods" to 
decrease the use of turnover as a mechanism of voice. 
The negotiated settlement occurring between May 7, 2001 and May 14, 2001 , again 
supports the concept that union members respond to collective bargaining events, as rates 
of turnover quickly rose to 0.63 during this time frame. This sudden rise in rates, within 
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a relatively short period oftime, is further indication that members might not have been 
as content with the outcome following the collective bargaining cycle, and in particular 
with aspects of the agreement that was reached between the union and employer. 
Once the negotiated settlement was reached, rates of turnover began a gradual 
decrease, with rates falling to 0.45 when the memo of understanding was signed (between 
May 15, 2001 and June 5, 2001). Rates continued to decrease to 0.32 with the ratification 
vote (between June 6, 2001 and July 9, 2001), and again to 0.31 when the collective 
agreement was signed (between July 10, 2001 and August 10, 2001). The period of 
cooling off, between August 11 , 2001 and September 11 , 2001 , found turnover rates 
decreasing to 0.22. 
During the 642 days of calm (occurring between September 12, 2001 and June 15, 
2003), rates increased slightly to 0.25, and again up to 0.27 (between June 16, 2003 and 
October 31 , 2003), when the union requested negotiations. Although these slight 
increases do occur, they do not continue as turnover rates go into a gradual decline to 
0.22, when heating up occurs (from November 1, 2003 to November 9, 2003). Rates 
continued on this decreasing trend to 0.13, during opening proposals (between November 
10, 2003 and December 2, 2003), and down further to 0.09 when the union wrote the 
NLHBA requesting to negotiate (between December 3, 2003 and January 14, 2004). This 
rate was maintained throughout the next event, when the union requested conciliation on 
January 15, 2004 (with the time frame ending on February 16, 2004). 
Following the request for conciliation, strike votes began on February 17, 2004 
(between February 17, 2004 and March 3, 2004), with turnover rates increased to 0.31. 
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This increase, does not last, as rates decrease to 0.18 when strike votes end on March 4, 
2004 (with the time frame ending on March 20, 2004), a turnover rate which is 
significantly lower than those reported during the time frame when strike votes began. 
This is an interesting finding, as this period is leading into more volatile union activity, a 
time when increases in turnover as a voice mechanism, could be expected. 
With the expiration ofthe collective agreement, between March 21, 2004 and March 
31, 2004, rates of turnover increased to 0.27. However, following strike action taking 
place between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004, rates ofturnover significantly decline to 
0.06, with the collective agreement being signed between May 4, 2004 and June 4, 2004. 
An interesting finding occurred in the cooling off period that took place between June 5, 
2004 and July 5, 2004, with respect to turnover rates. It was noted that rates of turnover 
during this period increased dramatically to 0.35. This sudden increase from 0.06 to 0.35 
(within 63 days) may have been in response to the heated strike action that occurred, as 
well as with the legislated agreement that was formed. There appears to be a relationship 
between the cooling off period, following a difficult strike action, and turnover as a voice 
mechanism. 
The period of calm occurring between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2008, lasting 1364 
days, found a decline in turnover rates to 0.22. However, the expiration of the collective 
agreement between March 31 , 2008 and April 30, 2008, shows an increase in turnover to 
0.29, which suggests union members appear to be influenced by collective bargaining, as 
rates of turnover increased in such a short period of time. In comparison, throughout the 
1364 days of calm, in the period preceding the expiration of the collective agreement, 
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turnover rates were lower than during the 31 days in the period corresponding to the 
collective agreement expiring. 
When considering the turnover data and collective bargaining events associated with 
the NAPE HS union group, the spikes in turnover rates do seem to be associated quite 
often with heated collective bargaining events. This does suggest that the NAPE HS 
union group appears to be influenced by the collective bargaining cycle, potentially 
encouraging union members to utilize turnover as a mechanism of voice. 
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Figure 15: NAPE LX Voluntary Turnover Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
When examining voluntary turnover data, it is important to know that the NAPE LX 
union is a small union group, therefore one must understand the limitations of this data. 
Voluntary turnover is considered an infrequent event; therefore rates of turnover will be 
quite small. Furthermore, this may also reflect that the NAPE LX members have a more 
difficult time securing work elsewhere within the area, outside of Eastern Health. 
When comparing the NAPE LX turnover data with collective bargaining information, 
there were a number of spikes in turnover rates identified. The first spike occurs 
125 
following a period of heating up occurring between July 18, 1997 and March 8, 1998, 
with turnover rates increasing from a rate of zero to 0.02. Rates continue to increase to 
0.05 when the memo of understanding was signed, between March 9, 1998 and 
November 24, 1998. Continuing on in this trend, turnover rates increased to 0.10 when 
the collective agreement was signed, between November 25, 1998 and December 25, 
1998. These increases in voluntary turnover occurred throughout the collective 
bargaining cycle, and continued onwards through to the collective agreement being 
signed, which may have been in response to the negotiation process or the final 
agreement that was reached between the parties. 
Following the collective agreement being signed, rates of turnover suddenly 
decreased to zero during the cooling off period between December 26, 1998 and January 
26, 1999. This decrease did not last long, as turnover rates slightly increased to 0.03 
during 625 days of calm, between January 27, 1999 and October 12, 2000. 
Following a long and stable period oftime where turnover rates remained at zero, 
between October 13, 2000 and April 5, 2001 , (a period oftime which included two strike 
periods), rates did slightly increase following the negotiated settlement formed between 
April 6, 2001 and July 18, 2001 , to 0.01. Rates once again fell to zero when the 
collective agreement was signed, between July 19, 2001 and August 19, 2001 . During 
the cooling off period that occurred at the end of this collective bargaining cycle, 
(between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001), rates fell from 0.06 down to 0.03 
during the 777 days of calm, between September 21 , 2001 and November 6, 2003 . Rates 
further decreased to 0.01 between November 7, 2003 and January 14, 2004, when 
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opening proposals were made. Following this event, there was a long period of stability, 
with respect to turnover rates remaining at zero (between January 15, 2004 and July 5, 
2004), a time that included many collective bargaining events, including the volatile 
strike action ofthe NAPE union between April 1, 2004 and May 3, 2004. It is interesting 
to note that following this difficult strike activity, associated turnover rates remained at 
zero, indicating that employees may have been greatly affected by this long period of 
struggle and possibly could have had less desire to voluntary leave their positions due to 
an_ extended period oftime with low strike pay. 
Turnover rates increase from zero to 0.03, during the period of calm, occurring 
between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2008, close to 4 years in duration. However, 
following this event, rates once again fell to zero when the collective agreement expired, 
between March 31 , 2008 and April 30, 2008. This is an important finding, as employees 
may have been less likely to utilize turnover as a mechanism of voice due to the previous 
strike action starting on April 1, 2004, as well as the legislated agreement on May 4, 
2004. This situation might have made union members leery of voluntary turnover, 
instead keeping job security as a mediating factor (along with regular income following 
33 days of strike pay). 
When examining voluntary turnover rates of the NAPE LX union group and their 
correlation to collective bargaining events, it is quite possible that this union utilized 
turnover as a mechanism of voice at times, most notably during the collective bargaining 
cycle occurring between July 18, 1997 and December 25, 1998. However, it must be 
noted that these turnover rates (and associated true counts) were never extremely high 
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throughout the entire data set, and this increase certainly was not a profound spike, by 
any means. 
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Figure 16: NLNU Voluntary Turnover Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
The NLNU voluntary turnover data indicates several spikes in turnover rates 
associated with collective bargaining events. The first spike follows opening proposals 
occurring between November 27, 1997 and December 27, 1997, with a turnover rate of 
0.06 rising to 0.20, during the heating up period between December 28, 1997 and January 
25, 1999. This lengthy period of time was the lead-in to a strike vote occurring on 
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January 26, 1999 (with the time frame ending March 15, 1999), however with this event, 
turnover rates decreased to 0.14. Rates continued to fall to 0.13 with conciliation 
occurring between March 16, 1999 and March 23, 1999, with strike activity occurring 
between March 24, 1999 and March 31 , 1999. Voluntary turnover continued to decline 
to 0.03 with the legislated agreement occurring between April1 , 1999 and May 1, 1999. 
These are quite interesting findings as it indicates that throughout heated collective 
bargaining events, NLNU members do not appear to utilize turnover as effective means 
of voicing discontent, and having these rates gradually and consistently decrease, also 
supports this idea. However, it must be reiterated that voluntary turnover is an extreme 
form of voice, and unlike other forms, is associated with major life change. Employees 
who exercise turnover as a form of voice, would only do this at one time, therefore the 
decreasing rates of turnover throughout the more volatile bargaining events, is ultimately 
not surprising. Furthermore, it may indicate that individuals who choose to utilize 
turnover, will do so well after the volatile period has ended. 
Voluntary turnover rates increased from 0.03, following the legislated agreement 
reached on April 1, 1999 (between April 1, 1999 and May 1, 1999), to 0.25, during the 
period of cooling off, which occurred between May 2, 1999 and June 2, 1999, with rates 
continuing to increase to 0.34 during the 855 days of calm, occurring between June 3, 
1999 and October 4, 2001. These increasing rates of voluntary turnover suggests that 
following heated collective bargaining events, and during more quiet periods of time, 
NLNU members possibly found reason to voice their discontent with increasing turnover 
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activity. However, these rates may also be related to the idea that there is a time-delay 
between workers deciding to look elsewhere for a job, and actually doing so. 
Directly after these quiet periods, turnover rates decreased to 0.15 during opening 
proposals occurring between October 5, 2001 and November 14,2001 , however 
following this, rates increased slightly to 0.20 when meetings took place between 
November 15, 2001 , and February 26,2002. Turnover rates continued to rise to 0.43, 
between February 27, 2002 and March 5, 2002, when the union requested that 
conciliation begin. 
These rates gradually decreased to 0.32, with conciliation occurring between March 
6, 2002 and May 23, 2002, and further to 0.12 when the agreement was ratified between 
May 24, 2002 and July 21 , 2002. Rates continued to decrease to 0.09 when the collective 
agreement was signed, between July 22, 2002 and August 22, 2002. These decreases in 
turnover rates occur at a time when there is a lot of union activity; however the 
interesting finding within this data is that while rates are decreasing during union 
involvement, during the cooling off period between August 23, 2002 and September 23, 
2002, rates actually increase to 0.28. 
Turnover rates decrease to 0.10 during the 626 days of calm occurring between 
September 24, 2002 and June 10, 2004, and further to zero, between June 11 , 2004 and 
June 29, 2004, when the union announced that they would not return to the bargaining 
table in 2004. Rates slightly increased to 0.06 when the collective agreement expired, 
between June 30, 2004 to July 30, 2004, and further to 0.10 during a period of heating up 
which occurred between July 31 , 2004 and May 25, 2005. Turnover rates again 
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increased to 0.15, between May 26, 2005 and February 23, 2006, when the government 
served notice to the union that negotiation should take place. 
Opening proposals that occurred from February 24, 2006 to April 13, 2006, found 
turnover rates decreased to 0.08. That said, rates once again increased to 0.26, when 
meetings occurred between April 14, 2006 and May 14, 2006. When the employer 
requested conciliation on May 15, 2006 (between May 15, 2006 and May 23, 2006), rates 
of turnover fell to 0.11. Once again, during meetings, rates increased to 0.22 (between 
May 24, 2006 and July 3, 2006), however they decreased quickly to zero on July 4, 2006 
(between July 4 and July 5, 2006), when conciliation took place. 
Turnover rates again increased to 0.18 when the final offer was given between July 6, 
2006 and October 22, 2006, however when the final agreement was made, between 
October 23, 2006 and December 3, 2006, rates decreased to 0.12. When this agreement 
was ratified, between December 4, 2006 and January 25, 2007, rates increased slightly to 
0.15. However, when the collective agreement was signed between January 26,2007 and 
February 26, 2007, rates fell slightly to 0.13 . This collective bargaining cycle lasted for 
quite a long time, as the collective agreement actually expired on June 30, 2004, and the 
new agreement was not signed until January 26, 2007. This prolonged period between 
contracts certainly may have played a part in why these rates demonstrated a slight 
increase at the end of this particular collective bargaining cycle. 
During the cooling off period occurring between February 27, 2007 and March 27, 
2007, turnover increased to 0.24. The spike in turnover rates, following this cooling off 
period, could be in response to the long negotiation period, possibly indicating an 
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increase in frustration following the resolution of this contract dispute. During the 
lengthy calm period between March 28, 2007 and June 29, 2008 (lasting 460 days), rates 
of turnover decreased to 0.17, and lowered further to 0.16 when the collective agreement 
expired between June 30, 2008 and July 30, 2008. 
When considering the NLNU voluntary turnover data and the correlation between 
collective bargaining, it appears that NLNU members may be influenced by collective 
bargaining events, as far as voluntary turnover behaviors are concerned. In addition, 
some of the spikes of rates occur during, or following more heated collective bargaining 
events, which supports the idea that this union group may be influenced by more 
contentious collective bargaining events. 
4.6 Adverse Events 
For this study, the term "adverse events" was used as a proxy for performance 
quality. The indicator is measured by counting the number of adverse events that 
occurred in the data set. Adverse events, in this case, are viewed as a key indicator of 
whether workers are giving their best work, energy and performance within the 
workplace. In particular, the interest with this mechanism of voice is whether collective 
bargaining events influence this level of performance through increased errors, near 
errors, or reporting of events. In this respect, an increase in adverse events around 
collective bargaining could signify lowered performance quality by union members. 
However, it is not necessarily true that increased adverse events equals lowered 
performance quality. In fact, it may be the more insidious side of adverse events that is 
related to lowered quality, with the loss of individual desire to keep working at a high, 
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professional level, influencing errors (or near errors) being made. Additionally, it may 
also be that workers are less likely to report adverse events during more contentious 
negotiation periods, suggesting that these rates might actually be higher than what is seen 
within the adverse events data. Likewise, workers might be more inclined to report 
adverse events in order to highlight problems within their work environment, around 
more volatile bargaining events/periods. 
A major issue with this data set is that while it counted overall adverse events, it did 
not include union affiliation as a variable of data collection. Due to this major 
information gap, it was impossible to accurately identify, with any certainty, which union 
each error was related to. For the purposes of this study, the adverse events data was 
divided into different units oftime to directly correspond with the collective bargaining 
events for each union group. While this was an obvious limitation of this data set, it was 
still deemed important to consider adverse events rates in relation to each of the 
collective bargaining cycles for the union groups under study, to determine whether there 
were spikes in rates around particular collective bargaining events. 
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Figure 17: AAHP Adverse Events Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
When examining adverse events data in relation to the AAHP collective bargaining 
information, it is apparent that a number of spikes and declines in rates occur throughout 
the bargaining cycle. The first event, opening proposals, occurring between February 9, 
1998 and March 29, 1998, identified a rate of adverse events at 13 .4 3, which declined to 
11 .28 when meetings between the union and the employer took place (between March 30, 
1998 and October 18, 1998). Adverse events increased to 11.50 when conciliation took 
place between October 19, 1998 and December 17, 1998. This increase was short lived 
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as rates decreased to 10.67, when meetings took place between December 18, 1998 and 
April 29, 1999, dropping further to 10.32 when the memo of understanding was signed 
between April 30, 1999 and June 27, 1999. 
Once the collective agreement was signed, between June 28, 1999 and July 28, 1999, 
rates again increased to 11.48. Following this increase, rates declined to 9.75 during the 
period of cooling off which took place between July 29, 1999 and August 29, 1999. This 
decrease in adverse events did not continue throughout the 462 days of calm occurring 
between August 30, 1999 and December 4, 2000, as rates of adverse events increased to 
10.86 during this time frame. 
During the next bargaining cycle, when the union requested negotiations begin, 
between December 5, 2000 and May 14, 2001 , rates of adverse events increased to 11.60, 
however, when opening proposals took place between May 15,2001 and June 13, 2001 , 
adverse events declined to 11.50. When the collective agreement expired, between June 
14, 2001 and June 30,2001, adverse events increased to 12.65. Rates decline to 10.15 
through the period ofheating up (occurring between July 1, 2001 and September 5, 
2001), a time when members could be getting worked up over the approaching collective 
bargaining cycle. 
Adverse events do slightly increase to 10.85 when meetings took place, between 
September 6, 2001 and September 25, 2001, however rates once again decreased to 9.47 
when the union applied for conciliation between September 26, 2001 and October 10, 
2001 . Following this slight decline, adverse events increased to 9.78 during conciliation, 
between October 11 , 2001 and October 28, 2001. 
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A spike in adverse events occurs following conciliation, with rates dramatically 
increasing to 12.95 when the tentative agreement was reached (between October 29, 2001 
and February 7, 2002). Once the collective agreement was signed on February 8, 2002, 
rates of adverse events decrease to 11.69 (between February 8, 2002 and March 8, 2002), 
continuing down to 10.16 during the cooling off period, occurring between March 9, 
2002 and April 9, 2002. Following this event, a long period of calm occurs between 
April 10, 2002 and June 29, 2004, when adverse events increased to 10.80, during these 
812 days of calm. 
This increase continues throughout the next collective bargaining time frame when 
the collective agreement expired, between June 30, 2004 and July 7, 2004, with adverse 
events increasing to 14.63. This spike in adverse events was short lived, as rates lowered 
to 12.25, when the union deferred notice to bargain (between July 8, 2004 and May 25, 
2005). Adverse event rates continue to decline to 11 .56, when the government served 
notice to begin negotiations on May 26, 2005 (between May 26, 2005 and March 21 , 
2006). 
Following this notice to begin negotiations, adverse events began to increase, from 
12.45 with negotiations (between March 22, 2006 and July 6, 2006), to 12.58 when the 
agreement was ratified (between July 7, 2006 and August 20, 2006). Continuing on in 
this pattern, rates rose to 12.63, when the collective agreement was signed between 
August 21 , 2006 and September 21 , 2006. The period of cooling off occurring between 
September 22, 2006 and October 22, 2006, found the rates of adverse events continuing 
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to increase to 13.10, and between October 23, 2006 and April26, 2007, rates continue to 
increase to 13.61, throughout a period of calm lasting 186 days. 
When examining the adverse events data, it is possible that the spikes and declines 
noted in adverse events rates could be related to AAHP collective bargaining events. 
Despite being unable to identify such a relationship with any certainty, it is worth noting 
these obvious spikes in the data, and recognizing that they occur during more volatile 
periods of the collective bargaining process. 
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Figure 18: NAPE HS Adverse Events Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
When evaluating NAPE HS adverse events rates in relation to collective bargaining 
events, it is apparent that there are a number of spikes in the data. The first spike occurs 
following 333 days of calm (between January 1, 1997 and November 30, 1997), with 
rates of adverse events increasing from 5.65 to 11.42 during the period of heating up that 
occurs between December 1, 1997 and December 31, 1997. These rates continue to rise 
to 13.15 throughout negotiations occurring on January 1, 1998 (between January I, 1998 
to February 23, 1998). Following these negotiations, the union announced a strike notice, 
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on February 24, 1998 (between February 24, 1998 and June 1, 1998), with an associated 
decrease in adverse events to 12.30. However, with the negotiated settlement occurring 
on June 2, 1998 (between June 2, 1998 and July 2, 1998), rates once again increased to 
12.65. 
The next group of collective bargaining found a lowered rate of adverse events, 
beginning with a cooling off period between July 3, 1998 and August 3, 1998, with 
corresponding adverse events at 10.56. A small spike in rates to 10.77 occurs throughout 
the 763 days of calm, between August 4, 1998 and September 4, 2000. Rates declined 
slightly to 10.71 , when the union group was involved in a heating up period between 
September 5, 2000 and October 5, 2000. Following along this trend, rates slightly 
increased to 10.75 (between October 6, 2000 and January 28, 2001), when opening 
proposals were given. Further, rates increase to 13.19 during conciliation, which took 
place between January 29, 2001 and March 5, 2001. Following this, a strike vote occurs 
between March 6, 2001 and March 22, 2001, with adverse events throughout this period 
rising slightly to 13.35. When the collective agreement expired between March 23, 2001 
and March 31 , 2001 , adverse events decreased to 10.89. 
Fallowing strike action (between April 1, 200 1 and April 5, 2001 ), and during the 
cooling off period (between April 6, 2001 and May 6, 2001), adverse events rates 
increased to 11. 71 . In addition, the negotiated settlement being reached between May 7, 
2001 and May 14, 2001 , saw rates spike to 13.25. When the memo ofunderstanding was 
signed between May 15, 2001 and June 5, 2001, rates declined to 11.59, although a slight 
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spike in rates did occur following this event, when a ratification vote was taken, with 
rates increasing slightly to 11.94 between June 6, 2001 and July 9, 2001. 
This slight increase was short lived, as when the collective agreement was signed on 
July 10, 2001 , rates of adverse events (between July 10, 2001 and August 10, 2001), 
decreased to 10.47, and further down to 9.03 during the cooling off period between 
August 11, 2001 and September 11, 2001. However, throughout the period of calm, 
lasting 642 days, rates of adverse events rose to 10.77 between September 12, 2001 and 
June 15, 2003 . These rates gradually increased to 11.22 between June 16, 2003 and 
October 31 , 2003, during which the union requested negotiations. A period of heating up 
into the collective bargaining process occurred between November 1, 2003 and 
November 9, 2003, with rates increasing further to 11.89. Continuing on in this trend, 
rates again increased to 12.83 when opening proposals were given, between November 
10, 2003 and December 2, 2003. 
Adverse events decreased slightly to 11.40 when the union wrote the NLHBA 
requesting negotiations, between December 3, 2003 and January 14, 2004. However, 
these rates increased to 12.03 when the union requested conciliation between January 15, 
2004 and February 16, 2004. When strike votes began, on February 17, 2004, rates of 
events increased further to 15.75 between February 17, 2004 and March 3, 2004. When 
strike votes ended, between March 4, 2004 and March 20, 2004, rates declined to 11.94, 
and again lowered to 10.18 when the collective agreement expired between March 21 , 
2004 and March 31 , 2004. 
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It is interesting to note that adverse events rates lowered throughout the buildup into 
this volatile strike action. This does lend itself to the idea that workers, aware that a 
strike may be looming, may not consider reporting errors as being as important a process 
when major strike activity will soon begin. 
When the collective agreement was signed on May 4, 2004 (between May 4, 2004 
and June 4, 2004), rates of adverse events begin to gradually increase to 11.13 and further 
to 11.32, during the cooling off period between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004. Rates 
again increased to 13.08 during the extended period of calm occurring between July 6, 
2004 and March 30, 2008, a period oftime lasting close to four years. These rates 
continued to spike to 14.42, between March 31 , 2008 and April 30, 2008, when the 
collective agreement expired. 
When examining the adverse event data, it is possible that many of these spikes and 
decreases in adverse events rates are correlated to collective bargaining events. While it 
is impossible to identify a cause and effect relationship, it is worth nothing that rates 
spike during particularly volatile periods of collective bargaining. In addition, 
inadvertent involvement may also have been occurring, whereby less quality put forth by 
workers throughout particular collective bargaining events, placed more emphasis and 
responsibility on other employees within the health care environment, thereby increasing 
the risk of adverse events occurring. 
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Figure 19: NAPE LX Adverse Events Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
When examining the NAPE LX adverse events data and the collective bargaining 
information for this union group, it is obvious that there are a number of spikes in data 
occurring throughout the collective bargaining cycle. The first spike in adverse events 
rates occurs following a period of calm taking place between January 1, 1997 and June 
16, 1997, with rates increasing from 2.66 to 4.86 during opening proposals between June 
17, 1997 and July 17, 1997 _ This bargaining cycle was quite short lived, and involved 
very few collective bargaining events, however during a period of heating up between 
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July 18, 1997 and March 8, 1998, rates increased to 10.97 and again to 11.3 8 when the 
memo of understanding was signed, between March 9, 1998 and November 24, 1998. 
When the collective agreement was signed on November 25, 1998, rates of adverse 
events declined to 10.55 (between November 25, 1998 and December 25, 1998). The 
cooling off period between December 26, 1998 and January 26, 1999, found rates 
increasing slightly to 10.81 , however this slight spike was short lived as rates lowered to 
10.75 during the 625 days of calm occurring between January 27, 1999 and October 12, 
2000. 
At the beginning of the next collective bargaining cycle, adverse events rates 
increased to 14.40, when opening proposals for the negotiation period were given 
between October 13, 2000 and October 17, 2000. This particular period of bargaining 
included a quick response by the union, involving strike action, between October 18, 
2000 and October 24, 2000. 
The mediated return to work that occurred on October 25, 2000 (within the time 
frame from October 25, 2000 and December 25, 2000), had a corresponding adverse 
event rate of 1 0.45. During the heating up period occurring between December 26, 2000 
and March 29, 2001 , adverse events increased to 12.26. When the collective agreement 
expired, on March 30, 2001 , rates of adverse events lowered to 6.00 during the time 
frame between March 30, 2001 and March 31 , 2001. Following a 5-day strike between 
April 1, 2001 and April 5, 2001 , rates increased to 11.70 during the negotiated settlement 
reached between April 6, 2001 and July 18, 2001. 
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When the collective agreement was signed on July 19, 2001 (between July 19, 2001 
and August 19, 2001 ), rates of adverse events decreased to 1 0.56, and further to 9.56 
throughout the cooling off period between August 20, 2001 and September 20, 2001 . 
This decrease in rates did not continue, as during the 777 days of calm, occurring 
between September 21 , 2001 and November 6, 2003, rates increased to 10.86. 
Adverse events continued to increase to 11. 72, during the period when opening 
proposals were given, between November 7, 2003 and January 14, 2004. When the union 
requested conciliation (between January 15, 2004 and January 25, 2004), rates lowered 
slightly to 10.36, however they increased once again to 12.88 when a heating up period 
occurred (between January 26, 2004 and March 29, 2004). When the collective 
agreement expired on March 30, 2004, rates increased to 13.00 (between March 30, 2004 
to March 31, 2004). 
With the collective agreement being signed on May 4, 2004 (between May 4, 2004 
and June 4, 2004 and following strike action between April1 and May 3, 2004), rates of 
adverse events decreased to 11.13. Rates increased to 11.32 during the cooling off period 
between June 5, 2004 and July 5, 2004, and continuing on in this pattern, throughout the 
extended period of calm lasting 1364 days (between July 6, 2004 and March 30, 2008), 
rates increased to 13.08. As the collective agreement expired on March 31 , 2008, adverse 
events increased to 14.42 (within the time frame March 31 , 2008 to April 30, 2008), 
which was the highest adverse event rate identified within the entire data set. This 
continual increase in adverse events is quite informative when trying to understand the 
impact that collective bargaining has upon the performance of union members, 
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particularly, as in this case, following a heated, drawn-out strike that occurred with this 
umon group. 
When examining the NAPE LX data, it appears possible that spikes in adverse events 
rates could be related to the collective bargaining cycle. Despite the fact that a true 
relationship cannot be reached with any certainty, it is interesting to note that spikes in 
adverse events do occur during more volatile periods of collective bargaining for this 
umon group. 
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Figure 20: NLNU Adverse Events Rates during Collective 
Bargaining Events 
When examining the adverse events data and collective bargaining information for 
the NLNU group, there are a number of spikes in adverse events identified in relation to 
key collective bargaining events. The first spike follows a period of heating up, between 
February 1, 1996 and November 26, 1997, when the union was entering a collective 
bargaining cycle, with rates going from 2.76 to 12.06 when opening proposals were made 
between November 27, 1997 and December 27, 1997. Following a slight decrease in 
rates to 11.61 , when an additional heating up period occurred between December 28, 
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1997 and January 25, 1999, rates increased to 12.47, when a strike vote was taken 
between January 26, 1999 and March 15, 1999. Following this strike vote, rates declined 
to 10.75 when conciliation was taking place between March 16, 1999 and March 23, 
1999. 
Once the strike occurred on March 24, 1999 (between March 24, 1999 and March 31 , 
1999), adverse events rates gradually increased, which may indicate how the collective 
bargaining event, as well as the outcome of the strike and agreement reached, could have 
influenced union members. Adverse events increased to 9.45 when the legislated 
agreement was made between April 1, 1999 and May 1, 1999. These rates increased to 
10.31 during the cooling offperiod occurring between May 2, 1999 and June 2, 1999, 
and further to 1 0.96, throughout the 855 days of calm occurring between June 3, 1999 
and October 4, 2001. 
Adverse event rates continued to increase to 11.39 at the start of the next collective 
bargaining cycle, occurring between October 5, 2001 and November 14,2001 , during 
which opening proposals took place. Following this, meetings between the parties 
occurred between November 15,2001 and February 26,2002, with an associated increase 
in adverse events to 12.66. 
Following this gradual increase, there was a subsequent gradual decline in adverse 
events, from 10.86 when the union requested conciliation, between February 27,2002 
and March 5, 2002. Rates continued to decline further to 10.34 when conciliation took 
place between March 6, 2002 and May 23, 2002, and lowered again to 9.42 when the 
agreement was ratified, between May 24, 2002 and July 21 , 2002. When the collective 
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agreement was signed on July 22, 2002 (between July 22, 2002 and August 22, 2002), 
rates again decreased to 7.50. 
Following the period of cooling off which occurred between August 23, 2002 and 
September 23, 2002, rates of adverse events began to increase to 9.22, and again to 11.19 
throughout the 626 days of calm occurring between September 24, 2002 and June 10, 
2004. The union announcing that it would not return to the bargaining table in 2004 
found adverse events decreased slightly to 11.00 (during the time frame of June 11 , 2004 
to June 29, 2004). That said, when the collective agreement expired on June 30, 2004, 
adverse events rates spiked to 15.29 (between June 30, 2004 to July 30, 2004). 
Following the expiration of the collective agreement, rates of adverse events lowered 
to 11.99, when the union entered a period of heating up between July 31 , 2004 and May 
25, 2005. Rates continued to decrease to 11.64, between May 26, 2005 and February 23, 
2006, when the government served notice to the union to negotiate. When opening 
proposals were made, between February 24,2006 and April13, 2006, rates of adverse 
events declined further to 11.39. 
This decrease in adverse events was short lived as when meetings took place between 
April14, 2006 and May 14, 2006, rates of adverse events increased to 12.87, and further 
to 13.44, when the employer requested conciliation, between May 15,2006 and May 23, 
2006. When the next group of meetings took place between May 24, 2006 and July 3, 
2006, rates of adverse events decreased to 12.22, and when conciliation took place, 
between July 4, 2006 and July 5, 2006, rates increased slightly to 12.50. With the final 
offer being placed on the table on July 6, 2006 (between the time frame July 6, 2006 and 
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October 22, 2006), rates of adverse events increased slightly to 12.69. When the final 
agreement was reached, between October 23, 2006 and December 3, 2006, rates again 
increased to 13.50. These increases in adverse events did not last, and with the ratified 
agreement on December 4, 2006, rates decreased to 11 .08 (between December 4, 2006 
and January 25, 2007). 
When the collective agreement was signed on January 26, 2007 (between January 26, 
2007 and February 26, 2007), rates of adverse events spiked to 16.22, and during the 
cooling off period (between February 27, 2007 and March 27, 2007), rates increased 
further to 16.28. During the 460 days of calm occurring between March 28, 2007 and 
June 29,2008, rates of adverse events dropped very quickly to 14.87, and profoundly 
decreased down to 3.65 once the collective agreement had expired on June 30, 2008 
(between June 30, 2008 and July 30, 2008). 
These results show that NLNU members appear to be responsive to collective 
bargaining, with respect to adverse events. The expectation from this data set is that the 
majority of adverse events are related to nurses; however, it is impossible to directly link 
adverse events to any one particular union group as no union affiliation was recorded for 
each entry in the data set. 
An interesting finding with the spikes in rates of adverse events noted is that they 
seem to be related to collective bargaining events that are considered to be less volatile in 
scope, in particular with cooling off periods, and in all but one calm period throughout 
the data set. This suggests that while union members may be upset with the negotiation 
process, it is when the situation "gets back to a normal routine" when rates seem to spike. 
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This could certainly be related to the bargaining process, with the agreement that was 
reached, or with issues around reporting adverse events. Likewise, when events that 
could be termed more volatile do occur, rates of adverse events seem to decrease. These 
events include conciliation, ratified agreement, and the collective agreement being 
signed. This contradiction is a fascinating aspect of the NLNU adverse events data set, 
and it raises many questions as to why this phenomenon occurs. 
The last collective bargaining cycle, beginning on February 24, 2006, does not 
proceed in this pattern. This bargaining cycle appears to be much more volatile 
throughout the entire process, with rates of adverse events remaining high throughout this 
period. This is another intriguing facet of this data set, suggesting that union members 
were more influenced by collective bargaining events, during this time. 
It is worth noting that this was the first bargaining cycle, which occurred following 
the long, drawn out and heated NAPE strike beginning April 1, 2004. Following this, on 
June 11 , 2004, the NLNU stated that it would not return to bargain within that year. It is 
interesting to consider whether the negative collective bargaining process (experienced 
by the NAPE union), influenced NLNU members to the degree that they went into this 
cycle with more desire for change, but expecting that the government would do nothing. 
This situation could have encouraged members to be more frustrated with their work 
environment, leading them to possibly report adverse events more often (to officially 
identify problems within the workplace), or to distance themselves from going beyond 
the call of duty within their work life, leading to lowered performance quality. In this 
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regard, adverse events could be viewed as a mechanism of voice that union members 
utilized, to announce their discontent. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
Rates of voice mechanisms were identified within this chapter, and a detailed 
discussion of the spikes and declines noted within the data sets were provided, and linked 
to the union group and collective bargaining event time frames. This data helped to 
identify if there was a relationship between the concepts under study and whether there 
was increased use of the mechanisms of voice, including: grievance, injury reporting, 
absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events, during collective bargaining events. 
Results identified that there appears to be peaks and decreases in rates of these voice 
mechanisms correlated to particular collective bargaining events. This process helped to 
identify if there were particular events that were more volatile than others, in respect to 
the use of the mechanisms of voice. This being said, it is clear that a more detailed 
statistical evaluation is required to provide evidence of whether a significant relationship 
can be identified between the spikes in the data and the collective bargaining process, the 
union groups and employee behaviors. The negative binomial regression analysis is the 
statistical technique that will be utilized to assist with this endeavor. The results of this 
regression analysis will be discussed, in detail, within chapter five. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Regression Analysis 
5.1 Negative Binomial Regression 
The negative binomial regression was used to estimate whether the observed 
differences in incidence rates of the various outcomes were statistically significant (Coxe, 
West & Aiken, 2009; Hilbe, 2007; STAT A, 2003).1 Negative binomial tests the number 
of events which occur during a time period, adjusting for observed differences in the 
durations of each collective bargaining cycle; allowing for the determination of whether 
the potential indicators of "voice" were significantly higher or lower during various 
phases ofthe bargaining process (Coxe, West & Aiken; Hilbe; STAT A). 
The collective bargaining events were categorized as: collective agreement expired 
( cb exp ), which is the predetermined period of time when the contract for a particular 
union group ends; collective agreement signed (cb signed), which is the time frame when 
the new contract has been reached, following a collective bargaining cycle; cooling off 
(cool off), which is the period of time following the end of a bargaining cycle, when 
individuals begin to "let go" of difficult or frustrating negotiation periods; heating up 
(heat up), a period of time where the union is heading into a collective bargaining cycle 
or event, appearing as a "build-up" into union involvement; and resolution (resolved), a 
period of time when settlements are reached, and the environment of the workplace 
eventually returns to "normal". It is important to note that any strike activity was taken 
1 Initia l attempt was made to utilize the Poisson regression technique in the statistica l ana lysis. Data 
diagnostic tests revea led overdispersion of the data, making negative binomial regression the appropriate 
statistical method. 
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out of this analysis, as striking workers are unable to exercise these voice mechanisms if 
they are not on the job. 
The results calculated for these procedures are all compared to the final outcome, 
"calm", a period oftime when no collective bargaining events occur. Calm is considered 
the reference category against which all outcomes are measured in the regression 
analysis. 
5.1.1 Statistical Power 
Due to the relatively limited statistical power, with small numbers of bargaining 
phases being utilized within this study, a p-value of 0.10 was used in the analysis of the 
data. It is important to note that near misses, up to 0.15, will be highlighted; however, 
these results should be interpreted with caution. 
5.2 Regression Analysis, All Union Groups 
The first part of the regression analysis, for this particular study, involved examining 
all the unions, and comparing the results for each outcome, or voice mechanism. This 
allowed for a view of the overall use of mechanisms of voice. A table was created to 
display the summary regression analysis data, and is located below (Table 6). For each 
mechanism of voice, and each collective bargaining event (excluding the calm period), 
the incident rate ratio (IRR) is indicated, with the p-value located within parentheses. An 
incident rate ratio examines the impact that a particular variable has on the outcome of 
interest (Hilbe, 2007). Incident rate ratios are centered at 1, with values greater than 1 
indicating higher incidence during this time period, and values less than 1 indicating 
lower incidence during this time period, as compared to the reference point (Hilbe). The 
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following table will be discussed in the order of collective bargaining event, providing a 
description of the regression analyses for the outcomes of interest, related to the 
collective bargaining events. All IRRs marked with an asterisk, identify cases where the 
p-value is less than 0.1 0. 
Table 6: Summary (All Unions) for Negative Binomial Regression (with p values 
located in parentheses). 
Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse 
Events 
cb exp 0.712 1.105 1.759 1.206 1.123 
(.425) (.764) (.101) (.456) (.123) 
cb signed 0.994 1.054 0.957 0.607* 1.091 * 
(.899) (.794) (.748) (.000) (.000) 
cool off 0.610* 1.138 1.278* 1.103 1.081 
(.054) (.544) (.037) (.415_} (.129) 
heat up 0.908 1.458 1.339 1.039 1.112* 
(.582) (.171) (.149) (.845) (.078) 
resolved 1.268 1.326 1.457* 1.407 1.107 
(.229) (.274) (.001) (.328) (.179) 
During the collective agreement expired period, the IRR for grievances is 0.712, 
indicating a lower incidence rate for all unions combined during this time period, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value is .425, which is not statistically significant. 
Injury reporting rates for this time period, has an IRR of 1.1 05, indicating an increase in 
incidence of injuries reported compared to the reference period (calm); the p-value is 
. 764, which indicates there is no statistical significance. 
Absences associated with the collective agreement expired period, has an IRR of 
1.759, with the p-value at .101 , which narrowly misses being statistically significant at 
the 1 0% level. Turnover associated with this outcome, has an IRR of 1.206, which 
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indicates higher rates of turnover during this period, as compared to calm. The p-value is 
.456, which again indicates that this result is not significant. The final outcome related to 
this bargaining phase, adverse events, was associated with an increase in incidence rates 
of errors, with an IRR of 1.123; the p-value at .123 indicates this result is not significant, 
however it does narrowly miss being statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Throughout the period when the collective agreement was signed, it was noted that 
results indicated a slight association with a lowered incidence rate of grievances, as 
compared to calm, with an IRR of 0.994, with a p-value at .899, indicating this fmding is 
not significant. Injuries reported during this time period had an IRR of 1.054, indicating 
that it is associated with an increase in incidence rates for this outcome, however with a 
p-value of. 794, it is not significant. Absences during this period had an IRR of 0.957, 
indicating a reduction in absence, compared with the reference period (calm). However, 
with a p-value of .748, the reduction is not significant. 
The IRR for turnover is 0.607, which is associated with lower incidence rates during 
this period, as compared to calm; the p-value for this analysis, is .000, which is 
statistically significant, suggesting that turnover is significantly lower during this phase 
of the bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. During this same time period, the IRR for 
adverse events is 1.091 , which is associated with a higher rate of incidence of errors, as 
compared to calm; the p-value associated with this analysis is .000, which again is 
statistically significant, suggesting that there are more adverse events occurring during 
this phase of the bargaining cycle, compared to the period of calm. 
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During cooling off periods, the IRR for grievances is 0.61 0, indicating there are lower 
incident rates of grievances for this period, as compared to calm. The associated p-value 
is .054, which is considered marginally significant, suggesting that grievance is utilized 
somewhat less during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. The IRR for 
reported injuries is 1.13 8, which indicates there is an increase in injuries reported during 
this bargaining period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value is .544, which 
indicates this is not a significant increase. 
During cooling off, the IRR for absences is 1.278, indicating higher absences during 
this period, as compared to calm. The p-value for this statistic is .037, which is 
statistically significant, suggesting that absences are higher during this phase of 
bargaining. Turnover had an IRR of 1.1 03, indicating an association with higher rates of 
turnover during this time period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value is .415, 
suggesting that it is not a significant effect. The IRR examining the association between 
cooling off and adverse events is 1.081 , indicating higher rates of adverse events, during 
this period of time, as compared to calm. The p-value of .129, indicates this is not a 
significant increase, although it should be noted that additional statistical power may 
have yielded a significant IRR. 
The IRR for grievances associated with the heating up phase, is 0.908, indicating 
lower rates of this outcome occurring during this particular time period, as compared to 
calm. However, the p-value at .582, indicates that this result is not significant. Injury 
reporting, during the same period, has an IRR of 1.458, indicating a higher incidence rate 
of this outcome during this particular time period, as compared to calm; the p-value for 
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this statistic is .171 , which identifies that this is not a significant effect. Absences during 
this bargaining phase has an IRR of 1.339, indicating a higher rate of missed days during 
this phase ofbargaining; the p-value at .149, is not a significant finding, however it does 
meet our criteria of qualifying as a "near miss". 
Turnover rates during this time period, has an IRR of 1.039, indicating an association 
between heating up and a higher rate of turnover, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .845, which indicates it is not a significant effect. In contrast, 
adverse events during the heating up period, has an IRR of 1.112, which indicates an 
association between higher rates of adverse events during this phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. The p-value at .078, identifies a marginal significant finding, 
suggesting that errors are more frequent during the heating up period, as compared to 
calm periods. 
During the period immediately following resolution, grievance activity had an IRR of 
1.268, indicating higher rates of grievance activity during this phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .229, which is not significant. 
The IRR for injury reporting is 1.326, which indicates higher rates of injuries reported 
during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value at .274 
indicates this is not a significant effect. 
The IRR for absences during the period of resolution is 1.457, which is associated 
with a higher incidence of absences during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. 
The p-value is .001 , which is statistically significant, suggesting a spike in absences 
during the resolution phase. The IRR for turnover is 1.407, which indicates a higher 
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incidence of adverse events during periods of resolution, as compared to calm. However, 
the p-value is .328, indicating that this result is not significant. Adverse events rates have 
an IRR of 1.1 07 during resolution, indicating an increase in adverse events, during this 
phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value of .179, indicates that 
this finding is not significant. 
5.3 Individual Union Groups 
It is important to realize that each union group will have a different union culture, and 
therefore may respond and behave differently to each of the collective bargaining events 
and furthermore may have different patterns of voice utilization during different phases 
of the collective bargaining cycle. To examine this, the analysis presented in the previous 
section is replicated for each union, separately. The results are presented in the next four 
sections. The first to be examined is the AAHP union. 
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5.3.1AAHP 
The table created to display the summary regression analysis data, for the AAHP 
union group, is displayed below. 
Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression for AAHP Union (with p values located in 
parentheses) 
Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse 
Events 
cb exp 0.000 1.192 1.170 2.358 1.147 
(.998) (.823) (.497) (.183) (.148) 
cb signed 0.962 4.160* 0.838 0.657 1.018 
(.970) (.001) (.439) (.506) (.815) 
cool off 0.000 1.637 0.794 1.057 0.937 
(.998) (.327) (.313) (.914) (.387) 
heat up 0.733 1.138 0.899 1.479 0.969 
(.399) (.670) (.539) (.1 07) (.572) 
resolved 1.597 1.485 0.924 2.162* 1.020 
(.399) (.353) (.729) (.024) (.781) 
During the collective agreement expired period, the IRR for grievances is 0.000, 
indicating lower rates of grievances (in fact none were observed) during this particular 
bargaining phase, as compared to calm, for the AAHP union group. The p-value for this 
statistic is .998, which indicates it is not statistically significant. The IRR on incidence of 
reported injuries is 1.192, suggesting higher rates of injuries being reported during this 
period oftime, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .823, 
which suggests it is not significant. 
During this same period, the IRR for absence is 1.170, indicating higher incidence of 
this outcome for AAHP union members during this period, as compared to periods of 
calm. The p-value for this statistic is .497, which suggests it is not significant. Similarly, 
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the IRR for turnover is 2.358, indicating that it is associated with higher rates ofthis 
outcome, during the time when the collective agreement expired, as compared to calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .183, which suggests it is not significant. 
Likewise, the IRR for adverse events is 1.14 7, suggesting that during this period there 
were higher rates of errors identified, as compared to calm periods. The p-value for this 
statistic is .148, which suggests it is not statistically significant; however we would 
classify this as a "near miss". 
When the collective agreement is signed, the IRR for grievances in the AAHP union 
group is 0.962, indicating lower rates for the outcome during this particular period. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .970, which indicates it is not significant. The 
IRR for reported injuries is 4.160, indicating higher rates of injury reported during this 
time period. The p-value for this statistic is .001, which indicates that this is a 
statistically significant effect, which suggests that there are more injuries being reported 
for AAHP union members, during this period, as compared to calm periods during the 
bargaining cycle. 
The IRR for absence of AAHP union members is 0.838, indicating that there is an 
association between lower rates of absence immediately after the collective agreement is 
signed. However the p-value for this statistic is .439, with indicates that this is not a 
significant decline. Similarly, the IRR for turnover for AAHP, during this period of time, 
is 0.657, which indicates that there is a lower incidence of individuals choosing to leave 
their posts, immediately following the signing of the collective agreement, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .506, which identifies that this is not a 
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significant decline. When considering the rates of adverse events occurring during this 
particular period of time, the IRR is 1.018, which indicates a higher rate of errors during 
this period. However the p-value for this statistic is .815, which indicates that this is not 
significant. 
During the collective bargaining period of cooling off, the IRR for grievance is 0.000, 
which suggests that there are fewer grievances (in fact none) filed by AAHP union 
members, during this period, as compared to calm. However the p-value for this statistic 
is .998, which indicates this is not a significant effect. The IRR for injury reporting 
during cooling off is 1.63 7, suggesting that there are higher rates of injuries reported 
during this period of time, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is 
.327, which indicates that this is not a significant effect. 
The IRR for absence for the AAHP union group during the cooling off period is 
0. 794, indicating lower rates of absence during this event, as compared to calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .313, which indicates this is not a significant 
effect. Continuing on with the cooling off period, turnover for AAHP members during 
this period has an IRR of 1.057, indicating a higher association between turnover rates 
and this time period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .914, 
indicating that this is not a significanfeffect. The IRR for adverse events is 0.937, which 
indicates that there are lower rates of errors during this phase of bargaining, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .387, which indicates that this is not a 
significant decline. 
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During heating up, the IRR for grievance is 0.733, indicating there are lower rates of 
grievance during this period of time, as compared to calm. However the p-value for this 
statistic is .399, indicating that this is not a statistically significant effect. Injury reporting 
rates for this same bargaining period has an IRR of 1.138, suggesting higher rates of 
injuries reported during this bargaining period, as compared to a period of calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .670, which identifies that this is not a significant 
increase. The IRR for absence during heating up is 0.899, suggesting lower rates of 
absence for this bargaining period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this 
statistic is .539, indicating that this is not a significant decline. 
The IRR for heating up on turnover is 1.479, which indicates that there are higher 
rates of voluntary resignations during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. The 
p-value for this statistic is .1 07, indicating this is not a significant effect, however it does 
narrowly miss achieving significance at the 10% level. The IRR for adverse events is 
0.969, suggesting that there are lower rates of errors during this collective bargaining 
event. However, the p-value for this statistic is .572, indicating that this is not a 
significant decline. 
During resolution, the IRR for grievance is 1.597, indicating that there are higher 
rates of this outcome during this bargaining phase, as compared to periods of calm. 
However the p-value for this statistic at .399, indicates that this is not significant. The 
IRR of resolution on reporting injury is 1.485, indicating higher rates of injury reporting 
during this phase, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .353, 
indicating that this is not a significant effect. 
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The IRR for absence during resolution for the AAHP union group is 0.924, 
suggesting that there is lower rates of absence following resolution, as compared to calm. 
The p-value for this statistic is . 729, which indicates that this is not a significant effect. 
The IRR for turnover is 2.162, suggesting that there are higher rates of voluntary 
turnover, during this particular phase of bargaining. The p-value for this statistic is .024, 
which indicates statistical significance. This identifies that there are more cases of 
voluntary turnover during the resolution phase of bargaining for AAHP union members, 
as compared to periods of calm. Finally, the IRR for adverse events, during the 
resolution phase of bargaining, is 1.020, indicating there are higher rates of errors, during 
this period of time, as compared to calm. However the p-value for this statistic is . 781 , 
indicating that this is not a significant increase. 
5.3.2 NAPE HS 
Next, the NAPE HS union will be examined, with the table created to display the 
summary regression analysis data, for this particular union group, displayed below. 
Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression for NAPE HS Union (with p values located 
in parentheses) 
Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse 
Events 
cb exp 1.007 0.990 1.333 1.278 1.193 
(.989) (.969) (.320) (.483) (.130) 
cb signed 1.037 0.834 1.250 0.749 1.071 
(.926) (.244) (.439) (.456) (.590) 
cool off 0.635 0.795* 1.355 1.013 1.057 
(.212) (.097) (.208) (.962) (.590) 
heat up 0.725 1.157 1.400* 0.971 1.215* 
(.270) (.177) (.096) (.881) (.017) 
resolved 0.806 0.796 1.287 1.616* 1.221 * 
(.573) (.137) (.297) (.082) (.058) 
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During the collective agreement expired period, the IRR for grievance is 1.007, 
suggesting that there are slightly higher rates of grievances, in this bargaining phase, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .989, indicating that this 
result is not significant. The IRR for injury reporting during this period is 0.990, 
suggesting that there are slightly lower rates of this outcome for this period of bargaining, 
as compared to calm. The p-value for this statistic is .969, indicating that this is not a 
significant result. The IRR for absence is 1.333, suggesting that there is an increase in 
absence during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for 
this statistic is .320, indicating that this is not a significant effect. 
The IRR for turnover, for this bargaining phase, is 1.278, suggesting that there are 
higher rates of voluntary turnover when the collective agreement expires, as compared to 
calm. The p-value for this statistic is .483, which indicates that this is not significant. 
The IRR for adverse events, following agreement expiration is 1.193, which indicates 
higher rates of adverse events during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .130, which indicates that this is not statistically 
significant, however it does narrowly miss significance at the 10% level. 
During the phase when the collective agreement is signed, the IRR for grievance is 
1.037, which suggests higher rates of grievance during this phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .926, which indicates that 
this is not significant. The IRR for injury reporting is 0.834, during the period following 
the signing of the collective agreement. This indicates an association with lower rates of 
injuries reported during this phase of bargaining, as compared to the reference period 
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(calm). However, the p-value for this statistic is .244, which is not significant. The 
coefficient for absence is 1.250, during this phase, suggesting higher rates of absence 
following the signing of an agreement, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for 
this statistic is .439, which is not significant. 
The IRR for turnover is 0.749 immediately following the signing of the collective 
agreement, suggesting that there are lower rates of voluntary turnover during this 
bargaining phase, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .456, 
which indicates that this is not a significant effect. The IRR for adverse events is 1.071 , 
suggesting higher rates of errors during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .590, which indicates that this effect is not 
significant. 
During the cooling off phase, the IRR for grievance is 0.635, suggesting an 
association between lower rates of this outcome during this event, compared to calm; the 
p-value for this statistic is .212, which indicates that this is not significant. The IRR for 
injury reporting during the cooling off phase of bargaining is 0.795, which suggests that 
there is an association between lower rates of injuries reported and this event; the p-value 
for this statistic is .097, which is marginally significant. This indicates that there are 
fewer injuries reported during periods of cooling off, as compared to periods of calm, for 
the NAPE HS union group. 
The IRR for absence rates during the cooling off period is 1.355, suggesting that there 
are higher rates of absence during this bargaining phase, as compared to calm. However, 
the p-value for this statistic is .208, which indicates that this is not a significant effect. 
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The IRR for turnover is 1.013, suggesting that there are higher rates of voluntary turnover 
during the cooling off period of the bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .962, which indicates that this is not statistically significant. 
The IRR for adverse events is 1.057, suggesting that there are higher rates of adverse 
events during this particular phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .590, which indicates that this is not a significant increase. 
The heating up phase of bargaining for the NAPE HS union group indicates a variety 
of interesting findings in the regression analysis. The IRR for grievance is 0. 725, 
suggesting lower rates of grievance activity during this phase of bargaining, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .270, which indicates that this is not a 
significant decline. The IRR for injury reporting is 1.157, suggesting higher rates of 
injuries reported during this bargaining period, as compared to calm. The p-value for this 
statistic is .177, which is not statistically significant. 
The IRR for absence during the heating up phase of bargaining, is 1.400, suggesting 
higher rates of absence during this bargaining phase. The p-value for this statistic is .096, 
which is marginally significant and identifies that there is more absenteeism during 
periods of heating up, as compared to periods of calm, for this particular union group. In 
comparison, the IRR for turnover for the NAPE HS union group during the heating up 
phase of bargaining is 0. 971 , which suggests lower rates of voluntary turnover for union 
members during this period of time, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this 
statistic is .881 , which indicates that this is not a significant effect. The IRR for adverse 
events is 1.215, which indicates higher rates of adverse events, during this particular 
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phase of bargaining. The p-value for this statistic is .017, which is statistically 
significant, and identifies that there are more incidents of adverse events during the 
heating up phase of bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. 
The resolution phase of bargaining also indicates a number of interesting effects. The 
IRR for grievance, during this period, is 0.806, suggesting lower rates of grievance 
activity during this particular phase of bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .573, which is not significant. The IRR for 
injury reporting, during this phase, is 0.796, indicating lower rates of injuries reported 
during the resolution phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. The p-value for this 
statistic is .137, which is not statistically significant, however it does narrowly miss 
achieving significance at the 1 0% level. 
The IRR for absence for the NAPE HS union group during the phase of resolution, is 
1.287, suggesting higher rates of absence during this particular phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .297, which is not significant. 
The IRR for turnover for this union group is 1.616, which indicates higher rates of 
voluntary turnover during this phase of bargaining. The p-value for this statistic is .082, 
which is marginally significant. This indicates that there is more voluntary turnover for 
NAPE HS employees during the collective bargaining phase of resolution, as compared 
to periods of calm. The IRR for adverse events is 1.221 , indicating higher rates of 
adverse events following contract resolution. The p-value for this statistic is .058, which 
is marginally significant. This indicates that there are somewhat more adverse events 
167 
occurring during the resolution phase of bargaining, as compared to calm, for NAPE HS 
union employees. 
5.3.3 NAPE LX 
Next, the NAPE HS union will be examined, with the table created to display the 
summary regression analysis data, for this particular union group, displayed below. 
Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression for NAPE LX Union (with p values located 
in parentheses) 
Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse 
Events 
cb exp 0.000 0.000 1.253 0.000 1.236 
(.994) (.995) (.574) (.991) (.392) 
cb signed 1.369 0.647 1.362 1.090 1.150 
(.606) (.292) (.367) (.884) (.550) 
cool off 0.927 0.439 1.673 0.440 1.1 27 
(.918) (.101) (.1 08) (.251) (.579) 
heat up 1.461 1.247 1.267 0.341 * 1.178 
(.269) (.280) (.426) (.019) (.392) 
resolved 3.370* 0.465* 1.421 1.324 1.235 
(.001) (.045) (.359) (.331) (.423) 
During the collective agreement expiring phase of bargaining, the IRR for grievance 
for the NAPE LX union group is 0.000, which suggests there are lower rates of grievance 
(and in fact, no grievances were filed) during this particular phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .994, which is not significant. 
The IRR for injury reporting is 0.000, which suggests there are lower rates of injuries 
reported (and in fact no injuries were reported) during this phase, as compared to calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .995, which indicates that this is not statistically 
significant. The IRR for absence is 1.253, which suggests there are higher rates of 
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absence during this particular phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. The p-value for 
this statistic is .574, indicating that this is not statistically significant effect. 
The IRR for turnover is 0.000, suggesting that there are lower rates of voluntary 
turnover (and in fact none occurred) during this phase of bargaining, as compared to 
calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .991 , suggesting this is not a significant 
decline. The IRR for adverse events incidence is 1.236, suggesting there are higher rates 
of adverse events during this phase of bargaining. However, the p-value for this statistic 
is .392, which indicates this is not a significant increase. 
During the period of collective agreement signed, the IRR for grievance for this union 
group is 1.369, suggesting higher rates of grievance activity during this particular phase 
of bargaining, compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .606, which is 
not significant. The IRR for injury reporting is 0.647, which suggests lower injury 
reporting rates during this period of bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .292, which is not significant. The IRR for 
absence following the signing of the collective agreement is 1.362, which suggests higher 
rates of absences during this period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this 
statistic is .367, which again is not statistically significant. 
The IRR for turnover is 1.090, suggesting higher rates of voluntary turnover during 
this particular phase of the bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. However, the p-value 
for this statistic is .884, which is not significant. The IRR for adverse events is 1.150, 
which suggests higher rates of adverse events during this period of time, as compared to 
calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .550, which is not statistically significant. 
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Turning to the cooling off phase, the IRR for grievance is 0.927, suggesting lower 
rates of grievance during this period, as compared to the reference period (calm). 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .918, which is not statistically significant. The 
IRR for injury reporting is 0.439, which suggests that there are lower rates of injuries 
reported during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. The p-value for this 
statistic is .1 01, which is not statistically significant, however it does narrowly miss 
achieving significance at the 10% level. The IRR for absence is 1.673, suggesting that 
there are higher rates of absenteeism, during this particular phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm; the p-value for this statistic is .1 08, which is not statistically 
significant, however it does narrowly miss achieving significance at the 10% level. 
The IRR for turnover, during cooling off, is 0.440, suggesting an association between 
lower rates of voluntary turnover, during this period, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .251, which is not significant. The IRR for adverse events is 
1.127, suggesting higher rates of adverse events during this particular phase of 
bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .579, which is 
not significant. 
When analyzing the heating up period for the NAPE LX union group, the IRR for 
grievance is 1.461 , which suggests higher rates of grievance during this phase of 
bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .269, which is 
not significant. The IRR for reported injuries is 1.247, which suggests an association 
between higher rates of injuries reported during this period of bargaining, as compared 
the reference period (calm). However, the p-value for this statistic is .280, which is not 
170 
----·---------~-~-~ 
significant. The IRR for absence is 1.267, suggesting higher rates of absence during the 
heating up periods of the bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. However, the p-value 
for this statistic is .426, which is not significant. 
The IRR for turnover, during this bargaining phase, is 0.341, suggesting lower rates 
of turnover. The p-value for this statistic is .019, which is statistically significant. This 
indicates that there is less voluntary turnover for the NAPE LX union group during the 
heating up phase of bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. The IRR for adverse 
events for the NAPE LX union group is 1.178, suggesting higher rates of adverse events 
during the heating up phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value 
for this statistic is .392, which is not significant. 
The final period of collective bargaining is the resolution phase. The IRR for 
grievance with the NAPE LX union group is 3.370, which suggests that there are higher 
rates of grievance activity during this particular phase of bargaining. The p-value for this 
statistic is .001 , which is statistically significant. This indicates that there is more 
grievance activity during the resolution phase of bargaining, than occurring in periods of 
calm. The IRR for injury reporting is 0.465, which suggests there is an association 
between lower rates of injuries reported during this bargaining period. The p-value for 
this statistic is .045, which is statistically significant. This indicates that there are fewer 
injuries reported during the resolution phase of the bargaining cycle, as compared to 
periods of calm. 
The IRR for absence during the resolution phase is 1.421 , suggesting higher rates of 
absence during this particular period of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the 
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p-value for this statistic is .359, which is not significant. The IRR for turnover is 1.324, 
suggesting higher rates of voluntary turnover during this bargaining period, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .331 , which is not statistically 
significant. Finally, the IRR for adverse events is 1.235, which suggests higher rates of 
adverse events, during this phase of bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .423, which is not significant. 
5.3.4NLNU 
Next, the NLNU union will be examined. The table created to display the summary 
regression analysis data, for this particular union group, is displayed below. 
Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression for NLNU Union (with p values located in 
parentheses) 
Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse 
Events 
cb exp 0.204 2.059 4.057* 0.504 0.855 
(.206) (.329) (.000) (.178) (.605) 
cb signed 0.890 1.355 0.919 0.488 1.071 
(.895) (.616) (.478) (.159) (.821) 
cool off 0.276 1.364 0.960 0.984 1.145 
(.129) (.573) (.675) (.961) (.603) 
heat up 0.784 1.637 0.955 0.699 1.034 
(.707) (.276) (.547) (.183) (.880) 
resolved 1.221 1.788 1.181* 0.484* 0.902 
(.816) (.332) (.085) (.071) (.707) 
The IRR for grievance, during the collective agreement expiring phase, is 0.204, 
suggesting lower rates of grievance, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this 
statistic is .206, which is not significant. The IRR for injury reporting is 2.059, 
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suggesting a higher rate of injuries being reported during this period, as compared to 
calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .329, which is not significant. 
The IRR for absence is 4.057, suggesting an increase in absence during this phase of 
bargaining. The p-value for this statistic is .000, which is statistically significant. This 
indicates that there are higher rates of absence for NLNU members when the collective 
agreement expires, as compared to periods of calm. The IRR for turnover is 0.504, which 
suggests lower rates of voluntary turnover during this period of the bargaining cycle, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .178, which is not 
statistically significant. Finally, the IRR for adverse events is 0.855, suggesting lower 
rates of adverse events during this phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, 
the p-value for this statistic is .605, which is not significant. 
During the period when the collective agreement is signed, the IRR for grievance is 
0.890, suggesting lower rates of grievance activity during this phase of bargaining, as 
compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .895, which is not significant. 
The IRR for injury reporting is 1.355, which suggests higher rates of injury reporting 
following the signing of the collective agreement, as compared to periods of calm. 
However, the p-value for this statistic is .616, which is not significant. The IRR for 
absence is 0.919, suggesting a lower rate of absence following the signing of the 
collective agreement, compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .478, 
which is not statistically significant. 
The IRR for turnover is 0.488, suggesting a lower rate of turnover during this 
particular bargaining period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic 
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is .159, which is not statistically significant. The IRR for adverse events during this 
phase of bargaining is 1.071, suggesting higher rates of adverse events during this period, 
as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .821 , which is not 
significant. 
During the collective bargaining phase of cooling off, the IRR for grievance is 0.276, 
which suggests an association between lower rates of grievance activity during this phase 
of bargaining, as compared to calm. The p-value for this statistic is .129, which is not 
significant, however it does narrowly miss achieving significance at the 10% level. The 
IRR for injury reporting is 1.364, suggesting that there are higher rates of injury reporting 
during this period of the collective bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .573, which is not significant. 
Turning to absence among NLNU members, the IRR for this outcome is 0.960, 
suggesting lower rates of absence during this particular phase of bargaining, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .675, which is not significant. The IRR 
for turnover is 0.984, suggesting lower rates of voluntary turnover during this phase of 
bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .961 , which is 
not significant. The IRR for adverse events is 1.145, suggesting higher rates of adverse 
events during this particular period of time, as compared to calm. However, the p-value 
for this statistic is .603, which is not statistically significant. 
Turning to the period of heating up, the IRR for grievance among NLNU members is 
0.784, suggesting lower rates of grievance activity during this phase of the bargaining 
cycle, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .707, which is not 
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significant. The IRR for injury reporting is 1.63 7, suggesting higher rates of injury 
reporting during this particular period of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .276, which is not significant. The IRR for absence is 0.955, 
suggesting lower rates of absence during heating up, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .54 7, which is not significant. 
Turning to turnover, the IRR is 0.699, which indicates lower rates of voluntary 
turnover during the heating up phase of bargaining, as compared to calm. However, the 
p-value for this statistic is .183, which is not statistically significant. The IRR for adverse 
events during heating up is 1.034, suggesting higher rates of adverse events during this 
bargaining phase, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .880, 
which is not significant. 
During the period of resolution, the IRR for grievance is 1.221 , suggesting there is 
higher rates of grievance activity during this phase of the bargaining cycle, as compared 
to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .816, which is not statistically 
significant. The IRR for injury reporting is 1. 788, which suggests higher rates of injury 
reporting during this bargaining period, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for 
this statistic is .332, which is not significant. 
Turning to absence, the IRR is 1.181 , suggesting higher rates of absence during the 
period immediately following resolution. The p-value for this statistic is .085, which is 
marginally significant. This suggests the NLNU union members utilize more 
absenteeism during resolution, than compared to periods of calm. The IRR for turnover 
during this phase is 0.484, suggesting lower rates of voluntary turnover during this period 
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of bargaining. The p-value for this statistic is .071 , which is statistically significant at the 
10% level. This indicates that the NLNU membership utilize less voluntary turnover 
during the period of resolution, as compared to periods of calm. Finally, the IRR for 
adverse events is 0.902, suggesting lower rates of adverse events during this phase of the 
bargaining cycle, as compared to calm. However, the p-value for this statistic is .707, 
which is not statistically significant. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results of the negative binomial regression analysis indicate several key instances 
of statistical significance, within the data, which signify times when there is a significant 
relationship between the mechanisms of voice and collective bargaining events; 
furthermore there are also numerous situations where there is near miss significance, at 
the 1 0% level. The full meaning of such statistical results will be discussed in detail 
within the next chapter, when the descriptive and regression analyses for each union 
group will be intertwined and the relationships identified. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Discussion 
This chapter will discuss the results of the statistical analysis, as well as highlight any 
important trends that emerge from the results. Emphasis will be placed upon linking the 
findings to the relevant literature. Through this process, further knowledge will be 
gained in the use of grievance, injury reporting, absence, and voluntary turnover, as well 
as adverse events, during key collective bargaining periods, as mechanisms of voice. 
Tables have been created to highlight the regression analyses for each of the outcomes of 
interest, grievance, injury reporting, absence, voluntary turnover and adverse events. 
These tables are located throughout this chapter. 
6.1 Grievance 
According to Freeman and Medoff (1984), unionized workers have grievance activity 
at their disposal, to right perceived wrongs. Nelson and Reimann (1983) discovered that 
large organizations with varied units and employee levels, and different skills, show the 
highest grievance activity. This is certainly the case with Eastern Health, as an 
organization of this size has a wide variety of services, with varying levels of employees, 
all of whom have differing skills sets, education levels and responsibilities (Eastern 
Health, 2008). 
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Table 11: Negative Binomial Regression for Grievances (with p values located in 
parentheses) 
AAHP NAPEHS NAPE LX NLNU All Unions 
cb exp 0.000 1.007 0.000 0.204 0.712 
(.998) (.989) (.994) (.206) (.425) 
cb signed 0.962 1.037 1.369 0.890 0.994 
(.970) (.926) (.606) (.895) (.899) 
cool off 0.000 0.635 0.927 0.276 0.610* 
(.998) (.212) (.918) (.129) (.054) 
heat up 0.733 0.725 1.461 0.784 0.908 
(.399) (.270) (.269) (.707) (.582) 
resolved 1.597 0.806 3.370* 1.221 1.268 
(.399) (.573) (.001) (.816) (.229) 
AAHP. The graph representing injury reporting rates for the AAHP union identified a 
number of minor spikes and one profound spike within the data, related to grievance 
activity. However, there were no statistically significant relationships identified with any 
of the collective bargaining periods through the regression analysis, as related to 
grievance activity. 
NAPE HS. NAPE HS descriptive analysis definitely identified volatility throughout the 
data, related to grievance activity and collective bargaining events. However, there were 
no statistically significant findings related to this outcome and collective bargaining in 
the regression analysis that was performed. 
NAPE LX. NAPE LX did identify one area of statistical significance in the regression 
analysis, with the period of resolution, indicating an association with higher rates of 
grievance activity during this bargaining period, as compared to periods of calm. When 
examining the graph associated with this voice mechanism, there is a large spike in 
grievance rates at a point in the collective bargaining process when the negotiated 
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settlement was reached between April 6, 2001 and July 18, 2001, as compared to periods 
of calm throughout the grievance data set. Interestingly, this collective bargaining event 
followed a five-day strike occurring between April 1 and April 5, 2001. Results suggest 
that this union group could have been utilizing grievance as a mechanism of voice during 
volatile periods of time, such as following strike activity, as well as when agreements 
were reached. 
NLNU. The NLNU union group does not show any statistically significant periods of 
higher or lower rates of grievance activity, when compared to periods of calm, despite 
periods of varying spikes seen in the graph associated with this outcome. That being 
said, the regression analysis did identify that during the cooling off phase, there was 
lower rates of grievance, narrowly missing statistical significance, indicating that this 
could be associated with lower rates of grievance, as compared to calm. When 
examining the graphic representation of this outcome, associated with the cooling off 
phase of bargaining, it appears that there was a sizeable decline in grievances to 0.22, 
between July 22, 2002 to August 22, 2002, during this cooling off period, between on 
August 23, 2002, and September 23, 2002, which occurred following the end of the 
collective bargaining cycle when the collective agreement was signed. This same period, 
when compared to calm, does indicate lower levels of grievance activity. This narrowly 
missed significance suggests a weak correlation between the collective bargaining 
activity of cooling off and grievance behavior. 
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6.2 Injury Reporting 
Employees have every right to report an injury sustained at work, a process that is 
considered to be one of the fringe benefits of unionized environments (Freeman & 
Medoff, 1984). Mittleman et al. (1945) found that in areas with increased conflict and 
demands, there was a subsequent increase in injury reporting. More recently, Havlovic 
( 1991) identified that satisfied employees were less likely to have and report workplace 
injuries, possibly suggesting that negative feelings surrounding collective bargaining 
events, could be less of an influencing factor upon these individuals. 
Table 12: Negative Binomial Regression for Injury Reporting (with p values located 
in parentheses) 
AAHP NAPEHS NAPE LX NLNU All Unions 
cb exp 1.192 0.990 0.000 2.059 1.105 
(.823) (.969) (.995) (.329) (.764) 
cb signed 4.160* 0.834 0.647 1.355 1.054 
(.001) (.244) (.292) (.616) (.794) 
cool off 1.637 0.795* 0.439 1.364 1.138 
(.327) (.097) (.101) (.573) (.544) 
heat up 1.138 1.157 1.247 1.637 1.458 
(.670) (.177) (.280) (.276) (.171) 
resolved 1.485 0.796 0.465* 1.788 1.326 
(.353) (.137) (.045) (.332) (.274) 
AAHP. When considering the AAHP injury reporting rates, and comparing them to 
periods of calm, the most profound spike in injuries reported occurred when the 
collective agreement was signed on February 8, 2002 (between February 8 and March 8, 
2002). Examining the regression analysis for this outcome, there is a statistically 
significant result, following the signing of the collective agreement, identifying an 
association between this event and higher rates of injuries reported, as compared to 
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periods of calm. These combined results indicate that AAHP members tends to utilize 
more injury reporting activity during times when the collective agreement is signed, 
which is interesting as it is the end of the active collective bargaining cycle. 
When comparing these results to the periods of calm within the data set, one 
"agreement signed" event, indicated higher rates of reported injuries, compared to calm. 
These results indicate that AAHP membership may to utilize this outcome as a 
mechanism of voice. 
NAPE HS. The regression analysis identified one statistically significant result 
associated with lower rates of reported injuries and the collective bargaining period of 
cooling off, as compared to calm. The most notable decline in the graphic representation 
of the descriptive data, took place between August 11 and September 11, 2001, with 
injury reporting rates decreasing during this bargaining period. However, one period of 
cooling off had injury reporting rates higher than both of the calm periods. Since this 
appears to occur at only one point in the observation period, this may indicate that other 
events surrounding this particular period may influence the use of injury reporting as a 
mechanism ofvoice. 
NAPE LX The regression analysis for NAPE LX, indicated a marginally significant 
result with the period of resolution, associated with lower levels of reported injuries, than 
found in periods of calm. However, the descriptive results indicate that the rates of 
reported injury, occurring during the period of resolution, are lower in only one of the 
two periods of calm, occurring in the data set. This may indicate that events surrounding 
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this particular bargaining period influenced the use of injury reporting as a mechanism of 
VOICe. 
The regression analysis also identified lower rates of injury reporting during cooling 
off, as compared to calm, although this narrowly missed achieving significance at a 10% 
level. In examining the graph of injury reporting rates, there are two periods of cooling 
off, which have rates of reported injury lower than those within the calm period. 
NLNU. The graph representing injury reporting rates associated with collective 
bargaining events for NLNU, fmds a number of spikes in rates throughout the data. 
However, the regression analysis indicates that none of these spikes are statistically 
significant, compared to periods of calm. These findings suggest that NLNU 
membership tends not to utilize injury reporting as a mechanism of voice. 
6.3 Absence 
Sapsford and Turnbull (1994) found that absenteeism could be a way to respond to 
dire work circumstances and to voice discontent and create strife in the workplace. It has 
also been shown that in workplaces with higher levels of individual satisfaction, there 
were less absent days used (Bennett, 2002; Rosenblatt & Shirom, 2005). 
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Table 13: Negative Binomial Regression for Absences (with p values located in 
parentheses) 
AAHP NAPEHS NAPE LX NLNU All Unions 
cb exp 1.170 1.333 1.253 4.057* 1.759 
(.497) (.320) (.574) (.000) (.101) 
cb signed 0.838 1.250 1.362 0.919 0.957 
(.439) (.439) (.367) (.478) (.748) 
cool off 0.794 1.355 1.673 0.960 1.278* 
(.313) (.208) (.1 08) (.675) (.037) 
heat up 0.899 1.400* 1.267 0.955 1.339 
(.539) (.096) (.426) (.547) (.149) 
resolved 0.924 1.287 1.421 1.181* 1.457* 
(.729)_ (.297) (.359) (.085) (.001) 
AAHP. When viewing the graph representing AAHP absence rates, throughout the 
collective bargaining cycle, there are a number of identified ebbs and flows in the data, 
when compared to periods of calm. However, there were no statistically significant 
results found with respect to absence rates and collective bargaining events. This 
suggests that AAHP membership does not utilize absence as a voice mechanism. 
NAPE HS. The graph representing absence rates for the NAPE HS union indicates 
periods of spikes and decreases in rates associated with the collective bargaining cycle, as 
compared to periods of calm. The regression analysis identified one interesting result 
with respect to absences. In periods of heating up (a time when involvement in the 
bargaining cycle is beginning, or leading into more volatile events), there was a 
statistically significant result found in absence rates for this union group, specifically an 
association between higher rates of absence, in relation to this collective bargaining 
event, compared to periods of calm. 
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When comparing regression and descriptive results, it is clear that there is not always 
an association between higher rates of absence in the heating up period, compared with 
calm. Results indicate that the absence rates for the two periods of calm were higher in 
one of two heating up periods. These findings indicate that NAPE HS union members 
may use absence as a mechanism of voice; however it may depend upon the collective 
bargaining cycle as well as the volatility within the cycle and surrounding the particular 
collective bargaining event. 
NAPE LX The regression analysis for NAPE LX union group, demonstrates that 
cooling off, narrowly missed achieving significance at the 1 0% level, where it would 
have been associated with higher rates of absence during this bargaining period, when 
compared to calm. When examining the graph representing the rates of absence for 
NAPE LX, it is noted that the rates of absence are higher in all of the cooling off periods, 
compared with calm. These results indicate that NAPE LX members could use absence 
as a mechanism of voice; however the results are not consistent. 
NLNU. The NLNU regression analysis reveals two interesting results. The "collective 
agreement expired" as well as "resolved periods of bargaining" were both statistically 
significant, and were associated with higher rates of absence, than in periods of calm. 
When viewing the graphic representation of the absence data for NLNU, the most 
profound spike in absence data occurs with the collective agreement expiring on June 30, 
2004, with rates increasing five-fold . It is interesting to note that this profound spike 
occurred following the union announcing it would not return to bargain in 2004, and 
followed the long and contentious strike ofthe NAPE union from April 1, 2004 and May 
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3, 2004. This dramatic increase in such a small period oftime corresponds to the 
regression analysis findings, specifically that the results are higher than the calm periods. 
As mentioned above, the broad collective bargaining period following resolution was 
statistically significant and associated with an increase in absence rates. The graphical 
representation of absence rates identifies two periods of collective bargaining which are 
categorized under the broader title of resolution for the regression analysis: legislated 
agreement, and ratified agreement. The legislated agreement occurred on April 1, 1999, 
and this period clearly identifies a spike in absence rates during this period, 
corresponding to the regression analysis results, with rates of absence higher than those 
found in periods of calm. 
It is interesting to note that a strike had occurred between March 24 and March 31 , 
1999, indicating that this union group had just gone through a more contentious 
bargaining period, which could have influenced the use of absence as a mechanism of 
voice during the period of resolution. The ratified agreement occurred on May 24, 2002. 
It was not associated, however, with an increase in absence; in fact this event was 
associated with a decrease in absence rates. 
These results indicate that NLNU membership tends to use absence, as a mechanism 
of voice, when the collective agreement expires. During the period of resolution, results 
show no clear pattern of changing absence rates, and as such it is unclear whether NLNU 
uses absence as a voice mechanism during this particular collective bargaining event. 
185 
6.4 Voluntary Turnover 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that unionized workers are less content with 
their work lives than individuals who are non unionized; however due to years of service, 
higher scale of pay, job security, and community attachments, they do not resort to quit 
behaviors as a voice mechanism (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Guest & Conway, 2004; 
Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, & Erez; 2001). In 
comparison, Iverson and Currivan (2003), found that desire to quit occurred in employees 
who were both happy and unhappy with their work life, which goes against conventional 
thought that only dissatisfied workers quit their jobs. Furthermore, they found that 
unionized employees, have ways to provide voice, simply from being a part of a union, 
and when getting involved in union activities, therefore they do not need to resign from 
their positions to demonstrate voice (Iverson & Currivan). 
Table 14: Negative Binomial Regression for Voluntary Turnover (with p values 
located in parentheses) 
AAHP NAPEHS NAPE LX NLNU All Unions 
cb exp 2.358 1.278 0.000 0.504 1.206 
(.183) (.483) (.991) (.178) (.456) 
cb signed 0.657 0.749 1.090 0.488 0.607* 
(.506) (.456) (.884) (.159) (.000) 
cool off 1.057 1.013 0.440 0.984 1.103 
(.914) (.962) (.251) (.961) (.415) 
heat up 1.479 0.971 0.341 * 0.699 1.039 
(.1 07) (.881) (.019) (.183) (.845) 
resolved 2.162* 1.616* 1.324 0.484* 1.407 
(.024) (.082) (.331) (.071) (.328) 
AAHP. A number of interesting results are identified in the AAHP analysis, in relation 
to voluntary turnover rates. The collective bargaining periods of resolution identified a 
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statistically significant relationship associated with high rates of voluntary turnover 
during these periods of time, as compared to periods of calm. When examining the 
descriptive results, it is apparent that there is considerable volatility in the voluntary 
turnover rates for this union group, and when comparing rates to periods of calm, it is 
clear that rates of turnover are higher in all but one period of resolution (in which the 
rates are the same in both periods). These results indicate that AAHP union group tends 
to use voluntary turnover as a mechanism of voice during resolution, perhaps suggesting 
that members waited to see the outcome of the bargaining process and ultimately found it 
to be unsatisfactory, encouraging them to resign (or quit) their posts. 
In addition, heating up narrowly missed being significant at a 10% level and is 
associated with higher rates of voluntary turnover during this period, as compared to 
periods of calm. The graphic representation of this data indicates many occurrences 
when heating up was associated with higher voluntary turnover rates, than noted in 
periods of calm. 
NAPE HS. The analysis indicates that the period of resolution has a statistically 
significant relationship associated with increased rates of voluntary turnover, when 
compared to periods of calm. The descriptive results reveal spikes in voluntary turnover 
rates in all four periods of resolution. When comparing rates found in the resolution 
phase with those in the calm period, rates for periods of resolution are higher than periods 
of calm, which corresponds to the results of the regression analysis. These results 
suggest that NAPE HS members tend to use voluntary turnover as a mechanism of voice 
during times when the collective bargaining period is coming to an end. 
187 
NAPE LX The period of heating up in the regression analysis showed a statistically 
significant relationship between lower rates of voluntary turnover and this period of 
collective bargaining, as compared to periods of calm. When examining the graphic 
representation of the data, there are three periods of heating up identified, however, only 
one of these periods show an increase in voluntary turnover rates, which suggests that 
this may have been an anomaly of this particular bargaining phase. 
NLNU. Resolution was identified in the analysis to have a significant result, associated 
with lower rates of turnover, as compared to periods of calm. When viewing the 
descriptive results, it is clear that during two of the three events related to resolution, 
legislated agreement occurring on April 1, 1999, and ratified agreement occurring on 
December 4, 2006, show a decrease in voluntary turnover rates when compared to rates 
within the calm periods. The other event related to resolution (ratified agreement, 
occurring on May 24, 2002) shows a slight increase in rates of turnover, compared to 
calm. These results show NLNU membership tend to use voluntary turnover as a 
mechanism of voice during particular periods associated with resolution. Since results 
are not consistent in all periods of resolution, it may be other events surrounding this 
particular period, which provide influence on union members to utilize voluntary 
turnover as a mechanism of voice. 
There were three periods within the analysis which revealed interesting findings for 
the NLNU group, including: collective agreement expired, collective agreement signed, 
and heating up, each of which were close to being associated with lower rates of 
voluntary turnover, when compared to periods of calm. In each of these periods, p< .20, 
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but is> .15, so while it is not a near miss by the definition used in the current study, 
having three findings so close to a near miss, suggests there may be something of interest 
happening. In the descriptive results, both periods where the collective agreement 
expired, had lower rates of voluntary turnover compared to periods of calm. Likewise, 
both periods where the collective agreement was signed had lower rates of voluntary 
turnover, compared to periods of calm. The three periods of heating up were associated 
with lower voluntary turnover rates; however the third heating up event had a higher rate 
ofturnover, compared to calm. 
6.5 Adverse Events 
It is important to recall that the adverse events are a proxy for performance quality, in 
this current study. The adverse events data file did not organize these events by union 
group, rather they were counted purely based on the event, or near miss, which was 
reported. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that during difficult periods between unions and 
employers, lowered performance levels were identified. Likewise, Mas (2008), found 
that machinery made during a seven-year union/employer battle, had more problems, and 
more importantly had lower resale value compared to machinery made during more 
stable periods, which was linked to lower exertion and interest on the part of employees, 
while performing required job tasks. Similarly, Kruger and Mas (2004), found during a 
two-year labor relations conflict between Bridgestone/Firestone and employees, tires 
made during this time were faulty, leading to numerous deaths and injuries. 
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Additionally, Mas (2006) found that negative collective bargaining involving police 
officers, found higher crime rates, fewer arrests, and less time spent in prison, as well as 
police officers being not as willing to help the court process after contentious collective 
bargaining. Kochan and Gobeille (1983) found that union/employer clash was shown to 
have a high negative impact upon employees desire to work hard, greatly affecting their 
workmanship during times of conflict. In comparison, Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
found that in periods of union/employer stability, workers were more efficient, and 
effective with tasks. 
Table 15: Negative Binomial Regression for Adverse Events (with p values 
located in parentheses) 
AAHP NAPEHS NAPE LX NLNU All Unions 
cb exp 1.147 1.193 1.236 0.855 1.123 
(.148) (.130) (.392) (.605) (.123) 
cb·signed 1.018 1.071 1.150 1.071 1.091 * 
(.815) (.590) (.550) (.821) (.000) 
cool off 0.937 1.057 1.127 1.145 1.081 
(.387) (.590) (.579) (.603) (.129) 
heat up 0.969 1.215* 1.178 1.034 1.112* 
(.572) (.017) (.392) (.880) (.078) 
resolved 1.020 1.221 * 1.235 0.902 1.107 
(.781) (.058) (.423) (.707) (.179) 
AAHP. The analysis identified that the period following the expiry of the collective 
agreement nearly missed being associated with higher rates of adverse events, compared 
to a period of calm, at the 10% level. During both periods represented in the descriptive 
analysis, increases in adverse events occurred, as compared to rates of adverse events in 
the periods of calm occurring throughout the data. It appears that any AAHP employees 
may utilize adverse event reporting as mechanisms of voice. 
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NAPE HS. The regression analysis identified two significant results: heating up and 
resolution, both associated with higher rates of adverse events when compared to periods 
of calm. In the descriptive analysis, when comparing the heating up periods to periods of 
calm, heating up was associated with higher rates of adverse events in one period of 
calm. In comparison, both of the periods of resolution were associated with higher rates 
of adverse events, when compared to calm. These results indicate that NAPE HS 
employees appear to use adverse events reporting as a mechanism of voice. 
In addition, there was a narrow miss of statistical significance for the collective 
agreement expired phase being associated with higher levels of adverse events, when 
compared to calm. When examining the descriptive results, three of these events 
occurred, with two showing higher rates of adverse events, when compared to calm. 
These results indicate that NAPE HS employees may utilize adverse events as a 
mechanism of voice, depending on the collective bargaining cycle and surrounding 
events. 
NAPE LX When viewing the descriptive analysis results for NAPE LX, it is clear that 
there are a number of increases and decreases in adverse events rates, related to particular 
collective bargaining events for this union group. That being said, through the regression 
analysis, there were no statistical significant relationships found, compared to periods of 
calm. Therefore, NAPE LX members do not appear to utilize adverse events as a voice 
mechanism. 
NLNU. It is important to note that nurses likely report the majority of adverse events. 
When viewing the graphs representing adverse events rates, and the collective bargaining 
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events of the NLNU, it is obvious that many spikes and decreases have occurred 
throughout the data. However, the regression analysis did not identify any statistically 
significant results for adverse events, compared to periods of calm. Therefore, it appears 
that adverse events do not appear to be influenced by the bargaining process, and that 
NLNU members do not utilize this outcome as a mechanism of voice. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter links together results from the descriptive and regression analysis, with 
supporting documentation from relevant literature sources. Findings were compared and 
contrasted, and relationships were identified based on visual findings in the graphs, as 
well as statistical significance brought forward from the regression analysis process. 
The results identify that some union members do utilize certain behaviors under study 
as mechanisms of voice, that is, as a way to announce their frustrations with the 
collective bargaining process. However, there are many instances when expected 
relationships were not clearly identified. These are interesting findings, as understanding 
the relationship and influence collective bargaining has on employee groups is extremely 
important to the overall health of a workplace. Identifying periods where increased use 
of voice mechanisms occur and identifying their relationship to the collective bargaining 
process, will further allow stakeholders to better understand the effects of workplace 
dynamics. 
Of interest is that the majority of significant findings were associated with periods of 
resolution. This is very surprising as resolution is a time when collective bargaining 
events are ending, and agreements are formed. Furthermore, these periods occur just 
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prior to the cooling off and calm periods in the collective bargaining cycle, when no 
active bargaining takes place. Obviously, based on study results, this period oftime is 
when union members show their frustration or disappointment with the negotiation 
process, or with the agreement reached. 
Likewise, the period of heating up was an identified area where a number of 
statistically significant results were identified. This is the period that builds up into the 
collective bargaining cycle, the period oftime before collective bargaining events begin. 
These results indicate that this point in the collective bargaining process may stir up 
individuals to utilize outcomes as mechanisms of voice. 
It is through this form of study when organizations can begin to identify periods of 
collective bargaining that may be more influential on their employees, thereby 
encouraging them to utilize voice mechanisms more often, including: grievance activity, 
injury reporting, absenteeism, voluntary turnover and adverse events. This endeavor can 
provide organizations with the ability to formulate clear plans, strategies and goals 
towards keeping employees motivated, eager to work, and impervious to the effects of 
collective bargaining. 
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Chapter Seven 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis examined the relationship between collective bargaining events and 
mechanisms of voice, including: grievance, injury reporting, absence, voluntary turnover, 
and adverse events. To examine these concepts, a thorough literature review was 
performed, and ethical approvals sought from the Human Investigation Committee (HIC) 
at Memorial University ofNewfoundland, and Research Proposal Approval Committee 
(RP AC) at Eastern Health, to obtain human resources data. Once all approvals were in 
place, data was obtained from Eastern Health, St. John's region, relating to the outcomes 
of interest for the four union groups, employed in acute care sectors. In addition, 
collective bargaining information was obtained from the NLHBA, relating to the unique 
collective bargaining cycles for each union group: AAHP, NAPE HS, NAPE LX, and 
NLNU. 
Data was organized in EXCEL files, and counted based on timelines created for each 
union group, based on unique collective bargaining events. These time frames varied in 
length, as they were strictly related to each collective bargaining event, specifically when 
each event began and when they ended. 
Once the data was organized, and counted, a descriptive analysis was performed to 
assess the rates of each of these events, which were then utilized to generate graphs used 
to give visual depiction of the rates of each outcome, associated with each collective 
bargaining event, per union. These descriptive results demonstrated considerable 
volatility in rates of each outcome. To clearly identify a relationship, regression analysis 
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was performed using negative binomial regression, since it is the appropriate technique to 
utilize for over dispersed count data covering variable lengths of exposure (Coxe, West & 
Aiken, 2009; Hilbe 2007; STAT A, 2003). 
Prior to doing the regression analysis, broad categories of collective bargaining events 
were developed, based on the collective bargaining events initially formulated at the 
beginning ofthe study. These broad categories helped organize the collective bargaining 
events into "themes" which facilitated the regression analysis. These broad categorical 
themes included: collective agreement expired (cb exp); collective agreement signed (cb 
signed); cooling off (cool off); heating up (heat up); resolution (resolved) and calm. Each 
ofthe main categories of collective bargaining fit into one of the five broad categories for 
the regression analysis procedure. 
Results were mixed, in that there were some clear indications where outcomes of 
interest were statistically significant, suggesting an association between voice and 
collective bargaining, while others clearly were not. Furthermore, there were several 
periods where statistical significance was narrowly missed, suggesting that with 
additional statistical power, statistical significance may have been achieved. 
Following the regression analysis, the results were ranked in order of the number of 
significant findings identified per outcome. Based on these results, the most oft used 
voice mechanism appears to be voluntary turnover, utilized by AAHP, NAPE HS and 
NLNU employees during periods of resolution, as well as by NAPE LX employees 
during heating up periods. Injury reporting and absence were next in significance, with 
injuries being reported by AAHP employees during collective agreement signed periods, 
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by NAPE HS employees during cooling off periods, and by NAPE LX employees during 
periods of resolution; absences were used by NAPE HS employees during heating up, 
and by NLNU employees during collective agreement signed and resolution. Adverse 
events were next in significance; appearing to be associated with NAPE HS employees 
during heating up and resolution periods. Grievances were last in significance, utilized 
by NAPE LX employees during resolution. 
Adverse events was a difficult outcome to assess, as the data did not provide any 
information to identify which union was related to each adverse event. However, in the 
effort to have events and near-events freely reported, this was probably a conscious 
decision to not identify specific union groups. Therefore, all results related to adverse 
events are very difficult to formulate into conclusive results. That being said, analysis 
did suggest that there was an increase in adverse events during heating up and resolution 
events, for NAPE HS employees. 
When considering the individual union groups, NAPE HS members appeared to 
utilize the outcomes most often, with five significant results revealed: injury reporting 
(during cooling off), absence (during heating up), voluntary turnover (during resolution) 
and adverse events (during heating up and resolution). It is interesting to note that they 
appear to utilize voice more often during resolution. NAPE LX and NLNU are next, 
having three significant results revealed: for NAPE LX, significant results were found 
with grievance (during resolution), injury reporting (during resolution) and voluntary 
turnover (during heating up); for NLNU, significant results were found with absence 
(during collective agreement signed and resolution) and with voluntary turnover (during 
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resolution). AAHP is last, with only two significant findings identified: injury reporting 
(during collective agreement signed) and voluntary turnover (during resolution). 
These results are quite interesting, and one might question why NAPE HS utilizes the 
majority of voice outcomes, and likewise, why AAHP utilizes the least. Part of this 
question might be answered by considering they may have differing union culture and 
individual involvement in union activity. However, there are core differences that can be 
identified between these groups, in particular with different levels of education (most of 
the AAHP members have undergraduate and many would have graduate level university 
education), pay level, employment status, and professional responsibility. As well, a key 
factor of this group is that many of AAHP members are not required to work shift work. 
That being said, the differences in these groups and reasons why they have appeared to 
utilize mechanisms of voice differently is likely to be more complex then can be 
identified within this current study. Each of the unions under study has different 
collective bargaining cycles, with differing events occurring within each cycle, lasting for 
varying lengths of time, some being more volatile than others. Therefore, further 
qualitative research into the differing culture between union groups and their response to 
collective bargaining, would help shed light on this interesting phenomenon. 
When examining the broad categories of collective bargaining, it is interesting to note 
that the majority of significant findings (in fact seven of them) occurred during periods of 
resolution, a time when settlements are reached, and the workplace milieu gradually 
returns to "normal". This is surprising, as this period of time is one, which would appear 
to be less volatile than others in the collective bargaining cycle. However, it could be a 
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reflection of dissatisfaction or disappointment with the bargaining outcome. Heating up 
was the next most oft noted broad category, with significant fmdings identified three 
times within the regression analysis. This result is less surprising as it is the period of 
time when a union is heading into a collective bargaining cycle or event, and is a "build 
up" into union involvement or activity, therefore it is a time when more volatility may be 
expected or observed. 
Another interesting finding is that many "near miss" results occurred in periods of 
cooling off (by NAPE LX members in relation to injury reporting and absence, and 
NLNU members in relation to grievance); cooling off is a time when the bargaining cycle 
has ended, and individuals (hopefully) "let go" of difficult or frustrating negotiation 
periods. These close results lend support to the idea that this period of time can be 
problematic, and members might utilize mechanisms of voice as a way to work through 
their frustrations or discontent. Collective agreement expired period is associated with 
two near missed results (by AAHP and NAPE HS members in relation to adverse events); 
this period is associated with the predetermined time when union contracts expire. 
Heating up is another period where near missed results occur (by AAHP members in 
relation to voluntary turnover). This period of time might be considered more volatile as 
employees become heightened to the build up into bargaining. The final near miss occurs 
during resolution (by NAPE HS employees in relation to injury reporting), a time when 
settlements are reached. 
There were limitations identified throughout this study. The data obtained was 
limited by the end dates for each data set, which was constrained by the timeframe that 
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the principal investigator requested its use. In particular, the absence data set was limited 
by the fact that it had been compiled for another purpose and could not be easily updated 
for the current study, and ended in 2004. Furthermore, much of the data was not gathered 
at the same point in time, which was further influenced by the transition from the old 
Health Care Corporation to the current Eastern Health organization. In addition, various 
departments and individuals within the human resources department were data holders 
for these data sets, and responsible for the collection and compilation of the information, 
with no uniform process of data collection used. 
Furthermore, the relationship between mechanisms of voice and collective bargaining 
may actually be more complex than is assumed within this study. Additionally, the 
relationship between injury reporting and the rates of adverse events delves into the 
larger issue of organizational safety, which when relating to the collective bargaining 
process, may also be more complex than can be captured with administrative data. 
Further research is needed to examine these concepts and explore their particular 
complexities to gain additional insight into these relationships. 
Further research should delve deeper into the themes identified in this current study, 
including the use of voluntary turnover being statistically significant for all unions, with 
the majority being utilized during the bargaining period of resolution. In addition, it 
would be beneficial to examine adverse events indicators once again, to try to find more 
conclusive results regarding their use during collective bargaining. 
There would be value in examining this subject matter in a qualitative and 
quantitative manner to try to investigate the degree of awareness union members have 
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about collective bargaining events, and their personal views on their use, to broaden the 
richness of information gleaned from this study. Additionally, examining the same 
relationships in a different context, within the broad public sector, including government 
and manufacturing organizations would be beneficial to identify if there are similarities 
or differences with the current study. 
Despite these limitations and observations that many phases of the bargaining cycle 
did not exhibit significant variation in voice behavior, a number of significant 
associations were found, which suggests that voice behaviors are associated with 
collective bargaining. Furthermore, many of the strongest results appear following 
resolution, suggesting that voice mechanisms are being used to express discontent, likely 
the outcome of the bargaining process and, perhaps, a lack of employment opportunities 
elsewhere. 
Results of this study are relevant to this health care organization as well as others 
similar in size and structure. Furthermore, they may be applicable to others with multiple 
union groups and levels of staff with varying education levels, responsibilities and skill 
sets, within its mix. These results indicate that organizations need to be cognizant of the 
influence that collective bargaining events have upon their employees. Perhaps more 
importantly, they need to discover ways to engage and motivate them to be loyal workers 
who are not as susceptible to the changing union/employer environment and who are 
willing to continue working at a high level of skill, regardless of the volatility of the 
negotiation cycle. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 16: AAHP: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and 
Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Table17: NAPE HS: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and 
Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Table 18: NAPE LX: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and 
Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Table 19: NLNU: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and 
Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
210 
Table 16: AAHP: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Union Start Dale End Dale Description of Collective Bargaining Event Broad Description of Collective Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse Even~ E1posure 
Bargaining Event Period 
AA1IP 9·Feb·9~ 29·Mar·9~ Opening Proposals Healing Up - - &12 (ll.IO) 3 (0.06) mowl 49 
AA1IP 3~Mar·9~ I~.Qcl-9~ Meetings Healing Up 
- -
1903 (9.l7) 24 (0.12) 2290 (11.2~) 203 
AAHP 19.0CI·9~ 17-llec-98 Concilialion Healing Up 
- -
78l (13.0~) 2(0.03) 690(11.10) 60 
AAHP I~·Dec·9~ 29·Apr·99 Meetings Healing Up 
- -
16~~ (12.69) 12 (0.09) 1419 (10.67) 133 
AAHP 30-Apr-99 27-Jun-99 MOU Signe~ Resolution - - 747 (12.66) II (0.19) 609 (IO.l2) l9 
AAHP 2~·lun·99 28·lul·99 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signe~ 
- -
377 (12.16) 0 316(1 1.48) 31 
AAHP 29-Jul-99 29·Aug·99 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
- -
3&1 (ll.l~) 3 (0.09) 312 (9.7l) 32 
AA1IP 3~Aug·99 4-Dec-00 Calm Calm 
- -
6868 (14.~7) 33 (0.07) i017 (10.~~ 462 
AAHP l·Dec.OO 14-May_~l Union Requesls Negotiations Heating Up 2(0.01) l (0.03) 3224 (19.90) ll (0.09) 1~79 (1 1.60) 162 
AAHP ll·May~l 13-Jun~l Opening Proposals Heating Up I (0.03) I (0.03) ill (17.10) 4 (0.13) 34l (ll.lO) 30 
AAHP 14-Jun~l 30-Jun~l Olllective Agreement Expire~ Collective Agreement Expired 0 I (0.0~ J33(19.l9) 3 (0.1~) 21l (12.6l) 17 
AAHP l·lui·OI l·Sep~l Healing Up Healing Up 0 l (0.07) 12&l(IW) l (0.07) 6~0 (IO.Il) 67 
AA1IP 6-Sep~l 2l-Sep~l Meetings Healing Ut 0 JlO.Il}_ 3~8 (19.40) 2 (0.10) 217 ( IO.~l) 20 
AAHP 26-Sep~l IO.Qcl~l Union Applied for Conciliation Heating Up 0 2 (0.13) 290(19.)3) I (0.07) 142 (9.47) ll 
AAHP II.Qcl-01 2~.Qcl~l Concilialion Healing Up 2 (0.11) 0 291 (l6.1n 0 176 ~.78) 18 
AAHP 29.Qcl~l 7·Feb~2 Tentative Agreement Resolution 3 (0.03) II (0.11) 1811 (1~.40) l (O.Oi) 1321 (12.9l) 102 
AA1IP 8-Fe~2 ~-Mar-02 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signed 1_(0.03) 13(0.4l) 461(16.03) 2(0.07) 339 (11.69) 29 
AA1IP 9-Mar~2 9-Apr~2 Cooling Off Cooling Off 0 4 (O.Il) 491 (ll.l4) 2(0.06) l21(10.16) 32 
AA1IP IO·Apr~2 29-Jun~ Calm Calm 12(0.02) 6~ (0.08) li235 [18.76) 3~ (O.Oi) 8113 (10.80) ~12 
AAHP 30-Jun~ 7-Jul~ Collective Agreement Expire~ Ollleclive Agreement Expired 0 I (0.13) ll8(1W) 0 117 (14.63) 8 
AAHP 8·lul~ 2l·May~5 Union Deferred Notice to Bargain Healing Up 3 (0.01) 43 (0.13) 25)0 06.J2) I IJ ~.04J 3943 [12.2l) 322 
AAHP 26-May~l 2 1·Mar~6 Oov't Served Notice lo Negotiate Healing Up 3(0.01) 22 (0.07) - 12(0.01) 3467 (1 1.56) 300 
AA1IP 22·Mar~6 6-Jul~ Negotiations Heating Up 2 (0.02) 6(0.06) 
-
)(0.05) 1332 (12.4l) 107 
AAHP 7-Jul-06 20-Aug~ Ralified Agreement Resolution I (0.02) 4 (0.09) - l (0.11) l66(12.l8) 45 
AAHP 21·AUt06 2 1·Sep~6 Collective Agreement Signe~ Collective Agreement Signe~ 0 4(0.lll - I (0.03) 404 (12.63) 32 
AAHP 22-Sep~ 12.0Ct~ Cooling Off Cooling Off 0 3 (0.10) - 0 406(13.10) 31 
AA1IP 23.Qcl~ 26-Apr-01 Calm Calm l (0.03) ~ (0.04) 
-
4(0.02) 2i31 (13.61) 186 
1 Absence data sel ends December 10, 2004 (exposure perlod;l5~, Source: NLHBA Collective Bargaining Information; AAHP HR data sel~ Eastern Health 
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Table 17: NAPE HS: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Union Start Date End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of Collective Grievance Injury Absence Turnom Adverse Exposure 
Btrgaining Event Bargaining Event Events Period 
NAPEHS l·lan·97 30.Nov·97 Calm Calm - - - ~1 (0.1~) 1~87 (5.65) 334 
NAPE HS I·Dec·97 31·Dec·97 Heating Up Heating Up - - - 5 (0.1~) 354(11.42) 31 
NAPEHS l·l&n·9~ 23·Feir98 Negotiations Heating Up 
- -
n~9(145.72l ~ (0. 15) 710(13.15) 54 
NAPEHS 24·Feir98 l ·lun·9~ Strike Notice Heating Up .. - 12957 (132.21) 47 (0.48) 1205 (12.30) 98 
NAPE HS 2·Jun·98 2·lul·98 Negotiated Settlement Resolution 
- -
36~2(118. 13) II (0.3~ 392 (12.~5) 31 
NAPE HS 3·JUI·98 3·Aug·98 Cooling Off Cooling Off 
- -
3669 (114.66) II (0.34) 338 (10.5~ 31 
NAPEHS 4·Aug·98 4·Sept.OO Calm Calm 
- -
1117% (154.31) 114 (0.28) 8214 (10.77) 1~3 
NAPEHS 5-Sept·OO 5.Qct.OO Heating Up Heating Up .. 
-
4845 (15~.29) 10 (0.~5) 332 (10.71) 31 
NAPEHS ~.Qct.OO 28·Jan.OI Opening Proposals Heating Up 9(0.08) - 15978 (138.94) 24 (0.21) 123~(10.75) 115 
NAPEHS 29·Jan.OI 5·Mar.OI Conciliation Heating Up 1~(0.50) 
-
~%5 (193.47) 1 (0.19) 47503.19) 3~ 
NAPEHS ~Mar .OJ 21·Mar.OI Strike Vote Heating Up 9(0.53) 
-
2793 (164.19) 1 (0.12) 227(13.3~ 17 
NAPE HS 23·Mar.OI 31·Mar.OI Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 1 (0.78) .. 1234fl37.11l 4(0.44) 98 (10.89) 9 
NAPEHS I·Apr.OI l·Apr.OI Strike Strike 0 I (0.20) 11b9 (155HO) 3 (0.60) 45 (9.00) 5 
NAPEHS ~Apr.OI ~May.OI Cooling off Cooling Off ~~.2~1 40 (1.29) 4997_U~I.I9) 3 (0. 10) 3~3 (11.71) 31 
NAPEHS l·May.OI 14·May.OI Negotiated Settlement Resolution 1 (0.~~) 13 (1.~3) 1292 (1~1.50) 5 (0.~3) IM (13.25) ~ 
NAPEHS 15·May.OI 5·Jun.OI MOU Signed Resolution 10(0.45) 32(1.45) 2970 (135.00) 10 (0.45) 255 (11.59) 22 
NAPEHS ~·Jun-O I 9·Jui.Ol Ratification Vote Resolution II (0.32) 4~ (1.41) 4607 (135.50) II (0.32) 40~ (11.94) 34 
NAPE HS IO.Jui.Ol IO·Aug.OI Collective Agreement Signed Collective A!feement Signed 20~.63) 41(1.28) 4412 (137.88) IO(O.JI) moo.47l 32 
. NAPEHS II·Aug.OI II·Sept.Ol Cooling Off Cooling Off 12(0.3~) 31 (o.9n 46~9 (14~.53) 1 (0.21) m(9.03J J1 
NAPEHS 12·Sept.OI 15·Jun.03 Calm Calm 530(0.~3) 1347 (2.10) 97)~9 (151.~1) 15~ (0.25) @14 (10.17) 642 
NAPEHS I~Jun-03 31.Qct.03 Union Requests Negotiations Heating Up 52(0.3~) 323 (2.J4) 1~590 (IJ4.71) 37 (O.lD 1549[11.22) 13~ 
NAPE HS I·Nov-03 9·Nov.03 Heating Up Heating Up 5 (0.5~ 1~ (1.78) 11 0~ (123.11) 2(0.22) 107 (11.~9) 9 
NAPEHS IO.Nov-03 1·Dec.03 Opening Proposals Heating Up II (0.48). 39(1.70) 3112(137.91) 3 (0.13) 295(1H3)_ 23 
NAPEHS 3·Dec.03 J4.Jan.Q4 Union wrote NLHBA to Negotiate Heating Up 1~(0.37) 91 (2.12) ~194 (144.05) 4 (0.09) 490 (11.40) 43 
NAPE HS ll·Jan-04 I~·Feb-04 Union Requests Conciliation Heating Up 210.641 73_G.2~ 5199(157.551 3 (0.09) 397 (12.03) 33 
NAPE HS JJ.feb-04 3·Mar-04 Strike Votes Start Heating Up II (0.~9) 3~ (2.3~) 25~6 (161.63) 5 (0.31) 252(15.75) I ~ 
NAPEHS 4·Mar.Q4 20·Mar.Q4 Strike Votes End Heating Up ~toAn 34 (2.00) 1635 (155.00) 3 (0.1~) 203 (11.94) 17 
NAPEHS 21·Mar.Q4 31·Mar-04 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 5 (0.45) 20 (1.~2) 1~25 (141.73) 3 (0.27) 112(10. 1~) II 
NAPEHS I·Apr-04 3·May.Q4 Strike Strike I (0.03) 14 (0.42) 5325 (161.36) 3 (0.09) 3M(9.2n 33 
NAPEHS 4-May-04 4-Jun-04 Collective Aweernent Signed Collective Agreement Signed 20(0.63) s7 (Lm 4140 (129.3~) 2 (0.06) 356(11.13) 32 
NAPEHS 5·1un-04 5·Jui.Q4 Cooling Off Cooling Off 1~{0.52) 66 (2.13) 4~66 (15~.97) II (0.3~ 351 (11.32) 31 
NAPERS ~lul-04 30·Mar.O~ Calm Calm 522(0.49)1 2160 ~.05}*1 19952 (144.5~)111 295 (0.22) 1 7~39 (13.08) 1364 
NAPEHS 31·Mar.08 30·Apr.08 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired - - - 9(0.29) 447 (14.42) 31 
*Grievance data set ends May 29,2007 (exposure period=l056) 11 lnjury data set ends March 30, 2007 (exposure perlod=IOSS) 111 Absence data set ends December 10, 2004 (exposure period=l38) 
Source: NLHBA Collectivt Bargaining Information; NAPE HS HR data stls, Eastern Health 
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Table 18: NAPE LX Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Union Start Date End Date Description of Collective Broad Description of Collective Grievance Injury Absence Turnover Adverse Exposure 
Bargaining Event Bargaining Event Event! Period 
NAPE LX 1-Jan-97 16-Jun-97 C~m c~ -
-
.. 2 (0.01) 444 (2.66) 167 
NAPE LX 17-Jun-97 17-Jul-97 Opening ProJ)OS8Js He~ingUp 
-
.. .. 0 141 (4.8~ 29 
NAPE LX 18-Jul-97 8-Mar-98 H~ingUp Heatin_gU~ - - 1590 (6.79) 4(0.02) 2566 (1 0.97) 2J4 
NAPE LX 9-Mar-98 24-Nov-98 MOUSigned Resclution -
-
5238 (20.07) 13 (0.05) 2969 (11.38) 261 
NAPE LX 25-Nov-98 25-0ec-98 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signed 
- -
656 (21.16) 3 (0.10) 327 (IO.l5) 31 
NAPE LX 26-0ec-98 26-Jan-99 Cooling Off Cooling Off .. 
-
78404.lOJ 0 346(10.8!1 32 
NAPE LX 27·Jan-99 12-0ct.OO c~ c~ .. .. 12875 (20.60) 16 (0.03) 6111 (10.15) 625 
NAPE LX 13-0ct.OO 17.()ct.00 _QjleningProposals Heating Up -
-
89Jl1.8Q)_ 0 72[14.40] 5 
NAPE LX 18-0ct.OO 24.()ct.00 Strike Str~e 
- -
1494 (213.43) 0 75 (10.71) 7 
NAPE LX 25.()ct.00 25-0ec.OO Medi~ed Return to Work Cooling Off - - 1693 (27.31) 0 641 (10.45) 62 
NAPE LX 26-0ec.OO 29-Mar-01 He~ingUp Heating Up 7 (0.07) - 2049 (21.80) 0 1152 (12.26) 94 
NAPE LX 30-Mar-01 31-Mar-01 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 0 
-
31 (15.l0) 0 12 (6.00) 2 
NAPE LX l·Apr-01 5-Apr-01 Strike Strike 0 0 1603 (320.60) 0 45 (9.00) 5 
NAPE LX 6-Apr-01 18-Jul-01 Negoti~ed Seillement Resclution 12 (0.12) 7 (0.07) 1981 (19.05) I (0.01) 1217 (11.70) 104 
NAPE LX 19-Jul-01 19-Aug-01 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Si~_ed I (0.03) 3 (0.09)_ 454 (14.19) 0 338j!O.l6) 32 
NAPE LX 20-Aug-01 20-Sept-01 Cooling Off Cooling Off 2 (0.06) 1 (0.03) 632 (19.75) 2 (0.06) 306 (9.l6) 32 
NAPE LX 21-Sept-01 6-Nov-03 Calm Calm 35(0.05) 115 ~.15} 14636 (18.84) 22 (0.03] 8439 i!0.86) 777 
NAPE LX 7-Nov-03 14-Jan-04 Opening Proposals H~ingUp 3 (0.04) 6(0.09) 1212(1W) I (0.01) 809(11.71) 69 
NAPE LX 15-Jan-04 25-Jan-04 Union Reques~ Conciliation He~ing Up 0 3 (0.27) 192 {17.45) 0 114 (10.36) II 
NAPE LX 26-Jan-04 29-Mar-04 H~ing Up Heating Up 2 (0.03) 17 (0.27) 1433 (22.39) 0 824 (12.88) 64 
NAPE LX 30-Mar-04 31-Mar-04 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 0 0 38iJ9.00J 0 2603.001 2 
NAPE LX I·Apr-04 3-May-04 Strike Strike 0 0 1085 (32.88) 0 306 (9.2~ 33 
NAPE LX 4-May-04 4-Jun-04 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signed 2(0.06) 3 (0.09) 669 (20.91) 0 356(11.13) 32 
NAPE LX 5-Jun-04 5-Jul-04 Cooling Off Cooling Off 0 3(0.10) 631 (20.55) 0 351 (11.32) 31 
NAPE LX 6-Jul-04 30-Mar-08 Calm Calm 36(0.03) 195 (0.14)1 2539 (18.40) II 45 (0.03) 17839(13.08) 1364 
NAPE LX 31-Mar-08 30-Apr-08 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 0 - - 0 447 (14.42) 31 
*Injury data set ends March 28,2007 (nposure period=1362) 11 Absence data set ends Decembu 10,2004 (exposure period=138) 
Source: NLHBA Collective Bargaining Information; NAPE LX IIR data sds, Eastern Health 
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Table 19: NLNU: Collective Bargaining Events, Associated Broad Categories and Outcomes, with Rates in Parentheses. 
Union SttrtSate End Date Deseription of Collective Bargaining Event Broad Deseription of Collective Grievance Injury Absence Turnom Adverse Exposure 
Bar2aini•e Evtnb Period 
NLNU l·lan·9l i2·lan·9l Calm Calm H H H .. H 12 
NLNU 13·Jan·9l 13·Feb-9l Collectiv~Agr_eement Signed Collective Agreement Signed H - .. .. H 32 
NLNU 14·Fe!J.9l 14·Mar·9l Cooling Off Cooling Off - H H - H 29 
NLNU ll·Mar·9l 30.[)ec.9) Calm C~m H H H - - 291 
NLNU 3J.i)ec.9) 3i·lan·9~ Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired H H - H .. 32 
NLNU I·Feb·9~ 2~·Nov·91 Heating Up Heating Up .. .. .. M(~.09) 1!3~(2.1~) 661 
NLNU 21·Nov·91 27·i)ec.97 Opening Proposals Heating Up .. - - 2(~.M) 314(12.Ml 31 
NLNU 28·!kc-91 21·lan·99 Heating Up Heating Up .. H 2%3~ (15.22) 11 (~.2~) 4173 (I 1.61) 394 
NLNU 16-Jan·99 ll·Mar·99 Stri~e Vote Heating Up H 
-
42~1 (8).1~) 1 (~.14) 611 oHn 49 
NLNU 16-Mar·99 23·Mar·99 Conciliation Heating Up H - l11(71.13) I (~. 13) 86(W.75) 8 
NLNU 24·Mar·99 31·Mar·99 Strike Strike - H 545~ (681.2)) I (~. 13) 62(1.15) 8 
NLNU I·Apr·99 I·May·99 Legislated Agreement Resolution 
- -
3)52 fl l4.lil_ I (~.~3) 293 (9.45) 31 
NLNU 2·May·99 2·Jun·99 Cooling Off Cooling Off - - 2474 (77JI) i (~.25) 33~(1~.31) 32 
NLNU 3·lun·99 4-0ct~l Calm C~m 132{~.15) 209@.2~ ~7811(19.36) 293 (~.34) 93~8(1~.9~ ill 
NLNU 5.Qct~J i4·Nov~l Opening Proposals Heating Up 23(~.1~ 5~(1.22) 2941 (71.76) 6(~. 1)) 461 (11.39) 41 
NLNU 15·Nov~l 2Heb~2 Meetings Heating Up 13 (~.11) 16~ (Ll4) 814i (78.28) 21 (~.2~) lll7 (12.66) 104 
NLNU 27·Feb~2 5·Mar~2 Conciliation Requested by Union Heating Up ~ W(l.43) 513 (81.8~) J (~.43) 76(1~.86) 1 
NLNU 6-Mar~2 23·May~2 Conciliation Heating Up )~(~.~3) 120(1.52) 6416(81.9n 2) (0.31) 811 (1034) 19 
NLNU 24·May~2 2i·Jul~2 Ratified Agreement Resolution 31 (~.l3) 95 (1.61) 44~8 (74.71) 1 (~. 11) ))6(9.41) )9 
NLNU 22·Ju1~2 22·Aug~2 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signed 17(~.53) 32 (1.00) 2352 (1l.l~) J (~.09) 24~ (7.5~) l2 
NLNU 23·Aug~2 23~ept~2 Cooling Off Cooling Off 1 (0.22) 51 (1.78) 2441 (7~.28) 9(~.28) 295 (9.22) 32 
NLNU 24·Sept~2 IO.Jun~ Calm Calm 299 (~.48) 887 (1.42) )~(8~.61) 6)_(~.1~) 7005(11.19) 626 
NLNU JJ.Jun~ 29·Jun~ Union AnnounctS Not Return to Bargain in 2004 Heating Up 6 (~.32) 23 (1.21) 1212(63.19) ~ 209 (I 1.00) 19 
NLNU 30-Jun~ 30-Jul~ Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expired 2 (~.06) )3 (1.11) lOOM (324.12) 2(~.M) 414 (1 ).29) 31 
NLNU 31·Jul~ 25·May~5 Heating up Heating Up 84 (0.28) 4~(1.64) .. 3~(~.1~) 3)86 (I 1.99) 299 
NLNU 26·May~l 23·Feb~ Government Serves Notice to Negotiate Heating Up 47(~.11) 380(1391 .. 4~ (~.1)) 3188(11.64) 274 
NLNU 24·Feb~ ll·Apr~ Opening Proposals Heating Up 2 (~.04) 11 (1.41) .. 4ill.~8J ll8 (1 JJ9) 49 
NLNU 14·Apr~ 14·May~ Meetings Heating Up I (~.03) 4~ (1.48) .. 8 (~.1~) 399 (12.87) 31 
NLNU 15·May~ 23·May~ Employer Reques~ Conciliation Heating Up ~ 9(1.00) .. I (~. 11) 121 (13.44) 9 
NLNU 24·May~ 3·Jul~ Meetings Heating Up I (~.02) 51 (1.24) - 9(~.22) 5~1 (12.22) 41 
NLNU 4·Jul~ l·Jul~ Conciliation HeatingUp ~ 3 (1.5~) 
-
~ 25 (12.1~) 2 
NLNU 6-Jul~ 22.Qct~ Final Offer Heating Up 21 (~.19) 146 (1.34) - 20~. 18}_ m3Q2.~~ 109 
NLNU 23.Qct~ 3·Dec~ Final Agreement Heating Up 14_[~.33) 44 (1.~5) .. 5 (~.12) )~1 (13.5~) 42 
NLNU 4·Dec~ 2l·Jan~1 Ratified Agreement Resolution 13(~.2)) 11 jl.36)_ " 8ill.15) 587 (11.~8) )3 
NLNU 26·Jan~1 26·Feb~7 Collective Agreement Signed Collective Agreement Signed I @.~3) 4~ (1.2)) .. 4 (~. 13) )19(16.22) 32 
NLNU 2J.Feb~1 21·Mar~1 Cooling_ Off Cooling Off ~.~1) 49 (1.~91 H 7(~.24) 471 (1~.28) 29 
NLNU 28·Mar~7 29·Jun~8 Calm Calm 4(~.1~) t ~ (1.00) tt .. 11 (~.m ~84~04.87) 4M 
NLNU 3~·lun~8 30.Jul~8 Collective Agreement Expired Collective Agreement Expued 
-
" 
.. 5(~.1~ 113 (3.6)) 31 
*Grievance data set ends May 7, 2007 (exposure period=41) **Injury data set ends Mmb 30, 21107 (expo ure period=J). Source: NLHBA CoUec~ve Bargaining Information; NLNU HR data ~tis, Eastern Hultb 
214 



